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ABSTRACT

The Republican party organized its first presidential
campaign in 1856.

The party was composed of men from a

wide variety of political backgrounds, primarily from free
soil and anti-slavery groups.

The rhetoric of this first

Republican campaign represented the efforts of these
individual speakers to reconcile their free soil arguments
with the official party platform.

Although the party was

loosely organized and poorly funded, many respected
orators participated in the campaign.
As background for the rhetorical analysis, the major
political and historical events of the decade are
identified in the first two chapters.

Bleeding Kansas,

abolitionism, and the reorganization of the major
political parties are examined for their contribution to
the rhetorical exigence of the political situation.
The analytical portion of the study first identifies
the method by which the party was organized in the period
between 1854 and 1856.

Then, the primary arguments

employed by the Republican speakers are analyzed in three
separate chapters for their logical, ethical, and
emotional forms of proof.

Individual speeches are

v

analyzed for the major form of artistic proof employed by
the speaker.

Some speakers argued for adoption of the

Republican platform on logical grounds and other men
employed emotional appeals with great skill.

Personal

credibility, mainly the eye-witness to the violence in
Kansas, was an important artistic proof in the 1856
campaign.
John C. Frfemont, the Republican presidential candidate,
did not speak publicly during the campaign.
party was represented by surrogate speakers.

Instead, the
Among these

speakers were former Barnburner Democrats, Liberty party
members, Conscience Whigs, and political abolitionists.
The rhetorical constraints posed by such a wide variety of
political coalitions justifies this type of individual
speech analysis.
The study concludes with a discussion of the
effectiveness of the rhetoric of the presidential campaign
of 1856.

Suggestions for further study are also included.

Introduction
Statement of the Problem

The success of the Republican campaign of 1856 is
difficult to measure against other national campaigns of
the era.

The immediate political challenge to the

Republican organization, James Buchanan and the Democratic
party campaign effort, was relatively well organized
throughout the nation and had access to substantial
campaign funds.

The Republicans were campaigning out of

their own pockets while devising strategy on a day-by-day
basis.

Yet, the Republicans accrued nearly one-third of

the popular vote while actively campaigning in only one
portion of the country.

Not only is that measure of

success remarkable, but it is equally significant that a
national party should emerge out of the diversity of
coalitions which struggled to control the fledgling party.
In general, American third parties have not fared well
in the political arena.

In the campaign of 1856,

the

Republicans faced the additional challenge of creating a
party out of such diverse elements as former Whigs and
abolitionists.

How were the Republicans able to marshall

the support necessary to create a new party that enjoyed

1
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such rapid success?

The procedure was complex, and m any

forces contributed to the shaping of the new party.
However, one element was the campaign oratory.

This study

is a rhetorical criticism of the Republican campaign
speaking.

Specifically, the study examines the choice of

issues used by the speakers, and the manner in which they
sought to adapt those issues to audiences.

The

investigation concludes with an evaluation of the
effectiveness of those speeches.

Methodology

The present study is offered, not as a history of the
speaking in the first Republican campaign, but rather as a
rhetorical criticism of the speeches.

As criticism, the

present investigation attempts to draw some conclusions
about the effectiveness of the campaign oratory.

The

methodology chosen for this study combines features from
Lloyd Bitzer's rhetorical situation* and a neoAristotelian approach.2

The

approach is based on the

concept that speeches create meaning as a result of a
rhetorical transaction between the audience and the text.
Consequently, the critic must first of all place the
speeches in an historical context in order to understand
the circumstances that produced the speeches

(the

rhetorical exigence, in Bitzer's terminology), the

characteristics of the audience that might affect their
reaction to the speeches, and the constraints that the
context imposed on what the speakers could or could not do
in the speeches.

It is not the intent of the study to

write a history of the period, which has been competently
provided by numerous historians, but rather to use those
histories to reconstruct the features of the historical
context necessary to understand the rhetorical situation
that produced the speeches.
However, a weakness of the rhetorical situation
methodology is that it does not lend itself well to a
criticism of the speech texts.

Therefore, in the analysis

of the speeches themselves, the study relies on a
modification of the neo-Aristotelian approach.
Specifically,

the analysis will examine the major premises

from which the speakers developed their ideas, and the
artistic proofs used to support those ideas.

The artistic

proofs consist of logical support for ideas, including
reasoning and evidence, as well as appeals to the emotions
of listeners and appeals based on the credibility of the
speaker.

The organization of the speeches will be

examined also.

However, delivery will be discussed only

in general terms, since first-hand accounts of the
speakers' delivery on specific occasions are usually not
available.

Finally, the speeches will be evaluated

against the background provided by the rhetorical
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situation in order to reach some judgments about the
effectiveness of the speeches.

Data

The primary data for this study were individual speech
texts.

Those speeches were published in the New York

daily newspapers during the campaign period.

These texts

were transcribed by trained reporters during the speech
act; so the possibility of textual error exists.

However,

since the major speaking events were attended by many
members of the press, there are usually two or more
reports of any large gathering.

Textual authenticity can

be checked by reading the various accounts of each major
speech.

None of the newspapers examined carried

challenges or corrections to any of the speech texts
included in the study.

Therefore, the texts seem to be

reliable.
In addition to the speech texts, data included the
biographies of the leading political figures of the era.
Many of these biographies included information about the
subject's speech training and physical delivery in
addition to information on speaking events.
Finally, standard histories of the period provided the
background data for reconstructing the rhetorical
situation in which the campaign took place.

wr

Some of these

works dealt in general with the pre-Civil War period in
the North and the western frontier, while others addressed
topics necessary to an understanding of the rhetorical
context of the speeches.

Organization of the Study

The first three chapters describe the rhetorical
situation.

Chapter 1 traces the history of the active

political parties from 1840 through 1854.

The breakdown

of the Whig party, the constantly shifting abolitionist
loyalties, the power struggles in the Democratic party,
and the rise of the Know-Nothings are briefly examined as
a part of the exigence which gave rise to the Republican
party.

Chapter 2 examines the issues of the 1856

campaign: the violence in Kansas and Nebraska, the
emerging sectionalism, and the abolitionist tendencies of
the radical Republicans.

Chapter 3 analyzes the

organizational structure of the party as it relates to the
rhetorical strategies and constraints of the first
Republican campaign.

In this third chapter, the

"enactment" or structural formation of the organization is
analyzed for its contribution to an understanding of
communication among campaign participants, a situation
that created rhetorical constraints for the speakers.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 analyze the speech texts.

In

order, they examine the three forms of artistic proof:
ethos, logos and pathos.

Chapter 4 focuses on the

credibility of the speakers and its effect on the campaign
rhetoric.

Chapter 5 describes the logical proof in terms

of the evidence and reasoning processes used by the
speakers to support their claims.

Chapter 6 looks at the

emotional appeals generated by the speakers.
Chapter 7 summarizes the findings and draws conclusions
about the rhetorical effectiveness of the speeches and the
significance of the campaign oratory in terms of the
future development of the Republican party.

Previous and Contributory Studies

No previous political or historical studies
specifically examine the rhetorical strategies of the 1856
Republican campaign.

However, several studies contributed

significantly to the description of the rhetorical
situation, enough as to warrant special mention.
Eric Foner, author of Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men:
The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil
W a r , 3 provided the basic framework for discussion of the

rhetorical situation which produced the speeches.
Especially with regard to the concept of the "free soil"
ideal, Foner clarified several lines of reasoning which

orators used throughout the campaign.

Allan Nevins' two-

volume work, The Ordeal of the U n i o n , was also
particularly valuable.^
Literary biographies of the leading Republican figures
of the nineteenth century provide some intellectual
insight into the motivation behind their political
affiliation.

Those works were useful in this study as a

means of identifying common themes developed by the
speakers.

Justification for the Study

Very little rhetorical research appears to have been
done in the historical period immediately predating the
American Civil War.

Although a wealth of academic inquiry

has been published concerning the inflammatory rhetoric of
the armed conflict, little has been documented with regard
to the emergent political themes in the decade predating
the outbreak of war.
Individual biographies of outspoken politicians, both
North and South, dominate the literature.

The southern

"fire eaters" and the northern abolitionist protesters
have been examined exhaustively.

Yet, the political

activism of the mid-1850's provided the catalytic force
which arrayed the country against itself.
done?

How was it

A study of the rhetoric of the first Republican
campaign is a logical starting place for analysis.

The

national party did not exist prior to 1856, yet it ran a
successful contest against a larger, wealthier, better
organized political entity.

Party spokesmen were

responsible for uniting the North and West against the
powerful Democratic party, against the entire South, and
against the nativist American party.

With limited funding

and reliance on public speaking and the newspapers to
reach the masses, the Republicans successfully united
nearly one-third of the nation in a brief four-month
period during which an explosive internal crisis removed
many of their most brilliant speakers to Washington, D.C.,
to deliberate in a special session.
An examination of the speeches of the 1856 campaign may
provide a useful supplement to the political and
historical analyses of the Pre-Civil War era.

It may be

that the rhetoric of the first Republicans contains a key
to understanding the sectional re-alignment of politics
prior to the conflict.

However, the particular aim of

this study is to determine the rhetorical strategies
employed by an emergent political party in its efforts to
unify a diversity of political ideologies in a turbulent
historical setting.
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Chapter 1
Anti-Slavery Politics - 1840-1854

1854 was a year characterized by physical violence.
From the floor of the Senate to the plains of Kansas,
bloodshed often resulted as politicians clashed.

This

escalating violence provided an "imperative stimulus," or
exigence, which, according to Lloyd Bitzer's situational
method of rhetorical analysis, is a necessary component of
any rhetorical situation.1

Situational exigence may be

defined as the actual or potential urgency of some
imperfection which may be modified only through discourse.
However, the Republican speakers faced serious
rhetorical constraints.

Four major constraints, or

situational limitations on the speaker's ability to engage
in successful discourse, are examined in the first four
chapters of this study.

In this first chapter, the major

political coalitions of 1840-1854 are examined for their
influence on the rhetoric of the Republican campaign.
The major campaign issue in 1856 was the repeal of the
Missouri Compromise.

Northerners were angry about the

extension of slavery into the new territories of Kansas
and Nebraska.

Southerners were defensive about the

northern resistance to the use of slaves in the prime,
western farming regions.

These sectional attitudes
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further divided the political parties during the years
between 1840 and the Civil War, but each party drew new
strength from its sectional realignment.
The major parties were split by powerful factions and
coalitions throughout the twenty years that preceded the
Civil War.
1852.

The Whig party was essentially powerless by

Third parties regularly formed and disbanded with

each presidential election from 1840 through 1852.

Many

of the new parties represented abolitionist or free soil
interests.

The Democrats faced serious internal sectional

conflicts between 1852 and 1856.
The Democrats were split by the (radical) Barnburner
faction in 1844, the Southern Rights Party
Calhoun)

(under John C.

in 1846, and the Free Soilers in 1848.

The

Conscience Whigs emerged as a faction within the Whig
party in 1845.

Even the Liberty party, formed in 1840 to

promote abolition and free soil territories, was split in
1844 by Salmon P. Chase and his coalitionists.
However, throughout this era of political realignment,
the radical factions remained within their parties.

Party

loyalty superseded sectional identification until the
1850s.

Radical Whig and Democratic party members did not

form new parties.

Instead, they attempted to purge

perceived ideological inconsistencies within their
respective parties.

The factions reflected a desire to

return to earlier, more basic political issues, to
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redefine the ideological differences which characterized
the formative era of each party. Coalitions did not form
across party lines until after 1850.

When the Compromise

of 1850 made the extension of slavery a regional rather
than a party issue, concerned men of all parties began to
plan for a national, anti-slavery coalition.
This chapter reviews three political developments
during the twenty years which preceded the presidential
campaign of 1856. First, the abolitionist societies of
1839-1850 are analyzed for their contribution to the
political status of the anti-slavery movement.

This

examination demonstrates the predisposition of the New
England and Western Reserve regions to support anti
slavery activities, a major factor in the success of the
Republican campaign of 1856.

The movement for the

abolition of slavery reached its apex as an anti-slavery
political movement in 1856, when the Republican party
drafted a radical, anti-expansionist platform at .its
inaugural convention.
Second, this chapter reviews the political events
surrounding President John Tyler's bid for the annexation
of Texas as a slave state and its impact on the Democratic
and Whig parties.

Although a member of neither major

political party, Tyler initiated a political issue which
resulted in the sectional realignment of American politics
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and the loss of all support in his renomination bid in
1844.
Third, this chapter reviews the changes within each
political party that resulted from the internal divisions
over the expansion issue.

These structural realignments

occurred in every party, directly relating to the
formation of the Republican party in 1854.

The major

coalitions that became the nucleus of the Republican
organization are analyzed for their rhetorical strategies
and fantasy themes that carried over into the 1856
campaign.

The variety of political experience its charter

members brought to the Republican party was broad, but the
variety also provided the vitality and met the exigence of
the inflammatory political situation.

American Antislavery Societies

American antislavery and manumission societies predated
the Revolution and remained active throughout the
eighteenth centu r y . 2

The Pennsylvania Abolition Society,

for example, was founded by Benjamin Franklin in 1 7 0 9 ^ and
Philadelphia retained its pre-eminence as a center for
abolitionist activities throughout the Civil War era.
The New York City Manumission Society was formed in
1785,4 ana New England fostered abolitionists among many
of the leading political families.

The most persistent
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abolitionists were the Quakers, whose active involvement
in behalf of enslaved Africans began in the late
seventeenth century.

However, the founding of the

American Anti-Slavery Society in December of 1833 marked
the true organizational thrust of the movement.5

The

Society was founded in Boston, Massachusetts, by William
Lloyd Garrison.

It was a strange ideological mixture,

being anti-political and anti-ecclesiastical.

Garrison

would brook no compromise.
Garrison demanded immediate emancipation.

His views

were widely known outside of abolition circles, since he
was a prolific writer and a well-traveled speaker.®

He

elicited extreme reactions from his audiences - he was
hailed either as a messiah of emancipation or a raving
zealot. By 1835, his influence was most prevalent in those
churches where individual ministers enjoyed the freedom to
rail against the moral evils of slavery by using
Garrison's arguments.7

However, many of the organized

religions did not support formally any type of abolition.
The mob violence that often greeted Garrison and other
abolitionist speakers was condemned by religious leaders.
David Christy, author of Pulpit Politics, recorded the
deliberations of the national Baptist, Methodist,
Presbyterian, and Catholic councils, which discussed
abolition during the pre-Civil War era.®

Religious

leaders preferred to advocate a non-violent end to
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bondage,

leaving the means of effecting manumission to the

politicians.
For a variety of reasons, political leaders shied away
from supporting Garrison's program of immediate abolition.
The breakdown of law and order that accompanied
abolitionist gatherings was one reason, but the influence
of the southern politicians in Congress was probably the
most important reason. Pressure from commercial interests,
especially those northern concerns carrying substantial
southern industrial accounts, contributed to the political
expediency of re-establishing law and order rather than
pressing for an end to slavery.®

Garrison's radical

tactics were an impediment to accomplishing a political
solution to the slavery issue during the 1830s.
By the end of the decade, Garrison had embraced women's
suffrage and a form of "Christian anarchy," ideas so
extreme that conservative abolitionists were alienated
from his o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e

schism between Garrison and

the conservatives resulted in the breakdown of the
American Anti-Slavery Society in 1840.
In 1839, a religious abolitionist group was organized
by Lewis Tappan.*1

This American and Foreign Anti-

Slavery Society first met in New York City, sharing
pulpits with sympathetic ministers throughout the city.
Tappan's group suggested that slavery must be abolished
through legal means, that is, the slave states
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themselves, had to remove slavery from their own
constitutions.

This voluntary constitutional abolition of

slavery would be morally preferable to having such
legislation forced upon them by Congress.*2

Members of

the group encouraged the slave states to pursue
educational programs designed to prepare the slaves for
their lives of freedom.
to failure.

Geography doomed Tappan's group

Their rhetoric was successful in recruiting

sympathetic northern churchgoers to the abolitionist
ideals, but the pulpits of southern churches were closed
to society members.

The society was preaching to the

converted, not to those who needed conversion.13
Tappan's strategy was to apply internal pressure on the
major organized religions, especially the Presbyterians,
the Methodists, and the Baptists.

However, these groups

were no more receptive to Tappan's abolitionists than were
the political party leaders to Garrison's followers.
Tappan's program was too radical to interest the large,
conservative organizations— especially those with large
southern memberships.

Influential southern church members

would hardly support a policy of abolition even if
endorsed by its denominational leadership, making churchsanctioned abolition an inexpedient national policy.
Without the support of the major churches, the society
remained little more than a loose network of local groups.
Members had control over some newspapers, providing a
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propaganda outlet.

However, the society was essentially a

nondenominational religious group that was unattractive to
both organized religion and the major political parties.
The transition from pulpit to politics began in 1840.*4
Popular interest in the abolition of slavery became a
potent political force, especially in New England where
the fugitive slave laws were ignored or brashly, openly
broken whenever possible.

Campaigning politicians could

no longer ignore the issue in the northeastern United
States, since their constituents demanded that action be
taken against the new, stronger fugitive slave laws.
Political abolition failed as a moral issue, but abolition
as a popular sovereignty issue had political significance.
Some abolitionists had been elected to local and state
offices in the northeast.15

These men began to question

publicly the constitutionality of the laws surrounding the
practice of slavery, particularly the fugitive slave laws
and the gag rule that bound Congress.
As an example, John Quincy Adams spent years fighting
against the First Amendment violations that resulted from
Congressional legislation favorable to the slavery
interests.

Adams was the popularly acknowledged spokesman

of the anti-slavery politicians who served in the House
during the 1830s and 1840s.*6

Adams was neither an

abolitionist nor the catalyst for the politicalization of
abolition.

In fact, he published an "indictment" against

the American Anti-Slavery Society in 1839.1^ His
indictment was inspired by the internal conflict that
characterized the society and undermined its credibility
with the people it sought to persuade at a time when Adams
was trying to secure the congressional right of petition
for abolitionists.
Adams was not interested in the abolitionists per se.
He was a strict constitutionalist who was horrified at the
Pinckney resolutions that were in effect in Congress.
These resolutions were a series of increasingly severe
restrictions on the introduction of anti-slavery petitions
to Congress.

The resolutions demanded, in essence, that

all anti-slavery petitions introduced to the House be
automatically tabled without being read, printed or
referenced in any fashion.18
Adams protested that the "gag rule" not only violated
the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech, but
that it set a dangerous precedent.

If the "gag rule"

could be enforced, then the precedent existed to introduce
and enforce other rules which violated Constitutional
guarantees. His popular image as the anti-slavery
spokesman resulted from his courage in testing the
strength of the resolutions.

On January 9, 1837, Adams

attempted to read a petition protesting slavery in the
District of Columbia into the daily proceedings of the
House.

His fellow representatives shouted him down,
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refusing to allow him to read the petition. On January 18,
only nine days after his abortive attempt to petition an
end to slavery in the District, the gag rule was renewed
by a large majority.!9
The Pinckney resolutions and their support by the
southern members of Congress and some northern
conservatives helped to focus northern attention on the
"unified" southern voting block that had evolved in
Congress.

This first experience with sectionalism would

become very important in the 1850s.

Annexation of Texas

Anti-slavery legislation was not a major political
issue in the early 1840s, in spite of John Quincy Adams'
dramatic attempts to break the gag rule.

However, John

Tyler's proposal to annex Texas as a slave state prodded
politicians to weigh the ramifications of slavery as a
party issue in 1844.
John Tyler succeeded to the presidency in 1841 upon the
death of Benjamin Harrison.

Although he was elected as a

member of the Whig party, Tyler disengaged himself from
the Whigs early in his administration by vetoing a number
of economic bills that were critical to the Whig program
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begun by Harrison.20

^s a result of his unpopular action,

Tyler was formally "read out" of the Whig party and the
entire cabinet resigned.21
Tyler promptly presented the names of his new cabinet
officers to the Senate for confirmation.

The new

President was already meeting regularly with his new
cabinet in September of 1841.22

a result, Abel P.

Upsher, who replaced Daniel Webster as Secretary of State,
was instructed to b'jgin immediate negotiations for the
annexation of Texas.
Tyler's reasons for immediate annexation seemed clear
to experienced politicians like Adams. Adams revealed in
his correspondence that he expected most of Tyler'a
presidential actions to be directed at securing reelection in 1844.

Tyler, a president without a party,

needed an issue with which to secure a nomination from a
sympathetic political organization.

Adams recorded with

great interest the furor created over the annexation issue
and the subsequent activities of Tyler in his quest for
the 1844 nomination.23
The annexation proposal reached the Senate in the
spring of 1844.

Essentially, the measure was supported by

the Democrats, a party in need of an issue to spur
reorganization and re-vitalization.

The more conservative

Whigs, notoriously anti-expansionist, were firmly opposed
to annexing Texas. Tyler forced the annexation issue onto
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Congress as the national conventions readied to select
candidates for the fall elections.
The Democrats split into two major factions, aligning
sectionally on the annexation issue.

Their compromise

candidate was James K. Polk, who was subsequently elected
to succeed Tyler.

The Whigs were equally divided, and the

moderate, Henry Clay, won the Whig nomination.

The

Liberty party fielded an abolitionist candidate, James G.
Birney, who helped to split the popular vote.

Political

factions outlasted the 1844 election. Factions that grew
out of the sectional annexation issue continued to agitate
from within each party.

The possibility of a political

minority winning control of the government, an issue
addressed by William H. Seward in later campaigns, was
already evident in the 1844 campaign.

Political Coalitions from 1844-1848

The Republican party drew members from three major
factions that were active throughout the 1840s and 1850s:
the Liberty party, the Conscience Whigs, and the
Democratic party.
The Liberty party held a national convention in June,
1845.24

The convention was designed to bring together any

individuals, regardless of party affiliation, who were
interested in the abolition of slavery.

The convention,
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which could be described as a large rally, was held in
Columbus, Ohio, which was a fitting location.

The

American midwest prided itself on being a seat of antislavery, anti-expansion activism.25

Most of the emigrants

to the frontier states of Michigan, Wisconsin, Ohio,
Illinois, and Indiana were from the northeast.

They

brought with them their anti-slavery sentiments, which
were enhanced by the abuses fostered by the corrupt
legislative processes in Kansas.

According to Theodore

Clark Smith, author of The Liberty and Free Soil Pa r t i e s ,
political anti-slavery agitation became an everyday issue
on the frontier, a situation that explains the brief
success of the Liberty party.
The proposed annexation of Texas spurred the formation
of the Liberty

p a r t y .
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Western Whigs were disappointed

in Tyler's presidency, and the idea of an anti-slavery
party became viable.

Men eager to stop the spread of

slavery had been meeting to support candidates whose
principles reflected the anti-slavery sentiments of the
Western Reserve, regardless of party affiliation.

Ohio

was the first state to put forth a convention call in
1840.27

Resolutions calling for candidates not affiliated

with either of the established parties were passed.
Indiana followed with a state convention in December,
1840, which also called for the nomination of candidates
who were independent of the Whig and Democratic p a r t i e s . 28
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State by state, the mid-west organized to support anti
slavery candidates.

A formal

organization was not yet in

place.
The Liberty party was dedicated to the abolition of
slavery.

As the political outgrowth of the American and

Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, the party continued to rely
upon evangelical oratory as a means of encouraging
legislative action toward the eradication of slavery.39
On May 12, 1841, the first national Liberty party
convention was held in New York City.30

a

slate of

candidates for the presidential campaign of 1844 was
chosen.

James G. Birney of Michigan was nominated for

President and Thomas Morris of Ohio was the VicePresidential nominee.

Both men were active abolitionists

and perennial political candidates from the Western
Reserve. Morris dropped out of the contest in 1843 when he
determined that the cross-section of new Liberty party
members included a great many men of considerable national
political experience.

He withdrew from the race, claiming

that a candidate of greater significance than himself
should be encouraged to run.

The East, however,

remained the center of anti-slavery activity.

Members of

the Liberty party met in 1843 to plan the strategy for the
upcoming national campaign.
Buffalo, New

Y o r k .
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a

The meeting was held in

platform was devised to reflect

the anti-slavery views of the party, and Morris was
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successfully pressed to accept the vice-presidential
nomination in spite of his reasons for withdrawal.

The

party entered into the contest of 1844 with enthusiasm.
The party strategists were enthusiastic, but neither
cautious nor politically experienced.

The Whigs

approached the Liberty party with coalition offers which
would have provided for a Texas compromise. The Whig
candidate for President was Henry Clay, a man whose
reputation sparked libelous editorials in the Liberty
press and slanderous rhetoric from Liberty candidates.
The Whigs could effect no compromise with the Liberty
party because of their nomination of

C l a y .
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Henry Clay,

with his pro-slavery background, was an unacceptable
candidate to the anti-slavery politicians.

They referred

to Clay as a "man-stealer," a gambler, and a duelist.
The Liberty Party's credibility with potential voters
was sorely shaken when it was revealed that the Democratic
party had been behind B i rney’s nomination for a seat in
the Michigan legislature.3 3

The Whigs immediately assumed

that the Liberty party and the Democrats were working
together to undermine Whig candidates.
explanation.

Birney had no

He merely announced that his nomination and

subsequent election to the state legislature was a mandate
from the people of Michigan, not the result of political
manipulation.34

The Liberty party presidential drive fell

apart. Joshua Giddings and other influential anti-slavery

politicians questioned the loyalty and the motives of
Birney and his supporters.

The questions intrigued the

press as well as the political community, causing the
Liberty party to founder in its membership
Polk won the 1844 election.

r e c r u i t m e n t . 35

The Liberty party helped

to split the votes, giving Polk a plurality.

The Whigs

were unable to forgive the Liberty party for the defeat of
their candidate, Henry Clay.
The major problem faced by the Liberty party in 1844
was its lack of organization.

The party was formed to

support anti-slavery candidates. It had no specific
internal structure nor did it have an organizational
hierarchy.

However, between the elections of 1844 and

1848, Salmon P. Chase took charge of the party and gave it
political direction.
By 1848, the Liberty party harbored three distinct
factions: the Chase people, who were primarily ex-Whigs
and politically experienced; the Birney supporters, who
embraced a full reform platform including woman suffrage
and prison reform; and the pure abolitionists.36
Although the antislavery Whigs and Democrats professed
alarm at their party nominees in 1848, many were afraid to
join the anti-slavery fight as members of the Liberty
party, since the party was popularly linked to
abolitionism and its attendant violence.

However, Chase

was committed to bringing Whigs and Democrats into the
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Liberty party through coalitions favorable to all freesoil interests. His opportunity arose when the Democratic
platform of 1848 forced the antislavery Democrats to call
a separate convention. These regional divisions were new
to American politics of the mid-nineteenth century.

Until

the Texas annexation issue arose to align voters on a
North-South basis, party loyalty had transcended
g e o g r a p h y .
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whigs voted as Whigs, regardless of their

state of residence.
lines.38

Democrats also voted across regional

prior to the 1850s, few issues carried the

sectional ramifications that characterized the political
extension of slavery.
The Democrats had a history of disagreement over
slavery.

In 1844, the party split on the annexation

issue, with the southern Democrats supporting the
annexation of Texas while Van Buren's "Barnburner" faction
remained adamantly opposed.

Ideologically, the

Barnburners felt that any form of bondage compromised the
ability of both the slave and the slave owner to function
as individuals.

The independent individual was the basis

of any republican system of government, according to the
Democratic anti-slavery faction.39

The faction adopted

their own version of collective responsibility, which was
the necessity of a republican society to police the
activities of its members to insure the greatest amount of
freedom for each member.

This necessity functioned as its

rationale for opposing the extension of slavery into the
territories. Barnburners identified slavery with
corruption, claiming that the wealthy, powerful members of
the South held the balance of power in the party,
corrupting the republican ideals upon which the party had
been

founded.
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The appellation, "Barnburners," arose

from the violence of their convictions, inviting
comparison with the crazed farmer who burned down his barn
to rid the building of rats.41
These radical Democrats were not abolitionists.
According to the definitions provided by Frederick Blue,
"antislavery" identified any or all aspects of the
political opposition to slavery (from non-expansion to
immediate abolition) whereas "abolition" was the moral
opposition to

s l a v e r y .
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The Barnburner Democrats, while

loyal to the principles of their party in 1844, were also
separated from the majority of party members by that
loyalty. Van Buren and his faction felt that the southern
Democrats were violating party loyalty and splitting the
membership along sectional lines by their enthusiastic
endorsement of the annexation of Texas.
Conversely, the southern Democrats were uneasy about
the strong, vocal northeastern coalition, which was
strongly entrenched in New York state machine politics.43
This coalition had control of a powerful organization in
New York and was a considerable threat to the survival of
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the party.

The rift widened as the nominating conventions

approached in the spring of 1844.

Democrats were split on

the spread of slavery and the party was forcing the issue
with its platform of territorial expansion.
According to Mark Berger, the roots of national
Democratic discord can be traced directly to New York
State politics. From 1844 until the Compromise of 1850,
the party split into smaller and smaller f a c t i o n s . V a n
Buren's "Barnburners," the radical faction of the party,
were arrayed against the "Hunkers," or the conservative
element.

Although the two factions were not new to the

party, the anti-slavery agitation forced the party members
to chose sides.

Southern Democrats and the Hunkers were

the ideological enemies of the Barnburners and the free
soil adherents.
In 1849, the more moderate Hunkers, referred to as
"Soft Shells" or "Softs," aligned with the Barnburner
(radical)

faction as anti-expansionists.

"Hard Shells" or

"Adamantines," who were northern Hunkers committed to the
national expansionist program of the Democratic party,
continued to support the southern Democrats.^5
The Whig party experienced a similar split in 1844.
Charles Sumner was the spiritual leader of the anti
expansionist Conscience Whigs.

The Conscience Whigs

represented another regional division, much like the
Barnburners in the Democratic party.

The Conscience Whigs

were a strong, northeastern faction that enjoyed the
support of Joshua Giddings and the active Western Reserve
movement against expansion .46
Abolitionist Joshua Reed Giddings of Ohio supplied the
ideology for the Conscience Whig faction. Giddings
resigned his Congressional seat in 1840 when fellow Whigs
condemned him for violating the "gag rule" in order to
introduce anti-slavery legislation.4 ?

He was immediately

elected to the same seat, where he represented the anti
slavery radicals of Ohio - an election which resulted in
landslide returns for Giddings.48
Giddings* political vision focused on the efforts of
free men who would create an effective government by
working together for the good of all m en.4®

His version

of national collective responsibility was enthusiastically
embraced by the Conscience Whigs.68

Giddings was able to

justify internal improvements, a perennial plank in any
Whig platform, by reasoning that highway and canal
construction throughout the nation would assist the
movement of progressive ideas as routes of travel
i m p r o v e d . R e p u b l i c a n rhetorical strategists would
argue in 1856 that industrial and agricultural progress in
the South, patterned on the northern industries, was the
responsibility of the administration. And they argued that
only a Republican administration could be entrusted to
enforce the necessary measures to promote southern
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progress.

The Conscience Whigs were prepared with a moral

argument against slavery, too.

They felt that the slave

was trapped in a civil caste system which rendered him
unable to assume responsibility for his actions.

This

violation of the Jeffersonian principles of republicanism
was perceived as an affront to the northern anti
expansionists of both major parties, since any
governmental system which condoned slavery could be
neither republican nor self-regulatory.52
The only major difference between the Democratic and
Whig anti-expansionist factions was the insistence by the
Whigs that slavery must be eradicated, not merely
contained within its pre-existing boundaries.

This

position of the Conscience Whigs was politically
expedient. The Conscience Whigs depended heavily on the
abolition vote in 1844 when

clashing with the Liberty

party for the antislavery vote.
Prior to 1844, the Liberty party balked at forming
coalitions with either the Conscience Whigs or the
barnburner Democrats.

From 1840 until early 1844, the

Liberty leadership actively disdained a national
organization, relying instead upon a loosely-formed
network of state groups.

By mid-1844, Salmon P. Chase was

guiding the party with greater political sophistication.
Chase actively encouraged coalitions with sympathetic
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Whigs and Democrats in order to protest more effectively
annexation and the extension of slavery.
Before Chase assumed leadership of the party, Liberty
party members focused their activities on educating
potential voters about the political and social problems
posed by slavery.

The speakers used an indirect,

expository approach, voter education, as a means of
persuading the audience to vote in favor of anti-slavery
legislation.

Their expository approach to political

activism persuaded few independent voters to support the
party in 1840.

In 1845, Salmon Chase convinced the

disorganized remnants of the Liberty party to sponsor a
coalition convention in 1845 in order to unite all
factions that supported antislavery legislation.

Political Coalitions 1848-1852

The Chase-sponsored convention in Columbus was intended
to encourage Barnburners and Whigs to leave their
respective parties and join with the antislavery
coa l i t i o n .

53

However, the Liberty party was too closely

associated with abolition in 1845 for a successful
coalition of the major parties to occur.

It was not until

June of 1848 that the Barnburner Democrats and the
Conscience Whigs bolted their respective parties and held
separate conventions.54
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The Democratic platform for the 1848 presidential
election incensed the New York Radicals.55

The

Barnburners withdrew from the convention and met in Utica,
New York, where they nominated Martin Van Buren for the
P r e s i d e n c y .56

The gathering was attended by delegates

from outside of New York who were equally unhappy with the
official expansionist platform of the Democratic party and
Lewis Cass, the Democratic nominee for P r e s i d e n t . 57
Worcester, Massachusetts, was the site of the
Conscience Whig convention.

The Whigs nominated no

candidate, but they organized a central committee to plan
a new party. A formal protest against the candidacy of
Zachary Taylor completed the official radical Whig
business of 1848.
The organizational ambivalence of the Conscience Whigs
ended in August of 1848.

They met in convention with

other free-soil advocates in Buffalo, New York, on August
9, 1848.58

Earlier in the summer, Ohio, Indiana,

Michigan, and Illinois held state conventions to elect
delegates to the New York Free Soil convention. This
convention was not sanctioned by the Liberty party.

Since

the free-soil factions of other established political
parties were limited to securing non-extension of slavery
rather than abolition, the Liberty party officially
condemned the Buffalo convention. This posture was
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consistent with the party's history of discouraging
coalitions and compromises.
Four major free-soil groups attended.

An "unofficial"

contingent of Liberty men arrived, nominally headed by
John P. Hale of New Hampshire. The Conscience Whigs,
including Joshua Giddings, Charles Sumner, and Charles
Francis Adams
gathering.

(son of John Quincy A d a m s ) , hosted the

The Democrats were of two sorts: the "Free

Soil" contingent, which wanted to support the nomination
of Cass but pressured him to support free soil principles
and the Barnburners, who were the most fully organized and
arrived with a presidential nominee in tow.59
A Barnburner-Liberty coalition resulted. The
Barnburners provided the strong candidate, Van Buren, and
the Liberty strategists provided the p l a t f o r m . T h e
fifteen-item platform had eleven anti-slavery planks,
three internal improvement planks, and a single economic
plank.

The party motto was "Free Soil, Free Speech, Free

Labor, Free Men."

Van Buren was unanimously nominated for

the Presidency and Charles Francis Adams was pressed to
accept the vice-presidential nomination.
Eastern Conscience Whigs were unhappy with Van Buren
because he was a Democrat and the Free Soil Democrats were
unhappy with Van Buren because he was not Cass, but the
remaining body of delegates emerged from the convention as
the Free Soil party.®1

The Liberty party was absorbed by
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the new Free Soil party, many Conscience Whigs remained
active with the Whig party, and the Free Soil Democrats
disappeared as a faction under that name. The Free Soilers
captured approximately ten percent of the popular vote in
1848, in spite of their precipitous formation.62
In his book, The Force of Fantasy: Restoring the
American D r e a m , Ernest Bormann postulates that it was the
free soil fantasy theme which united the various
abolitionist factions.63

Northern voters, weary of anti

slavery moralizing and frustrated by the lack of a
political solution to slavery, were eager to embrace the
free soil issue.

Free soil politics were finite; specific

legislation was needed and sides were clearly drawn.
"Saving" the territories would be a symbolic blow to
slavery and the perceived southern political domination.
The free soil concept appealed to many of the Whigs and
Democrats who were not abolitionists but were in need of a
vital, new issue to sustain their interest in national
politics.

Many voters found the salvation theme equally

appealing, especially as an alternative to the hackneyed
economic issues that dominated earlier campaigns.64
The 1848 canvass exposed some voting patterns that
foreshadowed the organizational problems facing the major
parties in 1852 and 1856.

The Free-Soilers split the vote

in New York and Pennsylvania, both critical Democratic
strongholds that would later plague Republican

strategists.

Zachary Taylor, the Whig nominee, swept the

country, winning in every region except the West, but he
won by a much smaller proportion of the popular vote than
expected.®®

Although Taylor's popular total included

votes cast in the new states of Wisconsin and Iowa, the
lower overall number of votes was an indication of the
lack of enthusiasm evidenced by the voters of this
particular election.®®

The Whig vote all over New England

declined significantly, with nearly 46,000 Whigs simply
not voting at all.®7
The Democrats drew a similar apathetic voter response.
The proportion of Democratic votes declined throughout New
England, the mid-Atlantic, and the northeast.®8

Even in

those southern states recording Democratic victories, the
overall vote declined up to sixteen percent.®8

The

decline in voter enthusiasm can be attributed to the lack
of clear-cut issues represented by the major candidates.
Cass was neither openly in favor of the Wilmot proviso,
nor openly sympathetic to southern interests, so he lost
considerable support in the North and the South.

Taylor

expressed sympathy with southern interests and was once a
slave holder himself, yet he was perceived as the
candidate of "lesser evil" by the non-slave holding
voters.70
Both major parties were shaken by the decline of voter
participation and the strength of the Free-Soil showing in
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1848.

Yet, the Free-Soil party all but disbanded

following the election.

The various factions made

attempts to re-unite with their respective parties,
searching for ways to resolve harmoniously the worrisome
sectional issues.71

The radical factions of the

Democratic and Whig parties were intent on purifying their
parties, not destroying them.

Bormann refers to their re

union attempts as a "restoration drama," noting that "the
successful reform effort [requires]

first a restoration of

society to its original foundations." 7 2

The Conscience

Whigs and the radical Democrats still identified with
their respective societies, the Whig party and the
Democratic party.

Political Parties to 1852

With the election of 1852, the Whig party
disintegrated.7 ^

There were no significant issues to

differentiate the major parties.

Both the Whigs and the

Democrats> favored acceptance of the Compromise of 1850,
which would effectively eliminate slavery as a political
issue.

Some politicians spoke in favor of allowing each

territory to decide the slavery question itself.

The

most significant political change affecting the parties in
1852 was the new provision for the direct popular election
of local and state officials in many of those states
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undergoing constitutional

re f o r m .

^4

Patronage, or the

appointment of public servants by elected officials, was
in the process of being legislated out of existence at the
state level. Local candidates focused popular resentment
on national leaders, blaming the party leaders for the
nation's ills.

Local men tried to divorce themselves from

the patronage, now an unpopular political association, by
declaring their allegiance to home-town or state groups.
This tactic further weakened support for the Whig and
Democratic parties and paved the way for more independent
political activity.

Without patronage, political

candidates would rely more heavily on emotional issues
rather than the promise of direct reward in order to
inflame the voting public to action at the polls.

In

general, the Democrats favored constitutional reform, a
stance that strengthened their numbers.7 5

The Whigs

resisted change, protesting many of the reforms.

Their

popular support declined significantly in reform states.
In spite of a search for fresh, vital issues in order
to spark voter participation in the 1852 election, it was
essentially a no-issue contest.

The two major parties

agreed on the Compromise and the territorial issue.
extension of slavery was not mentioned.

The

The election was

reduced to a popularity contest between Winfield Scott and
Franklin Pierce.
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Scott, the Whig nominee, was not popular with the
southern Whigs.

They protested his candidacy by either

declining to vote or voting across party lines. 76
Northern Whig strategists actively sought the new and
numerous Catholic vote, alienating the anti-Catholic and
nativist factions within the party. Since Scott had a
public record as an anti-immigrationist, few votes were
cast in his favor by the Catholic and immigrant voters.
Pierce was a compromise candidate from the North.
platform included acceptance of the Compromise.
campaign was conducted quietly.77

His

His

The free soil faction

ran John P. Hale for the presidency, but support for
H a l e ’s candidacy was lacking from important anti-slavery
leaders such as Giddings, Adams, Sumner, and Chase.7 ®

Summary

By 1850, national politics had changed dramatically.
Sectionalism fragmented the major national parties;
ideological lines had been crossed;

traditional issues

were resolved or tacitly tabled; and public confidence in
party leadership had eroded.
Even the economic issues that had sustained the Whigs
throughout their brief history were resolved.

The gold

rush and the flood of hard currency into the marketplace
erased the urgent economic and tariff issues that had been
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the mainstay of Whig platforms.

With the overwhelming

defeat of Zachary Scott, and no issues to sustain it, the
Whig party collapsed.

Scott's candidacy had alienated the

southern Whigs, the northern Conscience Whigs, and the
immigrant vote.
Special interest splinter parties were active in
splitting the vote and confusing loyalties.

Among the

most vocal were the prohibitionists and the antiCatholics.79

The low popular vote recorded in 1852

reflected the apathy and confusion within the general
population.

National issues and party loyalty were ebbing

away.®0
The Democratic party was also in flux.

Franklin Pierce

attempted to appease all of the factions within his party
by appointing key party members to important patronage
positions throughout the country.
Cabinet,

His "conglomerate"

for example, contained a former Whig, a

Barnburner, a Southern Rights Democrat, and a Catholic.
Pierce lacked a credible political program and he
alienated his power base. The Democratic party needed a
strong leader and a strong issue.
Senator Stephen A. Douglas supplied the issue which
galvanized the Democrats into legislative action and
spurred the formation of the Republican party.

Douglas

was the acknowledged author of the Kansas-Nebraska Act of
1854, which repealed the Missouri Compromise.
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Chapter 2
Political Issues - 1854-1856

The events of the early 1850s produced further
situational contraints on the Republican campaign rhetoric
in 1856.

According to Lloyd Bitzer, one facet of a

rhetorical situation is the necessity to give meaning to a
complex event, that is, the historical context of the
situation determines the proper rhetorical response.
The variety of arguments employed by the Republican
speakers in 1856 reflected the complexity of the
situational constraints imposed by the political events
which followed the Kansas-Nebraska Act.

Therefore, this

chapter examines the major social and political events of
the 1850s as they related to the campaign rhetoric.

Social and Political Movements:

1854-1856

The repeal of the Missouri Compromise inflamed northern
passions.

The repeal dominated politics from 1854 through

1856 as a popular issue.

The possible extension of

slavery into the territories finally united the free soil
and abolitionist factions throughout the free states.
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The popular reaction to the Kansas-Nebraska Act helped
to define the issues that would characterize the 1856
presidential contest.

First, the violent civil action in

Kansas demonstrated the breakdown in law and order as the
pro-slavery and anti-slavery factions clashed in armed
contest.

Second, a clear sectional alignment arose as a

result of the repeal, destroying the remnants of party
loyalty and promoting a regional identity in its place.
Third, militant abolitionism all but disappeared when the
slavery question shifted from outright abolition to its
extension into the territories.

With the legislative

battle over its expansion into previously free territory,
slavery became an inescapable political issue.
The shift to sectional loyalties as a result of the new
political focus on the expansion of slavery sparked an
array of intellectual and social responses.

This shift

in focus from the morality of slavery to the
constitutionality of slavery legislation is examined in
this chapter in terms of its effect on the formation of
the Republican party and its ideology. Further, an
examination of the background and the impact of the
Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 introduces the political
ramifications of the sectional and anti-slavery
expansionist)

(non

arguments so that their importance as

rhetorical strategies during the 1856 campaign is clearly
linked to one another.
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The Kansas-Nebraska Act

Senator Henry Clay's compromises were designed to re
unite the Union in 1850.

The proposed compromise package

received the support of political moderates like Daniel
Webster who were dedicated to saving the nation from
sectional division.1

Since one of Clay's propositions

strengthened the fugitive slave laws, northern radicals
were angry with Webster for supporting the compromise
measures.

However, moderates throughout the nation seemed

to be pleased with the Compromise of 1850 because it
quietly tabled the slavery issue.
The compromise essentially left the Missouri Compromise
intact, admitted California as a free state, allowed Utah
and New Mexico to decide the fate of slavery within their
own borders, abolished the slave trade in Washington,
D.C., and provided a stronger, more detailed fugitive
slave law.

All of these events contributed to a feeling

of national well-being.
In addition to the passage of the compromise in 1850,
the California gold rush was enriching the national
treasury, the Mexican War had been won by the United
States, and Stephen Douglas had publicly vowed to speak no
further on the slavery q u e s t i o n . 2

Abolitionist agitation subsided in the four years after
the passage of the compromise.

However, the tranquillity

that the moderates seemed to promise never materialized.
The Nebraska territory was filling with settlers, and the
railroads were agitating for a western route across the
nation, so the need to form a territorial government
became urgent.

Stephen Douglas, who chaired the Senate

Committee on Territories during the thirty-third Congress,
solved the political problems of the territory with the
Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854.3

By virtue of this one piece

of legislation, Douglas was blamed for the repeal of the
Missouri Compromise and the precipitation of a sectional
crisis that intensified throughout the decade.^
The organization of a territorial government for
Nebraska was a complex political task.

The resident

Indian tribes had to be relocated, the "sooners"

(settlers

who claimed huge tracts of land by merely occupying the
acreage) would have to be given resident status, the
railroad interests had to be considered, and the vocal,
slave-holding border Missourians had to be appeased.
During the winter session of Congress, 1852-1853, a
territorial organization bill passed the Hou s e . 5

This

bill excluded slavery from the Nebraska Territory
according to the provisions of the Missouri Compromise.
However, the Senate adjourned before the bill could be put
to a vote.
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When Congress reconvened in December of 1853, there was
a Democratic majority in both Houses of Congress.®

The

same organizational bill was re-introduced in the Senate
and referred to the Committee on Territories, chaired by
Stephen A. Douglas.

The bill evolved through three stages

while in the hands of the committee; first, the initial
format that allowed the territory to decide whether or not
to include slavery when composing its constitution;
second, a revision that included a new, twenty-first
section explicitly giving the territorial residents, not
the Congress, the right to determine whether or not to
allow slavery on their soil; and a third, and final, form
of the bill that was the most specific regarding the
disposition of slavery in the territories.?

Senator

Archibald Dixon, the successor to Henry Clay in the Whig
hierarchy, composed an amendment to the bill that called
for the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the division
of the Nebraska Territory into two parts.

The territorial

split was designed to appease angry, slave-holding
Missourians who could assume that, with two new states
being formed, one would be a slave state and the other a
free state.®
Free Soil protest was violent after the measure had
been read in the Senate on Monday, January 23, 1854.
Fearing that the bill would be "railroaded" through the
Senate without a debate,

free soil leaders published
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virulent protests designed to encourage public outcry
against the proposed repeal of the Missouri Compromise.
The northern states rose to the challenge.

Rallies were

organized to protest the Kansas-Nebraska Bill.

Sermons

and editorials were published denouncing the repeal.
Northern free soilers were urged to action against the
"slavocracy."9
The South, however, was not as passionate about the
proposed disposition of the territory as her northern
neighbors.

It was a matter of conflict between the border

Missourians and the anti-expansionists of the North,
according to editorials in the southern press.
The amended measure passed the Senate after a night
long debate on March 4, 1854.

Most Senators supported

their party rather than their section of the country.

The

House presented a more sectional argument against the
amended Senate bill.

Northern Whigs and most northern

Democrats defied the measure.

Resolutions and petitions

from angry northern constituents seemed to influence the
Representatives to a greater degree than their colleagues
in the Senate.

The House debate grew so emotional that

weapons were brandished on the f l o o r . H
On May 22, 1854, the territorial bill passed the House,
113-100, with the membership voting along clear sectional
lines.

The Kansas-Nebraska Bill thus voted into law was

the spark that ignited the violence that followed in the
territories.
Two primary groups clashed in Kansas: the free soil
emigrants and the pro-slavery border Missourians.

An

emigrant society, formed in the northeast specifically to
populate Kansas with free soil adherents, became one focus
of pro-slavery rhetoric.

The society sent approximately

thirty settlers from Massachusetts to establish a town at
L a w r e n c e . A l t h o u g h few in number, the emigrants were
encouraged by the vast publicity their organization
received in the northern press.

Pro-slavery residents of

Missouri encouraged this publicity, claiming that the
entire northeast was invading the territory in order to
establish an anti-slavery political base that would
outvote the pro-slavery territorial residents.

As the

territorial population grew rapidly through the summer of
1854, so did the fiery public sentiment over the impending
establishment of a representative territorial government.
Andrew H. Reeder was appointed governor of the Kansas
Territory in the fall of 1854.13

Although he had never

before held a political office, he was given broad powers
to organize the territory.

He was faced with the squatter

claims of the "sooners," the emigrating New England
abolitionists, and the "border ruffians" of Missouri who
were violently opposed to a free-soil state on their
western border.

As the territorial election of 1854

approached, tensions rose along with the numbers of armed
Missourians flooding across the border to establish flimsy
property rights that would enable them to vote as
Kansans.H
Hundreds of Missouri residents voted illegally for the
first Congressional delegate to represent Kansas.

Similar

voting abuses occurred in Nebraska as Iowa's residents
flooded the Nebraska polls to help elect a pro-slavery
Congressional delegate and a territorial legislature.
Kansas elected a legislature the following year,
waiting until the 1855 census was completed in order to
determine representation.15

to

avoid the illegal voting

practices of the previous fall, election regulations were
minutely designed, providing special election judges and
constables sworn to uphold the law at the polls in
addition to the more usual laws governing public behavior.
However, thousands of armed Missourians again
participated, electing a large majority of pro-slavery
representatives to the territorial legislature.
Although Reeder was aware of the voting fraud, he was
i

unsure of its extent.

He was also powerless to stop the

abuse, since the federal troops under the command of his
territorial administration were generally sympathetic to
the pro-slavery administration's views. Reeder officially
sought the assistance of President Pierce. Pierce
expressed concern over the situation, but he was unhappy

with Reeder's tactic of publicly denouncing the Kansas
voting frauds at every whistle-stop between the Missouri
border and Washington, D.C.l^

Reeder hoped that public

outcry against the massive voting frauds would force
federal assistance.
The Kansas legislature met in mid-summer and began to
pass legislation clearly favorable to pro-slavery
interests.

The representatives even went so far as to

adopt measures which condemned to hard labor any
individual who claimed that slavery was not legal in the
territory.18

The progress of the legislature was recorded

by a variety of extra-territorial newspapers, and angry
northern editorials helped to arouse sectional sentiment
against the activities of the pro-slavery men.
Free soil Kansans met in convention on September 5,
1855.18

They drew up a constitution calling for an end to

slavery in the territory after July 4, 1857.

When the

constitution was circulated by ballot, it had nearly
unanimous appeal.20

However, the vote also delineated

battle lines between the adherents of slavery and the
adherents of freedom.

In December, the two forces, fully

armed and prepared to battle, were stopped outside of
Lawrence and dissuaded from engaging in combat by
political leaders.2!
When the Thirty-Fourth Congress met at the end of 1855,
representatives from a variety of anti-Nebraska, anti
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slavery coalitions filled many of the seats.

The

Democrats had lost heavily in both state and local
elections while the Whigs were essentially powerless.

The

passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, and its attendant
violence, had a direct bearing on the formation of
coalition parties that sprang to life with a clear issue
and a ready-made constituency.

The coalitionists were

able to focus their energy on a single issue - the spread
of slavery into the territories - and relate that issue to
the larger issues of abolition and Constitutional law.
However, it was the sectional nature of the KansasNebraska conflict that provoked the formation of the
Republican party and its unique North-South patterns of
rhetorical conflict.

Rise of Sectionalism

The political sectionalism revealed by the Kansas
conflict took two forms: a covert form that grew out of
the technological advances overtaking the North and the
overt political alignments of the slavery against anti
slavery regions.
In general, technological advances were beneficial to
the North.

By mid-century, steamboats and railroads

linked large areas of the nation.

The Hoe rotary press

provided the means to mass-produce cheap newspapers which

were illustrated with photographs and lithographs.22

The

residents of the rapidly growing urban centers were not
only able to read of distant events within hours of their
occurrence, but they could travel to those distant points
with ever-increasing speed and ease.
These technological advances affected the North more
fully than the slave states.23

internal improvements such

as canals and railroads were more valuable to the
industrial North, which could not rely upon the unimproved
river systems that served the South.

In addition,

northern agriculture was diversified, aimed at regional
markets, and depended upon reliable and swift
transportation systems. The tariff, long an inflammatory
sectional issue, was designed to protect northern products
from foreign competition.

According to W. J. Cash, the

perpetuation of the old plantation system of selfsufficiency coupled with an unvarying daily and seasonal
routine was the goal of the southern planter-aristocrat
and those who aspired to his position within the regional
social system.24

cash concluded that the southern

plantation system did not lend itself to technological
advances without major modifications.

Change, whether

social or political, was not compatible with the
plantation system.
However, the South was culturally and economically
dependent upon the North at the mid-century point.25

Educational opportunities in the South lagged behind those
of the North.

The North was rapidly industrializing and

there was a constant supply of cheap, inunigrant labor in
northern urban centers.

The plantations needed new

markets in order to perpetuate the system.

Southern

planters needed to expand westward as their soil wore out
from intensive, single-crop farming.

New land was

available in the territories, land that they needed in
order to increase production and supply new markets.
Politically, the North was gaining power in the House
as the immigrant flood continued, for few immigrants
settled in the slave states.

Suffrage laws were eased in

many northern cities to allow immigrants to vote prior to
gaining full citizenship.

The traditional southern

control of the House was slipping away as the northern
population continued to grow and push westward, leaving
the slave-holding states to assume the minority position
in national politics.
Southern leaders adopted a defensive posture.

The

southern commercial conventions of 1852 through 1859
provide evidence of the sectional defensiveness pervading
southern politics prior to the Civil W ar.26

speakers at

these regional conventions dealt with issues such as the
improvement of the southern economy or the growing threat
of northern political power.

Demands that the federal

government force the North to adhere to the fugitive slave

laws and that the South unite to combat dependence on the
North were recorded at various meetings.27

Prom 1853

until the eve of the Civil War, delegates to these
commercial conventions even promoted enthusiastic support
for strictly southern educational and literary
institutions that would limit the intellectual contact
between the North and the South.28
C. Vann Woodward defined southern sectionalism through
its defense of slavery.

He claimed that "Loyalty to the

South came to be defined in terras of conformity of thought
regarding one of its institutions."2 ®

He charged that

southerners embraced their defense of slavery with the
eagerness and single-mindedness of a cleric involved in
the "repression of heresy."

Woodward blamed the sectional

realignment of Congress and the evolving struggle for
political control on the slavery issue.

The South was put

on the political defensive and was unable to strategically
recover before the issue became fatally divisive.
Therefore, the rhetorical dilemma facing the South helped
to define the Republican rhetorical strategies of 1856.
According to Woodward, the South permitted the opposition
to define the issue, and naturally the issue was not
defined to the South's advantage.

"Because the attack

centered on slavery, the defense rallied around that
point."30
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As early as 1849, John C. Calhoun encouraged a southern
caucus to prepare a formal defense of southern rights in
C o n g r e s s . 31

immediately prior to the Compromise of 1850,

Calhoun began agitating for a southern rights party to
organize in protest against Joshua Giddings'

constant

petitions, which urged the abolition of the slave trade in
Washington, D.C.32

The address which Calhoun prepared for

delivery in Congress was far too radical to suit even his
southern rights supporters.

Although never actually

delivered in Congress, the address was widely circulated
throughout the South as a bill of grievances against the
northern abolitionists.

Calhoun's defense of slavery,

both morally and constitutionally, provided the nucleus of
defensive thought that united the South as a political
unit.33
Political sectionalism intensified during 1849.
Southern Democrats and Whigs united against the plan to
admit California and New Mexico as free states.34
Northern free soil Democrats and Free Soil party members
formed coalitions in various states, while the
Massachusetts Democratic Convention proposed a platform
specifically opposed to slavery and its spread into the
territories.
Even the opening of Congress was delayed by the
sectional squabbling.

The major parties had split

sectionally and had spawned so many factions that it took
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nearly four weeks to elect a

s p e a k e r .

35

The moderates

were appeased during the following year with Clay's
compromises, which allowed the government to function in
spite of sectional differences.

Southern politicians were

pleased with a stronger fugitive slave law.

While

northern radicals were driven to a greater fury because of
the fugitive clause, they were not in a sufficiently
strong position to change government policy in 1850.
The publication of Uncle Tom's Cabin in 1852 gave new
impetus to the radical northern abolitionists.36

once

again, rallies and editorials inflamed the passions
against the evil "slavocracy" in the South.

The

activities of the Underground Railroad increased and this
open defiance of the Fugitive Slave Laws infuriated
southerners.
The Compromise of 1850, which had quieted the moderate
members of the major parties, was destroyed with the
passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill.

Rampant sectionalism

guided political activity from 1854 through the Civil War.
Sectionalism was fostered by those northern politicians
who genuinely feared the power of southern slave owners to
undermine the republican principles of government,
especially the concept of majority

r ule.

37

The three-

fifths representation accorded each slave had given
southern representatives a powerful edge in Congress for
many years.

The spread of slavery into the territories
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virtually guaranteed the continuation of a southern
political stranglehold in Congress, according to the
radical abolitionist press.

The Kansas-Nebraska Bill was

perceived as the beginning of northern political
enslavement by the southern wslavocracy" according to the
radical abolitionists.

Abolitionism

By 1855, the radical abolitionists had a legitimate
political issue.

Sectional differences polarized around

the slavery issue.

In particular, the disposition of

fugitive slaves widened the ideological gulf between the
North and the South.

Developing from this sectional view

of the fugitive slave legislation, two northern responses
directly influenced the Republican party platform and the
rhetoric of 1856.

First, the response to the slave's

condition of enforced servitude produced the need for
arguments in the political sphere to deal with the moral
issue.

Second, the constitutional, or legal, aspects of

the legislation providing for the institution of slavery
and its perpetuation in the territories provided
Republican party spokesmen with logical grounds to argue.
The moral arguments against slavery could be traced to
the four truths of John Woolman.38

Woolman, a Quaker,

held that all men were equal in the eyes of God, that
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Negroes were intellectually and morally responsible
members of society, that the slave owners, not the slaves,
should bear the expense of emancipation, and that slaves
were entitled to "retributive justice."39

Benjamin Rush

defined slavery as a sin, claiming that the moral
faculties of the slave owner became debased and any vices
in which the Negro indulged could be blamed on his
involuntary servitude.40
Abolitionists condemned the institution for its
immorality, unchristian character, and cruelty.
Politically active abolitionists attacked the planter
aristocracy as being undemocratic, robbing the slave of
his freedom, which the antislavery forces claimed was
grounded in the Constitution.

To the abolitionists, the

slave was a person, not a piece of property, and he had
the same rights under the Constitution as any other man.
However, protests against the institution were politically
ineffective because no one knew how to abolish the system
without causing economic devastation in the South.

There

was no program for emancipation.
Instead,

the militant abolitionists, including William

Lloyd Garrison and Bostonian David Walker, called for
immediate emancipation.41

Slavery, they contended in

their editorial columns, was contrary to Christianity and
the American way of life.

Economic devastation or not,

they demanded that the institution be abolished by any

possible means.

These demands were perceived by the

moderates as threats against law and order.

The

Compromise of 1850 realigned the relationship between the
political moderates and the radical abolitionists. The
moderates felt that the slavery issue had been legislated
to rest, while the abolitionists were in the forefront of
the protest against the stronger fugitive slave laws.

In

fact, the fugitive slave clause was one of the principle
issues that polarized the adherents and opponents of
slavery on constitutional, rather than moral, grounds.
Historically, the slavery issue centered around a
definition: was the slave a person or was the slave
property?4^

successful fugitive slave legislation

depended upon the slave's being perceived as stolen
property by the courts of the state in which he was
apprehended.

Interstate cooperation was critical for the

enforcement of the fugitive statutes, since no extradition
laws covered the slave.43
The first fugitive slave law was passed in 1793.

The

slave owner, or his agent, needed only to appear before a
magistrate and prove ownership by whatever means might be
satisfactory to that particular magistrate.

Free blacks

could be kidnapped and placed into bondage on the word of
a slave owner or his attorney.44

The Compromise of 1850

strengthened and further defined this law.

Fines for

obstructing the apprehension of a fugitive were raised and
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the commissioners appointed by the state circuit courts
were to be paid $10 for each ruling favorable to the slave
owner and only $5 for each ruling favorable to the
fugitive.

The fugitive was not allowed to testify in his

own behalf nor was he allowed a jury trial.

It was these

abridgements of his constitutional rights that aroused the
wrath of the North against the continuation and spread of
slavery.
For example, the argument in favor of a slave's
constitutional right to a jury trial was reasonably
strong.slaves,

who were worth over $20, required a

jury trial as stolen property.

If deemed a person instead

of property, the fugitive was being denied protection of
life and liberty.

Some northern states passed personal

liberty laws which were designed to provide fugitives with
a jury trial, witnesses to his identity, free counsel, and
the mechanism to fine and imprison anyone who reduced a
freeman to slavery.

Summary

The repeal of the Missouri Compromise was a major
situational restraint that shaped the Republican rhetoric
of 1856.

Sectionalism was no longer a subtle distinction

in 1855, but a viable political issue.

"Bleeding Kansas"

united the free-soil adherents ideologically, regardless

of previous party affiliation.

The underground railroad

and personal liberty laws operated in open defiance of the
fugitive slave laws, Uncle Tom's Cabin brought a
dramatization of slavery into northern homes, and the
northern press continued to sensationalize rallies and
mobs that gathered to protect unjustly accused fugitives
in major urban centers.
Successful Republican candidates began to emerge from
the state and local elections of 1854.

The party gathered

national political recognition from the support of men
like William Seward, Charles Sumner, Thurlow Weed, Joshua
Giddings, and Horace Greeley.

These men formed the

organizing committee of the new, national Republican
party.
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Chapter 3
The Organization of the Republican Party

The Republican national party was organized quickly.
The presidential election was scheduled for the late fall
of 1856, and the party formally organized less than six
months before the election.

The rapid formation of the

national organization can be examined according to Lloyd
Bitzer's concept of exigence as a motivating factor.

The

major controlling exigence was the need to form an
organization that would effectively guide the Republican
campaign efforts.

The organization had to run

efficiently, yet the major factions had to be given some
measure of control and power.
The audience addressed by the Republican organizers was
composed of anti-slavery coalition members and Republican
sympathizers from the individual states.

The change to be

effected was the organization of a strong national party
which would offer a direct challenge to the Democratic
party.

Finally, a presidential candidate whose political

record could satisfy the major factions and represent
Republican free soil interests would need to be recruited
to the party.
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This third chapter examines the organizational
structure of the Republican party as a means of
identifying further situational constraints on the 1856
campaign rhetoric.
The Republican party was organized with astonishing
speed.

From a loosely affiliated network of local free-

soil "Nebraska" coalitions in 1854, a fully organized
national party emerged to compete successfully in the
presidential election of 1856.
The organization of the party cannot be examined
internally from an effective interpersonal or small group
perspective.

These perspectives would be of great value

in determining the particular campaign strategies employed
by the party leaders.

However, the secrecy which cloaked

the early meetings of the party founders formed a
precedent that guides the activities of the national
Republican party today.

A brief examination of the

contemporary duties of the party organizers will help
explain the significance of the organizational task
accomplished by the men who planned the 1856 presidential
campaign.
The contemporary Republican party is organized around
an executive committee that coordinates a national
convention every fourth year.

This executive committee,

referred to as the National Committee, began to function
as a permanent entity in the twentieth century.

Prior to
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its contemporary form, the committee met only to write a
convention call in the months immediately prior to a
national presidential election.
The contemporary National Committee runs the party.

It

is responsible for raising funds, providing information to
state organizations, and defining policy.*
which policy is determined are secret.

The means by

No records are

made of official meetings; no by-laws have been recorded;
no organizational chart has been developed; and public
records are heavily edited.

The party stands, unified,

behind the platform and the policy as determined by the
most powerful party activists.
The same procedure was followed in 1856.

Although not

formally organized into a national committee, several men
of particular political or organizational stature - well
known to one another - determined the policies of the new
Republican party.

The organization reflected the

political needs of Whigs and Democrats, Free Soilers and
compromisers, businessmen,

laborers, and professionals of

all classes in the free states.
The organizational methods employed by the early party
leaders molded these disparate elements into a political
entity. These organizational methods can be studied
thematically. However, in order to identify the elements
of the Republican ideology as it emerged from this initial
campaign, it will be necessary to analyze the situation
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that spurred the organization of the Republican party in
the spring of 1856.
The organization itself can be defined in terms of
contemporary organizational theory to explain its internal
structure and its success in surviving intact through the
post-Civil War era.

The emergent thematic unity of the

platform and its attendant ideology will be analyzed
according to the fantasy theme motif proposed by Ernest
Bormann,

Organizational Environment - External Factors

According to Lewis Clephane, author of the pamphlet
"Birth of the Republican Party," and the national
secretary of the self-styled Republican Club of
Washington, D.C., a local movement was organized in the
Capitol to urge the adoption of an abolitionist platform
by one of the major parties planning to campaign in the
1856 contest.2

The Republicans had not organized at the

time Clephane called for an abolitionist party, but many
anti-slavery activists had formed local clubs that
corresponded with one another.

The clubs also sponsored

speakers and other public events. The intention of
Clephane, Daniel R. Goodloe, and H. S. Brown, the selfappointed organizing committee of the "Republican
Association," was to force the rapid coalition of all
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anti-slavery groups under the aegis of a single,
"republican" ideology.3
The Republican Association, as conceived by Clephane et
a l . , was organized on June 15, 1855.
Republican party in January,

It became the

1856, when a national

assembly met under that name and voted itself into
existence.^

The various state party leaders, many of whom

had run for local offices in the 1854 elections as
"Republicans," assembled in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on
February 21, 1856.5

Their ranks were swollen by the

presence of wavering Know-Nothings and abolitionist
leaders. According to Horace Greeley's enthusiastic
reporting from the pages of the New York Weekly Tribune,
an executive committee was appointed as the first order of
business in Pittsburgh, along with the following
committees: Address and Resolutions, to prepare the
official convention platform; Safety, to investigate the
armed conflict in Kansas; Convention Credentials; and a
committee for the Rules for the Government of the
Convention.®

The executive committee was charged by

Francis P. Blair, Sr., president of the Pittsburgh
convention, to "execute" a national nominating convention
for mid-June of 1856.7
The organizational process was well under way by the
spring of 1856,

A clearly defined hierarchical structure

of power and authority was created with the formation of
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the national committee and its specialized sub
committees.®

This structure closely resembled the

national Whig organization, the model on which the
Republican party appeared to be cast.

The need for a

strong, national organization was a recent political
innovation, a factor resulting from legislation which
defined a particular date for the polling of national
election returns.

Both of these organizational concepts,

the clearly defined hierarchical structure and the
environmentally-produced organization, are critical
factors in the ability of an organization to function
efficiently.®
The political environment shaped the national character
of the party structure.

Prior to the 1848 presidential

campaign, the individual states held presidential
elections on different dates.

A small cadre of party

spokesmen could travel through many states, delivering the
same message to a wide variety of voters.

Eight months of

the year, there were elections in one state or another.
By Congressional action, however, a uniform, national
election day was established in 1845, giving the Whigs and
the Democrats, the two most powerful political parties of
that decade, three years to re-organize and create
national organizations which could coordinate a national
presidential campaign.
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The local and state organizations remained important.
Communication and fund-raising activities remained local
responsibilities.

The necessity that forced the parties

to organize at the national level did not significantly
reduce the power of the state organizations.

For example,

the incumbent Democratic leaders who wielded the greatest
power in Congress were in control of tightly organized
state machines.

The more experienced Whigs, while not in

control of the sophisticated "machines'' that characterized
northeastern Democrats, were the dominant coalition within
the new, Republican organization by virtue of their
experience in state and national politics.

Men like

William Seward and Thurlow Weed delivered huge local
blocks of votes into the new party by virtue of their
influence at the state and local level.
The dominant coalition of ex-Whigs was responsible for
the structural similarities between the new Republican
party and the old Whig organization.

The power and

authority for structuring the new party were firmly in the
hands of the experienced ex-Whigs rather than distributed
throughout the factions of Free Soilers, Softs,
abolitionists, or other groups whose experience in
practical politics would not have been as near the source
of national power.

Seward, Weed, Clephane, Blair, and the

rest of the dominant coalition were already ensconced in
Washington, D.C.

They brought a rich background of
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political experience to the Republican party.11

They were

determined to nurture the organization, even if it meant
sacrificing some individual goals in order to sustain the
organization.
In his correspondence, Thurlow Weed alluded to the
strategic planning element of the dominant (Whig)
coalition.

He felt that the Republicans had a very slim

hope of success in the 1856 presidential contest.

He

found the Republicans poorly organized when compared to
the Democratic party machine, especially in the southern
states.12

He recognized that the Know-Nothings, thinly

disguised as the American party to avoid comparison with
their secret society Masonic party counterparts of twenty
years past, would split the vote in several critical
polling areas.

Therefore, he proposed the following

strategy: with Buchanan's election

(the Democratic

candidate for President in the 1856 election), the
Republican candidate would be sacrificed.

However,

Buchanan's term of office could be expected to generate
enough public errors that the Republicans would be
guaranteed the presidency in 1860.
The element of strategic planning was evident from
Weed's memoirs, which chronicled the activities of his
close associates, many of whom had been members of the
dominant Whig coalition.

Strategic planning, as an

organizational resource, provides a measure of flexibility
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within the organization, allowing for a shortened reaction
time when organizational readjustment becomes necessary in
a volatile political environment.*3
In addition to the strategic planning element as a
sophisticated organizational resource used by party
planners, the Republicans had access to communication
resources already functioning within the political
environment.

The existence of these resources in the

political environment was a critical factor in the speedy
creation of the new party.
Republican candidates had access to a wide variety of
sympathetic newspapers.

They were able to draw support

from the abolitionist press, the anti-Democratic press,
independent newspapers willing to run Republican
editorials for financial remuneration, and newspapers
owned by the party itself.

The major metropolitan

newspapers had telegraph terminals in city news rooms for
the rapid dissemination of campaign speeches, news of the
latest, inflammatory border disputes, and demands for
broadsides and pamphlets to counter opposition attacks
f

throughout the nation, throughout the campaign.
Members of Congress and church leaders communicated the
Republican platform at those regular secular and religious
gatherings designed as public speaking forums.

In return,

these same Republicans provided feed-back to the national
party.

Information about the Democratic and American
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party platforms were gathered from opposition speakers who
shared the same speaking occasion, partisans hosting
speakers on campaign tours, and copies of the local press
forwarded from "stump" locations.
Thurlow Weed was the major figure in the organization
and use of these information systems that were already in
use as a part of the daily news gathering sources.

He

created at the national level a form of the party machine
he had manufactured in New York state for the gathering
and dissemination of information.

With a central

location for information processing and the field
resources to gather and disburse that information, the
power and authority of the national party could be
effectively wielded.
In spite of the wide variety of political factions
represented at the first Republican convention, the
organizational process was swift and effective.

Once a

national coordinating committee had been established, the
assorted free-soil interest groups were able to interact
formally.

Yet, the national coordinating committee would

have been unable to form without the assorted free soil
interest groups that it represented.
Conflict and uncertainty were reduced as the Free
Soilers, Whigs, abolitionists, and Democrats united under
an ideology broad enough to encompass a variety of
separate ideologies that were dedicated to an equal
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variety of solutions for the slavery issue.

The

organization was able to focus its activities by
organizing specific committees which included members from
the various factions.

The reduction of separate political

units increased the immediate positive outcome of all
activities, since the coordination of support for each
activity was enhanced with the concentration of authority
in a central c o m m i t t e e . H

Therefore, once the

organization was formally defined, strategic planning was
possible.

Organizational objectives were formulated

simultaneously with the party itself and all members could
use the available communication resources.
The specific organizational structure, the internal
hierarchy, was not made a matter of record nor did any of
the members of the dominant coalition refer to the
structure in extant letters or manuscripts.

This

reluctance to specify an internal hierarchy provided some
measure of organizational flexibility.

Present-day

organizational theorists suggest that the absence of a
hierarchy may indicate that the dominant coalition was so
well acquainted and so politically experienced that
specific roles and duties were not assigned. A rigid
hierarchy might have blocked communication channels and
slowed the reaction time of the organization.

Yet,

contemporary studies of the national committee are
confounded by this historical lack of documentation.

As
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Hugh Bone observed,

"[I]n both parties the operation of

the national committee is not generally prescribed but is
left to custom and the discretion of the chairman and his
staff."!5

According to this contemporary description of

the committee structure, the internal communication flow
appears to be blocked both vertically and horizontally.
The structure suggests that flexibility was more important
than specific hierarchical distinctions, a structure that
would have served the party well when it first organized
in an era of limited communication technology

and trusted

associates.

Organizational Environment - Internal Factors

The politicians attending the first Republican
convention represented a wide variety of political
affiliations.

The very diversity which characterized the

representatives should have been a barrier to internal
communication and compromise.

Since the organization was

*

swiftly and effectively created in spite of the potential
for disagreement, a summary analysis of the theoretical
basis for the success of the organization is necessary.
The diversity of experience and personality brought to
the convention by the participants was itself the key to
the swift formation of the party structure.

The

organization was the means of effecting coalitions of the

varying interests of the participants.1®

The organization

became a "marketplace" of influence without which the
convention participants would not have been able to
establish bo n d s , compromises, or common experiences in
nearly so short a time.

The common free-soil interests of

the Republicans would have hardly been enough to provide
the basis for effective, concerted action in the highly
structured political environment.

Instead, an internal

structure of influence and control established the
necessary hierarchy as well as the means to plan for
effective, measurable political activities.
The men who gathered in Pittsburgh planned just such a
coalition of influence as they developed a united stand
against the spread of slavery.1?

The marketplace concept

allows the participating individuals to retain some
measure of control in a compromise situation.

The

possession of resources determined the amount of control
that any one participant might expect.

For example, many

of the participants were in control of viable state
organizations, a necessary resource of the national party.
Others held positions of power and influence in the
national government or in the private sector.

The common

desire of these men to stop the spread of slavery, whether
for political or economic gain, formed their official
union.

The amount of influence possessed by each
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participant determined the organizational hierarchy even
before their initial meeting.
The success with which an organization mobilizes is a
measure of the success with which the need for stability
and unity of purpose is met.*9

Since the convention

participants had a single, over-riding purpose in the
desire to prevent the spread of slavery into the
territories, a hierarchical organization met their needs
as a means of facilitating the union of various factions
into a cohesive political unit.
structure,

The organizational

itself, provided the stability through which

the activities of the groups could be measured and
aligned.
Specifically, a political organization is merely the
institutionalizing of control, both symbolically and
realistically.20

^he elected leadership within the party

functions both as a symbol of control to members within
the organization and as the mechanism for dealing with
external demands.

Therefore, the formation of the

Republican party fulfilled the institutional needs of the
various "Nebraska" groups whose unity of purpose had been
confounded by the lack of centralization or organizational
stability. With the formation of a stable central
organization which directed the activities of its members,
the course of action chosen by the party leaders could be
launched.
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The particular political environment of 1856 dictated
rapid action on the part of party organizers.

Not only

were events moving quickly in those geographic regions
under dispute over the spread of slavery, but
Congressional guidelines regarding presidential elections
affected the nomination and campaign procedures of all
organized parties, forcing the formation of national
organizations.
Prior to 1848, each state held elections for national
offices within a given calendar period, not on the same
day.

There was no need for a national organization.

When

the election procedure was changed by Congress to allow a
single day, nationwide, for the election of national
officers, it became necessary to organize quickly in order
that the necessary channels of communication would be in
place by the date of the election.21

Many of the men who

were active in the structuring of the Whig national
organization turned to the Republican party while their
organizing experience was still fresh, providing for the
enactment of an organizational structure similar to that
of the defunct Whig party.
Therefore, the Republican party succeeded as an
organization because it fit well into the pre-connected
political environment. The organization was acceptable to
the majority of individuals within the group.

It has

retained its bias in favor of northern business interests,
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giving rise to continued criticism of its clearly
sectional interests.

Those interests arose from the

strategic need to campaign sensibly in 1856, pouring all
resources into the non-slave-holding areas for the most
effective voter return, rather than making a weakened,
geographically comprehensive effort to campaign throughout
the entire nation.

Free Labor Ideology

The formal ideology of the early Republican party was
reflected in the introduction to its convention call of
1856.

The convention planners invited

[Those] People of the United States, without
regard to past political differences or
divisions, who are opposed to the repeal of
the Missouri Compromise, to the policy of the
present Administration, to the extension of
slavery into the territories, in favor of the
admission of Kansas as a free State, and of
restoring the action of the Federal
Government to the principles of Washington
and Jefferson . . .22
This invitation to convene encapsulated the popular
beliefs of a rhetorical movement that had been in place
for several decades.

From the pulpits of New England to

the floor of the Congress, orators had thundered against
the spread of slavery in the United States.

Concerned

politicians like John Quincy Adams and other
constitutionalists, men who were bitterly opposed to the
gag rule and the fugitive slave laws, gave the Republican

party a legal basis for its platform of anti-expansion.
But, it can be argued that the Republican party was
ideologically structured by the prevailing popular opinion
against slavery and the extant rhetorical movement against
the institution and its spread into the western
territories.

According to Leland Griffin, a rhetorical

movement such as the popular movement against slavery may
be classified either as an attempt to arouse public
opinion in favor of an idea or an institution or an
attempt to further the destruction of an institution.22
Although the abolitionists favored the destruction of an
institution

(slavery), they demanded that the public

accept the notion of universal freedom from bondage.
Abolitionist speakers removed their demands from the
destruction of an economic and social institution to the
more philosophic plane of greater human good.
Griffin classifies rhetoricians as aggressors or
defenders, according to their stand within the rhetorical
movement.

Many of the boundary-spanning journalists and

abolitionist orators inherited by the Republican party
were aggressively in favor of freedom from bondage. Some
were so aggressive that they suffered physical harm for
their zeal in speaking against the spread of s l a v e r y . 2 ^
The political rhetors sought to focus public attention
on the origins of sentiment against the spread of slavery.
The repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the extension of
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slavery into previously "free" regions was the result of
the Kansas-Nebraska Act, according to the Republican
speakers.2 5

Congressional candidates added their voice to

those of the clergy in the effort to stop the spread of
slavery, making political issues out of the moral
sentiment against human bondage.
Once the roots of the movement have been uncovered by
public speakers, methods for propagation of information
must be found.2®

For the Republicans, avenues of

propaganda were already in place, with Greeley's Tribune
heading the list of partisan newspapers eager to press for
the containment of slavery and an end to bloodshed in
Kansas.

In addition, many prominent abolitionist orators

were serving as publically-elected officials and they used
their public positions to speak against slavery with
greater authority.
The Republicans, therefore, simply absorbed the
movement against slavery.

Orators such as the Reverend

Henry Ward Beecher, who was widely known for his
dedication to the abolition of slavery, joined the
Republican cause immediately upon its organization.
Beecher, in fact, took a leave of absence from his New
York pulpit in order to campaign for the Republicans in
1856.27
The rhetorical movement against the spread of slavery
encompassed all regions of the United States during the

1850s, except for the South.

By 1855, two phases of

rhetorical development had been completed, according to
Griffin's model.

The period of inception, which stretched

from the end of the slave trade to the Missouri
Compromise, had been marked with occasional organizational
success, mainly because of the Quakers and an increasing
number of active abolitionists.

The period of rhetorical

crises, the second phase of development, occurred with the
passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854.
The final developmental period of the rhetorical
movement, the period of consummation, occurred when the
Republicans formally organized with a specific plan to
bring the ideals of the movement to fruition.

Although

the Republican presidential candidate did not win the
election in 1856, the party continued to grow in strength
as a result of its absorption of the abolitionist and free
soil movements.

The movement prospered within the

organization; the organization prospered under the
leadership of the men who formed it; and the party was
sustained through the rhetorical crises of a political
campaign by the consistency of the movement that spawned
the organization.

This symbiotic political/ideological

relationship succeeded, according to Griffin,

” ...

irrevocably disturbing that balance . . . between the
groups which had existed in the mind of the collective
audience."28

The movement for the non-expansion of

in
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slavery could never return to being either an abolitionist
movement or a constitutional restoration movement.

The

balance between the individual moral and the political
elements was destroyed in the public mind. The public had
a new choice: it could align with the Democrats
slavery identification group) or the Republicans

(the pro
(the new

anti-slavery identification g r o u p ) .
The rhetorical analysis of the 1856 Republican campaign
must rest on the particular strategies that created and
nourished the party, uniting a variety of coalitions under
a new ideology. As will be seen later in this study, the
diversity of elements created important constraints on the
rhetoric in support of the party's presidential candidate.

General Rhetorical Strategies

The rhetorical battles of 1856 were waged by surrogate
speakers representing the Republican party, not the
Republican candidate.

Political communication theorists

suggest that successful surrogate speakers normally should
have a proven record of competence as public speakers, and
they should have a clearly identifiable link to the
candidate.29

This link was established in the 1856

campaign by the implicit common political affiliation and
the shared rhetorical vision of the party members.

In
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addition to speaking experience and a link to the
candidate, campaign speakers had to establish a link with
the audience.
home states,

Many of the surrogates stumped in their
from their familiar pulpits and in their own

towns where sympathetic communication could easily occur.
For lack of speaker-audience links, no Republicans
campaigned in the South.
The particular rhetorical problems faced by the
surrogate speakers included disavowing any direct
association with the Whig party, avoiding the use of
abolitionist rhetoric in place of anti-slavery arguments,
raising grave suspicions against the Know-Nothings, and
maintaining the fervor of the partisans already supporting
the new party.
Campaign efforts were limited to New England and the
mid-west.

The far West was deemed pro-Fremont,

freeing

the strategists to concentrate on the disputed border
areas.30
Two formal means of currying voters were employed: the
political clubs and the stump speaker^.

The clubs were

formed locally and were the primary source of grass-roots
funding, undertaking sanctioned local organizational and
fund-raising events.31

stump speakers, sanctioned or not,

provided the substance of the campaign.

From the local

scene, in which small-town magistrates and Fremont Club
members would orchestrate torch-light processions and
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outdoor rallies for front-page press coverage, to the
pulpits of metropolitan churches, men engaged in discourse
about the political solution to slavery.

The names of the

particular presidential candidates were often absent from
such discourse, even when it involved specific campaign
issues.
The sectional arguments that formed the basis of the
Republican campaign included the statistical comparison of
slave versus free labor, protective tariffs that favored
northern manufactured goods and were violently opposed by
southerners, and the alleged southern political
stranglehold on Congress.

Free labor was the Republican

ideological explanation for the rate of northern urban
growth and its attendant

enlightened culture. Northern

industrial growth outstripped that of the South, claimed
the Republicans, as a result of the immigrants who were
filling the northern cities to compete in the free labor
market,

swelling the general population and nearly

outstripping the demand for both skilled and unskilled
labor.

32

The Republicans argued that the comparative

growth of northern and southern cities demonstrated the
vitality of northern dedication to the free labor
principle, since the sheer numbers of factories, goods
produced, and people employed were significantly larger in
the North.

However, statistics were not enough to

persuade voters that the new Republican party was

93
dedicated to serving the interests of the free states.

An

ideological commitment to larger principles than factory
ownership was necessary to allow for the successful
emotional appeal of the party's platform.
Eric Foner located the roots of pre-Civil-War
Republican ideology in the concept that labor is a noble
and dignified pastime.33

Actually, the concept of labor

was characterized by a complex moral, social, and economic
system. According to Foner's analysis, to labor was a
noble pastime.

The nobility of labor stemmed from its

role as a Christian endeavor,

for the capital produced by

labor created wealth that was perceived as one means of
serving God.

The Republicans argued that labor might only

be construed as a Christian value, however, if the laborer
were able to enjoy the fruits of his labor.

Since slaves

labored only to enrich their masters, both slave and
master were debased and brutalized by the system.

The

slave could not enjoy any capital gain or material
advancement as a result of laboring; therefore virtue
could not arise from the act of laboring to increase one's
capital.

Further, the slave owner who prevented the slave

from advancing materially or intellectually by the results
of his labor was brutalized by the corrupt moral system
that usurped both free will and free labor.
The Republicans neatly defined a laborer as anyone
engaged in any useful activity.34

The woodcutter and the
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novelist alike were members of the laboring class, as were
the fisherman and the professor.

The measure that

determined whether or not one was laboring freely was
one's degree of financial independence.

It was not

necessary to amass great wealth to have achieved success
in a free labor market.

Merely to have economic choices

or financial independence was enough to satisfy the
Republican definition of "freedom."

For this reason,

Republican speakers with working-class roots usually had
the greatest prior ethos.

For example, Henry Wilson had

once been an indentured servant and Nathaniel Banks had
been a bobbin boy in a mill.

Both men enjoyed enhanced

prestige for having worked their way upward to an economic
status of financial independence.

They exemplified the

Republican free labor ideal.
In theory, the financially independent woodcutter
should have been able to enjoy the same social success as
the novelist or professor.

But the reality of northern

social mobility was not as egalitarian as Republican
idealists would portray it.

However, there were two

methods of defending the northern social attitude to the
voters.

Either the southern social caste system could be

painted in the darkest possible terms to contrast
unfavorably with northern society, or Republican orators
could remind their audiences of the vast potential for
economic and social opportunity that awaited the

enterprising entrepreneur, either in the industrial
northeast or the western frontier.
The South suffered from a totally closed social system,
according to the northern anti-slavery orators.

That

rigid class system was the major reason that the economic
theories of the North could not take hold in the cotton
regions.

Since social mobility accompanied the

accumulation of capital in any free-labor market, the
South was doomed to practices that tied the entire
population to a form of economic slavery and eventual
extinction.

Since slaves were unable to benefit directly

from their own labor, all participants in the system, free
and bound, were condemned to both social and economic
stagnation.
The West figured prominently in the Republican
ideology.

The West was regarded as an economic extension

of the industrial northeast.

Those northern farmers and

businessmen who wished greater opportunities than those
available in the heavily populated New England region
turned to the frontier areas as a means of establishing
their financial independence.

As immigration swelled the

ranks of the unskilled and semi-skilled laborers to
bursting, the excess population could move westward.
Republican speakers portrayed westward migration as the
only available means of protecting the eastern urban areas
from the unemployed who would otherwise live on the

streets of the northern cities.3 5

The threat of slavery

in the territories directly affected the free labor market
because slave labor would choke off the need for free
laborers in the West.

Unemployment and urban poverty

would then rise to dangerous, unprecedented levels,
according to Republican speakers, since immigration
continued to swell the northeastern population faster than
jobs and housing could be made available.

This threat of

blocked emigration became a stock secondary argument in
the Republican repertoire, second only to the arguments
regarding the constitutionality of the pro-slavery
representation in Kansas and the repeal of the Missouri
Compromise.
Eric Foner referred to the election of 1856 as a
constitutional referendum.36

The primary debate centered

around the issue of the constitutionality of slavery.

Was

it protected under the Constitution, as the South
believed, or was it a matter for the individual states to
decide?
The more radical Republicans, William F. Seward and
Charles Sumner among them, were dedicated to the
eradication of slavery by any means.

The 1856 Republican

platform reflected the radical position on slavery, but
the arguments favored by the Republican spokesmen on the
stump did not effectively echo the degree of radicalism
preferred by Chase, Giddings, and other politicians with
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abolitionist backgrounds.

Therefore, the major themes

espoused by Republican speakers dealt with the violence in
Kansas as a symbolic expression of the pro-slavery
mentality, the economic problems created by a slave
society in a free-market world, and the political threat
posed to the North by the united "Slave Power" in the
South.

The Candidate as a Constraint

John C. Fremont was a popular, romanticized hero of the
nineteenth century.

He was the "Pathfinder," the daring

explorer who bravely opened the West to overland travel
and lived to write of his exploits.

He was the son-in-law

of Thomas Hart Benton, distinguished Senator from
Missouri.

With the companionship of his wife, Jesse, he

outfoxed presidents and became the darling of the young
literary set in both the United States and Europe.
Continental salons idolized the young explorer.
Yet, Fremont was court-martialed during P o l k ’s
administration, held responsible for the extreme suffering
and negligent deaths of his fourth expedition, involved in
disreputable land speculation in California, and scorned
by his powerful father-in-law.
Fremont's career in politics was brief.

He served only

a few months in the U.S Senate before accepting the
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Republican presidential candidacy in 1856.

How did a man

of so little political experience come to represent a new
party in an era of political crisis?
John C. Fremont entered politics as a Senator from
California in 1849.

The first session of the California

Constitutional convention met on September 1, 1849.
Saturday, October 13, its work was finished.

On

The borders

of the new state were determined, state elections were
scheduled so that a legislature could be seated on
December 21, 1849, and copies of the proceedings were sent
to Washington.
John C. Fremont and William M. Gwin were elected by the
California legislature to represent the state in the U.S.
Senate.37

They were a compromise slate, for Fremont was a

Free Soil Democrat and Gwin represented a growing p r o 
slavery faction.

The pro-slavery faction in California

was very powerful.

Members were primarily wealthy mine

owners who were in favor of working the mines with cheap
slave labor rather than with wage-earning laborers.
Fremont and his family boarded a ship bound for
Washington, D.C., less than one year after arriving in
California.

Fremont had taken no active part in the

organization of the new state, was battling for title to
his Mariposa lands,

faced a Congressional investigation

into the deaths of eleven men from his fourth expedition,
and was preparing to work in Congress with the same men
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who had participated in his celebrated court-martial of
one year past.
Fremont and Gwin waited in Washington for nine months
before California was finally admitted to statehood.

The

admission of the territory was angrily contested in
Congress, since the southern Senators wanted that portion
of the territory lying south of 36® 30' to be open to
slavery but the residents of the territory had approved a
free soil constitution.3®

The California Bill was passed

on August 13, 1850, by a vote of 34-18 in the Senate.

The

following day, a long, formal protest against Fremont and
the anti-slavery status of the new state was read into the
Senate record, signed by Senators from Virginia, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and
Florida.

They were outraged at the new political

imbalance between the slave-holding and free states,
protesting that
an odious discrimination is made
against the property of the fifteen
slaveholding States of the Union, who
are thus deprived of that position of
equality which the Constitution so
manifestly designs, and which
constituted the only sure and stable
foundation on which
this Union can repose.
Fremont was never called to answer any charges or explain
his position as a free soil advocate.

However, some pro

slavery Senators claimed that Fremont's uncompromising
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stance on slavery prolonged the debate that delayed the
seating of the California Senators.
William M. Gwin and John C. Fremont entered the Senate
chambers on September 9, 1850.

Fremont's credentials were

presented by Senator Barnwell of South Carolina, who noted
that he was not in favor of seating the new Senator under
the present c i r c u m s t a n c e s . J e f f e r s o n Davis of
Mississippi even raised a formal protest before Fremont
was finally seated, that the election of the California
Senator was unconstitutional.42
Within a period of only four working days, Fremont and
Gwin caused seven bills to be read and referred to various
committees.

Speed was essential, since only three weeks

of the legislative session remained after the two men were
sworn into office.
The first session of the Thirty-First Congress closed
on September 26, 1850.

Fremont's most effective speech

had been delivered the previous day when he pleaded for
gold mine legislation.

A great deal of business remained

unfinished with regard to California, but Fremont's role
was over.

Because of a recurrence of Chagres

(Panama)

fever, he was unable to return to Washington to attend his
second, and final, session of Congress in January, 1851.
At the time of his appointment to the U.S. Senate, Fremont
drew the shortest of three straws that represented the
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three new Senatorial terms available to the two men.

Of

the three terms due to expire in 1851, 1853, and 1855,
Fremont drew the term which ended in 1851, represented by
the shortest of three straws.

William Gwin drew the

session which lasted through 1855 and was an active member
of the pro-slavery faction throughout his term.
Fremont campaigned briefly for re-election as a Free
Soil candidate.

However, during his long absence in

Washington, the pro-slavery wing of the California
Democratic party had grown stronger.

Since his health was

weak and the election was held only two months after his
return to California, he had little opportunity to
campaign effectively.
February,

He was soundly defeated in

1851, but no candidate was elected in his

stead.4 3
Europeans were interested in large-scale mining
propositions in the American West, so Fremont took his
family to Europe in 1852, traveling to amass financial
backing for mining operations on his Mariposa grant.
Fremont remained aloof from domestic events until he
returned to the United States to find himself the
presidential nominee of the Republican party.
Although experienced abolitionists, Free Soil
Democrats, Whigs, and other politically active men flocked
to the Republican cause,
a national nomination.

few among them were suitable for
Sumner, recovering from the
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caning, was too volatile an abolitionist even if his
health had permitted him to campaign.

Salmon F. Chase and

William H. Seward, although experienced politicians, were
equally radical in their demands that the fugitive slave
laws be repealed along with the right to sell slaves in
the District of Columbia.44
The Republicans needed a candidate with a firm,
moderate stand on slavery, high name recognition, and no
interest in politics.45

John Charles Fremont was deemed

the ideal candidate by an ad hoc group of party officials
and newspaper editors meeting in New York City four months
prior to the nominating convention.
As spring opened, the St. Louis
D emocrat, Worcester S p y , New York
Evening7"Post, and other journals were
all quietly pressing the ex p l o r e r . 46
However, the attributes that brought Fremont to the
attention of these powerful men were rhetorical
weaknesses.

Fremont successfully engaged the public fancy

as a dashing young explorer.

He had powerful friends and

relatives scattered in all regions of the nation.

Yet, he

was never a candidate of any substance. His political
experience included less than three weeks of national
service in an appointed office, a powerful father-in-law
who refused to support his candidacy, and a record
of leadership which did not bear close scrutiny.
Nevins, Fremont's biographer, noted that

Allan

It was true that his career was
sprinkled with incidents indicating
that he lacked practical judgement,
was deplorably erratic in his
estimates of men, acted impulsively
and egotistically, and wanted both
tact and the stauncher traits of
character.47
Yet, the initial period of Fremont's candidacy was intense
and successful.

Without so much as a single recorded word

on his part, Fremont was guaranteed the presidential
nomination.

John C. Fremont was a manufactured candidate

who fitted the rhetorical needs of the Republican party in
1856: he was glamorous, he was popular, and he was silent.
Since Fremont was a figurehead rather than a
political leader, Charles Sumner emerged as the symbolic
leader of the Republican campaign.

Sumner was beaten into

insensibility at his desk on the floor of the Senate
chamber by Preston Brooks, a southerner.
the action was rich.

The symbolism of

The august Senate chamber, where the

founders of the nation had deliberated, was sullied by the
blood of an anti-slavery martyr whose life was threatened
by a weapon-wielding southerner. Sumner had seriously
offended Brooks and the entire body of southern Senators
by delivering a polemic entitled "The Crime Against
K a n s a s .

"48

Because of his rhetorical attack on the South,

Sumner became the symbol of northern righteousness. Brooks
came to symbolize the incarnate inhumanity of the southern
slavocracy through his instinctive defensive action.
Sumner's speech formed the basis of many emotional proofs
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against the extension of slavery, while the Republicans
had a new focus for their emotional appeals which was
neither economic nor moral.

It was a sectional focus.

Summary

The excitement of a presidential canvass arises from
the highly-charged emotional issues and a sense of
supporting a righteous cause against an enormous wrong.
The constitutionality of slavery certainly provided a
double-edged issue, but the economic and moral arguments
employed by the Republicans needed an emotional focus
which would enhance identification between the party and
its cause without employing stock Whig or abolitionist
arguments.
The Republicans were challenging Democratic party
control and Whig influence in all sections of the North.
Particular attention was given to the campaign strategies
in Pennsylvania and New York, for these were the two
pivotal urban regions that would determine the election.
According to Trent and Friedenberg, there are seven
strategies available to the political challenger in a
contest.

The Republicans employed five of the seven

strategies, each designed to force a change in the status
quo.

The strategies used by the Republicans included

attacking the record of their opponents

(the Democrats);
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taking the offensive position on issues
expansion); calling for a change

(slavery and its

(a Republican

administration); emphasizing optimism for the future

(a

free labor society for the South and greater economic
protection for the North); and speaking to traditional
values rather than calling for value changes

(the

constitutionality of a free society rather than the
unconstitutional "slavocracy").
By June, the Republican party was ready to launch a
national campaign.
completed.

The organizational phase was

A national committee was operational, a

convention was called to nominate a presidential
candidate, a platform was drawn around a clearly
articulated ideology, and a broad base of popular support
was secured by the state organizations.

The Republican

party was designed to formulate and direct those national
activities that affected its candidates and its policies.
The individual members were free to explain, elaborate and
define those activities and policies according to the
exingence of the situation.
However,
the party.

it was the individual speaker who represented
It was the individual speaker who defined the

needs of a particular audience with regard to the policies
of the party.

Therefore, the strategies of the 1856

Republican campaign can be most effectively studied

through analyses of those speeches that were delivered
during the course of the summer campaign.
The specific rhetorical strategies employed by the
Republicans are examined in the next three chapters
according to a neo-Aristotelian model of speech criticism
suggested by Lester Thonssen, A. Craig Baird, and Waldo W.
Braden in the second edition of Speech Criticism.
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Chapter 4
Ethos: Identification and Credibility

According to rhetorical theory, the credibility of a
speaker develops from one of three major factors.

First,

the speaker may present himself as an "expert" during the
course of the speech.

If he conveys an impression of

being well trained in the art of public speaking and
persuasion, as well as thoroughly schooled in the subject
of the speech, he will likely be perceived as trustworthy
by the audience.

If he is able to incorporate practical

and theoretical experience into a speech act that
encourages the audience to trust him as an "official"
messenger, he will probably create a lasting impression
that will serve to enhance his reputation either as an
effective speaker or an expert in the particular issue
under discussion.

The resulting positive "terminal ethos"

provides the "initial ethos" at his next public speaking
appearance.
Second, he may be associated with a particular group or
movement that endows the speaker with the enhanced
credibility of the association or "prior ethos."

The

names of those speakers who represented the free soil
coalitions,

for example, were quite often substituted for
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the political party.

"Garrisonians" for abolitionists was

one synedoche in which the man was named in

place of the

entire movement.
Third, the speaker may be well-known as an "opinion
leader” within a small but influential group.

Local

elected officials or respected citizens within a community
often perform this leadership function.

They may not be

directly affiliated with the issue under discussion or
they may not be qualified experts as speakers or analysts,
but they enjoy the respect of the community.

Reputations

as men of public "good will" qualify them to speak on
political topics.
Lester Thonssen, A. Craig Baird, and Waldo Braden
confirm the classical notion that the speech can be only
as credible as the speaker.

Whether the speaker merely

creates an impression of trustworthiness in the minds of
his audience or whether he is trustworthy by virtue of his
prior activities or reputation is an issue which has been
debated for centuries.

In Speech Criticism, the authors

present a variety of classical studies that illustrate the
importance of the speaker's personality and reputation in
any persuasive endeavor.*

In the present analysis, the

elements which constitute the "ethos" of a speaker will be
drawn from classical literature.

The character of the

speaker, his intelligence and his good will toward the

audience will be used as the primary elements of
credibility.
The character of the speaker is measured by the
audience.

According to Speech Criticism, the speaker may

associate himself with anything deemed "virtuous" by the
audience.2

He may link his cause with praiseworthy

accomplishments or link his opponents' cause with events
that are scandalous or horrifying.
appear to be sincere.

The speaker must

Otherwise, his character may not be

perceived as trustworthy.
The second element of the ethical appeal is the measure
of sagacity demonstrated by the speaker.

This term refers

to the "integrity and wisdom" demonstrated by the speaker
during the course of the speech.

It is a measure of his

intellectual stock and rhetorical skill.

The speaker who

is tactful yet compelling, wise, informed, and tasteful
demonstrates sagacity in public speaking.

Clear logic and

good, recent evidence contribute to the perceived
intelligence of a speaker by enhancing the impression of
wisdom.
Good will and emotional appeals are very closely
linked.

The speaker wants the audience to trust his

motives in any persuasive endeavor but he must stir the
audience to action.

The audience must want to believe

that the speaker is seeking to protect the common good and
will protect them from whatever evil lurks within the
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opposition.

The speaker must reveal himself as a

"messenger of truth" in order to establish his good will
toward the audience.3
The major Republican speakers of 1856 were a critical
factor in the party's success.

Their training and

experience in practical politics served to enhance their
image of character, intelligence and perceived good will
throughout the campaign.

The specific elements of the

ethical appeals employed by the Republicans will be
examined in this chapter.
Political parties that were organized during the 1850s
in the critical frontier regions shared several
characteristics, according to Theodore Clarke Smith.
Organization was incomplete, the personalities of the
politicians counted far more than principles or voting
records, and "eloquence and combativeness for more than
social culture and wealth.
The Republican party had no political history with
which to define itself in 1856,

The most effective means

available to persuade voters to support the new party lay
in the artistic proofs of ethos, pathos and logos as
employed by the surrogate
representative)

(non-candidate party

campaign speakers.

The men who spoke in

support of the Republican platform needed to embody the
principles of the party

by demonstrating the virtue of

their cause through ethical and logical means.

Specifically, the platform called for a return to the
ideals rooted in the Constitution, the abolition of
slavery and polygamy in the territories, and the immediate
admission of Kansas under a free soil constitution.^
Although one plank in the platform called for a full
range of internal improvements, including railroad lines
and harbor improvements,

few of the campaign speeches

address the need to provide such improvements.

Instead of

urging the voters to approve funds for better
transportation, it was the task of the Republican speakers
to establish the urgency of the Constitutional issues
embodied in the platform and to persuade the voting public
to support the party's presidential candidate.

The

personal recommendations of these campaign speakers
constituted the sole basis of their credibility, since no
recorded party activities could stand as inartistic proof
in support of their ethos.®
The men who represented the new party enjoyed a great
measure of prior ethos as trustworthy political
,representatives or leading abolitionists.

In this

chapter, the ethical appeal of five major speakers is
examined according to the neo-Aristotelian standards set
forth by Thonssen, Baird, and Braden in Speech Criticism.?
The issues of the campaign were clear and the arguments in
favor of adopting the Republican platform were limited by
the short history of the party.

Therefore, the
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examination of the speakers in this chapter falls into one
of three issue-related categories.

The speakers were eye

witnesses to the chaos in Kansas, leading anti-slavery
politicians, or religious leaders whose ethical standards
transcended political boundaries.
These speakers represented another situational
constraint. The rhetors spoke directly to potential
voters, attempting to produce action by giving meaning to
the political situation.

Party membership imposed

situational constraints on the identity of each speaker.
However, the orator had the freedom to manipulate the
artistic proofs of each speech, allowing his personality
to overcome the situational restraints of party
membership.

Leading Republicans

A list of the major political and literary figures
associated with the Republican cause during the 1856
campaign includes many famous names.

Thaddeus Stevens,

William L. Dayton, Horace Greeley, Abraham Lincoln, John
Greenleaf Whittier, Charles Sumner, Henry Ward Beecher,
Salmon P. Chase, Francis Preston Blair, Schuyler Colfax,
Washington Irving, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry Wadsworth
Longfellow, and William Cullen Bryant of the New York
Evening Post were among the more prominent opinion leaders
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who flocked to the Republican party.

However, not all of

these men were seasoned politicians with the oratorical
skills necessary to participate in a national campaign.
For example, William Dayton, the Republican vicepresidential nominee and a former Senator from New Jersey,
proved an able campaigner but cost the party critical
votes in Pennsylvania.®
Horace Greeley devoted the New York T r i b u n e , both the
daily and the weekly editions, to the Republican campaign,
often travelling to report on significant speeches and
rallies in person.®

Members of sanctioned Republican

clubs were treated to a special, reduced subscription rate
to the weekly Tribune during the course of the campaign.
But Greeley's effectiveness was limited by his temper
which he vented both in person and through his editorials.
His editorials were often libelous, giving rise to the
quip that the weekly edition of the Tribune was purchased
only by those readers who wished to disagree with its
sentiments.I®
Schuyler Colfax was an example of an abolitionist
politician who allied himself with the Republicans in
spite of personal hardship.

Colfax was a respected, self

avowed abolitionist from Indiana.

After running for re-

election to the U.S. Senate in the fall of 1856, Colfax
immediately went on the stump for the Republicans.

He

drew enthusiastic crowds throughout southwest Indiana in
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spite of a voice weakened from hours of outdoor oratory in
his successful senatorial campaign.

Senator Colfax noted

that
. . . in the woods, miles from the nearest
village, there would be four thousand
present, procession and banners, bands and
glee clubs, ladies innumerable; spoke three
hours and a half in open air, throat giving
out; but the crowds can't get into the
houses . . .11
Colfax described other crowds and other occasions in his
letters, all as enthusiastic and well-turned-out as the
crowd he described above, but he felt sure that Fremont
would not carry the state because of to the presence of a
strong Know Nothing contingent.
Salmon P. Chase was not a powerful speaker.

In

addition to a minor speech impediment, Chase was
uncomfortable when speaking to the "common people."

J.W.

Schukers, a biographer of Chase, compared the Senator
unfavorably with Stephen Douglas, claiming to have heard
them both speak a number of times.
. . . he did not employ the language of the
people . . . he could not please the crowds
either "on the stump" or at the bar or in the
legislative hall.12
Audiences were prone to thin out quickly when Chase rose
to speak, an effect not favorable to his message.
However, his distinguished physical appearance and
borrowed credibility from a seat in the U.S. Senate lent
dignity to most formal speech
occasions.
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Francis Preston Blair of Maryland was one of the more
flamboyant and outspoken anti-slavery speakers of the
campaign.

He travelled throughout Missouri, railing

against the spread of slavery into the territories.
life was threatened more than once.

His

He seemed to be

enormously gifted in generating hostility wherever he
spoke.

Professing a burning moral commitment to eradicate

slavery, he was nevertheless a slave owner who undermined
his credibility by refusing to emancipate his family's
slaves.
A variety of rhetorical tactics was employed in an
effort to unify the divergent political beliefs which
distinguished the early party spokesmen. For example,
Republican speakers alluded to themselves and their
supporters as the defenders of liberty, rather than as
Republicans or abolitionists.

The slavery argument was

limited to the proposed expansion of the institution into
the territories and the events in Kansas.

The Know

Nothing threat was soft-pedaled in those areas where
American party and Republican co-operation would best
serve to defeat Democratic candidates for office.
Partisans were reminded that the South was an economic and
intellectual wasteland, existing only to sap the North of
its industrial and economic advantages.
John Charles Fremont was the popular symbol that united
the diverse Republican speakers in the 1856 presidential

campaign.
candidacy.

Fremont did not actively promote his own
He did not even attend the nomination

convention in Philadelphia, so he was not present to
accept formally his nomination on June 19, 1856.H

The

major purpose served by this convention was to provide a
forum for the moderate free-soil men.

Fremont had already

been "tapped" for the nomination by the dominant coalition
of powerful ex-Whigs months before the convention, but a
formal convention fulfilled a symbolic function that
unified the free-soil coalitionists into a single
political i d e n t i t y . T h e

convention hardly met the

criteria for a deliberative body, since the platform and
the presidential candidate had been approved before the
opening speech in Philadelphia.
Fremont was nominated on the first ballot to the great
enthusiasm of the participants.

Six days later, a

ratification meeting in New York City ended with a
torchlight procession to the home of the "Pathfinder," a
meeting that the nominee had declined to attend when
invited by enthusiastic supporters. However the
Republicans were not ill-served by their candidate's
silence.

With his lack of political experience, he would

have been a liability if pitted against Democratic orators
such as the embittered Stephen Douglas.
campaigning, the Fremonts "received."

Instead of
The candidate

greeted small delegations of admirers at his home, where
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his wife, Jesse Benton Fremont, served coffee.

The

partisans seemed gratified by their gracious reception, as
confirmed by effusive descriptions appearing in the press.
In the midst of the group sat a small,
intense, earnest, determined-looking man, who
bore the trace of hardships and toil, yet his
countenance beamed with such an expression of
good-nature that it seemed to preserve a
magnetic attraction for his guests . . . My
preconception of greatness was confounded yet I could not help admiring the man more
than ever . . . modesty; ability; integrity;
were written as plainly as the alphabet upon
the whole MAN.
Fremont's silence allowed the professional campaigners of
the party to organize a battery of highly skilled orators,
fueled by sympathetic and powerful newspapers.

Their

skill was such that Fremont's name became the symbol for
every democratic ideal they might conjure, with the Free
Soil party slogan expanded to include "Free Speech, Free
Press, Free Men, Free Labor and Fremont" to become the
Republican rallying

cry.

Speeches by William H. Seward and Henry Ward Beecher
are representative of the tactical speaking employed by
Republicans in 1856. > Their discourses dealt with a dual
rhetorical vision posited by other leading Republicans.
This vision provided for a nation which could either favor
slavery and divide against itself and its founding
principles or a nation which could abolish slavery and
regain its integrity.
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William H. Seward nursed a personal ambition to become
the foremost speaker among the anti-slavery leaders,
according to his biographer Frederick B a n c r o f t . H e
enjoyed an undisputed reputation for "ringing oratory,"
and his participation in the 1856 campaign was critical to
the success of the new party.
Henry Ward Beecher took a leave of absence from the
pulpit to stump the northeast for the campaign.19

He

compared slavery to a burning building and the political
controversy raging around the issue to a quantity of
explosives stored therein.

He called for a daring but

prudent man to rush between the fire and the
explosives in order to separate them and preserve the
surrounding institutions.

Fremont, as the Republican

candidate, was that unnamed, metaphorical man of daring
and prudence.

But even Beecher was hard pressed to answer

the anti-Fremont accusations that streamed from the
Democratic press.

The primary attacks against Fremont

included allegations that he was Catholic, that he was
illegitimate, that he was an alcoholic, that he was
negligent with regard to the fourth western expedition,
that he was a slave-owner, and that he was engaged in land
speculation in California.

These Democratic attacks

against Fremont's religion and parentage served indirectly
to weaken his candidacy in those states that supported the
nativist, Protestant sentiments shared by the Know
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Nothings and their candidate, Millard Fillmore.

The rest

of the allegations were less serious problems than the
loss of the anti-Catholic vote in Democratic strongholds
like Pennsylvania.
This chapter analyzes the ethical appeals in selected
speeches of representative Republican surrogate speakers.
Campaign speeches by Charles Robinson, Andrew H. Reeder,
Salmon P. Chase, William H. Seward, and Cassius M. Clay
are examined for their ethical appeals.

Robinson and

Reeder were eye-witnesses to the violence in Kansas, Chase
and Seward were experienced free soil politicians, and
Clay was an anti-slavery southerner.

Eye-Witnesses

Charles Robinson and Andrew Horatio Reeder served as
governors of Kansas during the first turbulent months of
territorial organization.

Reeder was appointed governor

of the Kansas territory by President Pierce and was
outraged by the corrupt election practices that resulted
in a pro-slavery legislature being seated in 1 8 5 4 . 2 0
Having taken his outrage to the people by engaging in a
public-speaking tour on his way to Washington, D.C., in
the winter of 1855, he proved too great an embarrassment
to the Pierce administration and was removed as governor
in July of 1855.21
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Returning to Kansas, he was elected as the free soil
(free state) candidate for Congress in October, 1855, by a
narrow margin over the pro-slavery candidate.

Reeder then

spent nine months campaigning for recognition of his
status as a legal territorial representative to Congress.
His status as a Congressional delegate was eventually
disallowed by the special committee formed to examine his
credentials.

He returned to Kansas once again, arriving

in the spring of 1856, when he was indicted for treason by
a pro-slavery grand jury.

He fled the state in May, and

openly traveled east from Illinois, speaking frequently to
large, sympathetic audiences during his journey to
Washington, D.C.
Charles Robinson was indicted for treason along with
Andrew Reeder in May of 1856.

Robinson was an active

abolitionist and a practicing physician who served as the
resident agent for the Emigrant Aid Society, the Boston,
Massachusetts, settlement group.

Robinson's reputation as

a proponent of "fair play" and as a defender of the
underdog grew from his defense of California squatters
whose land was pre-empted by Sutter during the height of
the California gold rush.

He was seriously wounded in an

armed confrontation between the squatters and Sutter's men
in 1849, then tried for conspiracy and murder.
was eventually acquitted of both charges.

Robinson

While on trial,

he was elected as a free soil proponent to the California
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legislature, where he supported John C. Fremont's
candidacy to the U.S. Senate.2 2
In Kansas, Robinson was active with free soil
state)

(free

interests from 1854, when he arrived, until the

successful admission of the state under a free soil
constitution in 1861.

During 1855-56, his home was sacked

and burned by pro-slavery men and he was imprisoned.

He

was elected governor of Kansas under the free state Topeka
constitution in 1855, but he did not take office until
Kansas was admitted to the Union.23
During the campaign of 1856, Robinson traveled widely
in the East, speaking in behalf of a free Kansas.

He

relied upon his personal experience and integrity as a
free soil politician to generate good will toward the
Republican platform.

Charles Robinson: Speech of October 22, 1856

Charles Robinson was the first free soil governor of
Kansas.

Before statehood was conferred on the Kansas

territory, however, Robinson's election to the
governorship by the extra-legal free state convention was
an act of defiance which thrilled the anti-slavery
sympathizers across the nation.

Robinson traveled

throughout the free states during the campaign of 1856,
speaking in behalf of those free soil Kansans who had
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elected him to office.

His address of October 22, 1856,

provides an example of the ethos which he brought to the
Republican campaign.
According to the account printed in the New York Daily
Ti m e s , Robinson was the first of several speakers to
address a noisy, partisan audience
York Academy of Music to

ca p a c i t y .

that had jammed the New
24 He

opened his address

by immediately establishing his status as a representative
of the people of Kansas, enhancing his prior ethos.
. . . in the present canvass there is a great
issue before the people.
And I wish briefly
to speak in regard to that issue, for I feel
personally interested in it.
I
feel that the
people that I in part represent
here tonight,
are personally interested in that issue.
The
question with me is a personal one . . .25
The question was slavery.

The issue was its extension

into the territories.

Robinson knew the partisan nature

of his audience well.

He did not provide any particulars

about the extension of slavery until the conclusion of his
speech.

Instead, he spent the bulk of his address firmly

establishing his credibility as a witness to the political
problems in Kansas.
Robinson was an eyewitness to the Kansas atrocities.
However, rather than discuss the sweeping events occurring
on the frontier, events that were being chronicled with
relish by the newspapers as quickly as telegraphed
accounts were received from Kansas, Robinson chose to
illustrate the conflict with a series of homespun,
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specific examples.

He reminded the audience of the unfair

laws passed against the anti-slavery residents of Kansas
by explaining that
The Missourians carried the election and they
passed such laws as they chose - laws under
which you can scarcely breathe. Why, a man
cannot speak even to his wife in the night
without being liable to break those l a w s . 26
To some extent, the audience would have been familiar with
the pro-slavery legislation of Kansas to some extent from
reading editorials and news announcements headlined
"Current Kansas Atrocities."

By providing a folksy,

humorous illustration of the unconstitutional constraints
of the new laws, Robinson underlined the severity of the
new legal code while invoking the sympathy of his
audience.

Robinson enhanced his credibility as an

eyewitness by providing a sense of perspective for the
particular problem - the abridgement of free speech in
Kansas.
His understated description of the sack of Lawrence
illustrated the hopeless frustration of the anti-slavery
men in the face of the pro-administration border ruffians.
In Robinson's account of "battle," the pro-slavery,
territorial militia marched to the outskirts of Lawrence,
Kansas, an anti-slavery settlement.

The ruffians were

armed and angry, just spoiling for a confrontation with
the free state men.

A rabble of 2,000 to 3,000

Missourians approached the city, claimed Robinson, only to
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be stopped from engaging in open battle after marching,
fully armed, right up to the city limits.

The new

governor of the territory, an administration appointee and
pro-slavery man, talked the rabble into leaving the city
of Lawrence alone.

However, as Robinson recounted the

confrontation, it was obvious that anti-slavery law and
order prevailed over the unprincipled actions of the p r o 
slavery forces as they retreated from the field of
"battle."
The governor goes down and gets them in
consultation. They agreed very reluctantly
that they would let Lawrence stand, and not
attack at that time, and concluded they would
go home.
But, before they go home, they
begin to steal horses again, right before the
go v ernor’s e y e s . 27
Robinson illustrated the extent of the political
corruption he had observed by describing how the
insurgents proceeded to burn a sawmill and several homes
while still in the governor's company.
conclusions for his audience.

He drew no

Instead, he enhanced his

ethos as a rational, intelligent observer by allowing his
audience to draw its own conclusions about the actions of
the pro-slavery administration in Kansas.
Robinson was an expert free soil witness to the
activities perpetrated by the pro-administration
territorial government. He was unquestionably loyal to the
anti-slavery, anti-administration coalition which sought
to contain slavery.

He illustrated the political

situation and identified the major figures, but Robinson
drew no conclusions for his audience.

He left the

audience to draw the necessary inductive generalizations
from Robinson's specific examples of injustice to the
conclusion that the Pierce administration was to blame for
the chaos that plagued the entire territory.

Robinson

provided his audience with a vivid contrast.

He balanced

his anecdotes with skill.

The irrational activities of

the pro-slavery faction were effectively contrasted with
the understated observations of the more peaceful anti
slavery faction that Robinson represented.
For example, he captured the irony of the confrontation
quoted above in the very next passage of his address.

The

citizens whose cattle had been stolen along with the
horses appealed to the governor to help them recover their
goods.

Robinson related the following confrontation:

Well, the Governor says, I don't know, those
men are gentlemen down there, I find that
they are old political friends.
I have known
them before.
I find them very honorable men
and I don't know about stopping them; you
ought to have driven your cattle away. Well,
says a man, ought I to have driven away my
sawmill that they burned?2 ®
Robinson's drawling narrative style was perfectly suited
to his reputation as a homespun, frontier man of action.
His rather plain style reenforced his credibility as an
intelligent, objective eyewitness.

According to Thonsson,

Baird and Braden, the relationship between the speaker's
style and his credibility reveals the inner character of
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the speaker to his audience since "personal character is
clearly revealed by the speaker's style of e x p r e s s i o n . "29
Although his speech was relatively free of stylistic
figures, Robinson incorporated a great deal of irony into
his narrative.

Both irony and sarcasm served to

underscore his sympathy for the Kansans while he ridiculed
the administration.

The ironic twists within each

descriptive passage focused the attention of the audience
on the point Robinson wished to emphasize, illustrating
his facility for persuasive exposition.
Robinson related dialogue as a witness to its
occurrence.30 in addition to his presence at the
confrontation between the governor's troops and the anti
slavery settlers of Lawrence, Kansas, he was perceived as
a reputable anti-slavery eyewitness because of his status
as the victim of pro-administration persecution.

He

illustrated the lack of due process that faced the free
soil settlers in a manner calculated to engage the good
will of his audience.
Robinson relied upon this form of expository narrative
throughout his address.

His authority as a responsible

eyewitness was enhanced, for he included no judgments
against the territorial administration or the powers in
Washington.

In Speech Criticism, Thonssen, Baird and

Braden contend that any distinctive speaking style is

" . . .

an indivisible element of the process of

persuasion and focuses attention on what language does,
rather than exclusively upon what it is."31

Robinson

probably hoped to enhance the identification process by
presenting familiar political relationships, that is,
patronage, re-set in a violent context.

He painted a

familiar picture - an administrative appointee
governor) with corrupt associations
exposed by an "honest man"

(the

(the pro-slavery men)

(the farmer with the burned

barn) who exposed the dishonest practices to the audience
via the narrative sequence.
Robinson further implied Republican

support of the

soil Kansans by burlesquing the illegal activities
pro-slavery Pierce administration.

free

of the

He related an incident

involving a roving "posse" of pro-slavery militia that had
appropriated several hundred head of horses.
The Marshal of the United States is guilty
then of horse stealing Kansas by the whole
sale.
The President of the United States
retains him in office to this hour, indorses
[sic] his conduct and he is himself a horse
thief.32
The audience roared with applause and shouts at Robinson's
observation.

His narrative moved the audience to

demonstrate a measure of their good will.

He then shifted

into an intense, first-person narrative of the particular
atrocities in Kansas for which he blamed the President
whom he had just characterized as a horse thief.

133
Now I tell you that I might depict to you
every outrage that has been committed there,
if I had the power and you could not believe
them. . . . We can tell you of them but we
cannot show you the dead body of Barboue,
shot by an officer of the United States.
We
cannot show you the shrieking wife as she
sees the dead b o d y . 33
Robinson's plain style was perfectly suited to this
climactic,

intense exposition.

His method of relating

grand tragedy in simple terms enhanced his image as a
credible eyewitness.

He implied a sense of stark

helplessness consistent with a horror-benumbed eyewitness
account.
The image of Robinson presented by the speech text
mirrored his prior ethos closely.

The consistency between

the type of action-loving man Robinson was perceived to be
and the manner of active exposition that characterized his
speech suggested that the speaker could be trusted by his
listeners.
Robinson drew no explicit conclusions for his audience.
He made no grand promises nor any dire threats about the
national problems that could arise from the territorial
unrest.

Robinson used his narrative about the plight of

Kansas to provide an inductive basis from which his
audience could draw their own conclusions about the larger
problems implied in Kansas.

If Robinson assumed

correctly, then the trustworthiness and credibility he
established during the course of the speech should
persuade the audience to support the free soil activists.
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If Robinson's integrity, good taste, trustworthiness, and
expertness were successfully demonstrated throughout the
speech by the consistent objectivity with which he
reported the violent and illegal activities in the Kansas
territory then, based upon his experience in Kansas,
Charles Robinson can be considered an expert witness
against the Democratic administration.

Therefore, the

audience should reason that all men who accepted
Robinson's narrative as the truth should vote against the
Democratic administration.
The conclusion of the speech was not reproduced by the
New York Daily T i m e s , but the columnist summarized
Robinson's closing remarks.

He apparently suggested to

his audience that a vote for Fremont was a vote against
the Democratic administration, which Robinson blamed for
the problems in Kansas.

Since the rally at which he spoke

was sponsored by the Young Men's Republican General
Committee of the City of New York, Robin s o n ’s closing
remarks were predictably partisan and a necessary part of
the speech.

His address expressed support for the

Republican program with regard to its ability to redress
the consitational infringements wrought on the citizens of
Kansas by the pro-slavery, Democratic administration in
Washington, D.C.
were scant.

However, Robinson's partisan remarks

Robinson's speech was designed to support the

anti-slavery stance of the Republican party, that is, the
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concept that the Kansas situation was a blatant Democratic
attempt to force slavery on the territories.
Charles Robinson was not the first eyewitness to
address a New York audience during the 1856 campaign.
Andrew Reeder, the first governor of the Kansas territory,
had spoken in New York City earlier in the campaign.
Reeder was an experienced anti-slavery politician as well
as an eyewitness to the chaos in Kansas.

He was not an

active member of the Republican party, however.

He was a

free soil advocate with the ability to testify to the pro
slavery abuses fostered on the Kansas settlers by the
Democratic administration.

Andrew Reeder: Speech of 27 August 1856

Andrew Reeder spoke before an audience of approximately
three thousand in the New York Tabernacle on Tuesday,
August 27, 1856.

He arrived late.

He had cancelled a

scheduled speech earlier in the summer at the same
location long after the Tabernacle was filled with an
eager audience.

The packed house was noisy, hot, and

unruly, according to the newspaper account.

Reeder was

anxiously awaited by the organizing committee, since they
hoped that his arrival would calm the crowd.
Although delayed, Reeder arrived to speak that Tuesday
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evening.

His appearance was met with cheers and sustained

applause, according to the New York Daily

T r i b u n e . 34

Reeder had served a short, turbulent term as the first
governor of Kansas, appointed by President Pierce.

His

reputation for first-hand knowledge of the political chaos
in the territory produced for him a strong initial ethos
when speaking to partisan groups during the 1856 canvass.
In addition, Reeder's election to the U.S. Senate by the
anti-slavery settlers in Kansas probably enhanced his
ethos as a spokesman before anti-slavery audiences.
Reeder was sincerely outraged by the violence in the
territory.

His sincerity and integrity were evident as he

attempted to engage the good will of his audience with the
introduction to his speech.

"I come before you upon a

mission from the Free State men of Kansas to tell their
tale of wrongs and to appeal to you for that aid."35
However, his appeal was indirect, compared to the
emotional appeals of Robinson's vivid narrative.

Reeder

attempted to engage the sympathy of his audience without
describing particular activities or remedies.

The good

will he hoped to induce in his audience was heavily
process-oriented.

He appealed for their sympathy and

their support. He thanked the audience for its show of
sympathetic applause upon his entrance to the hall.

He

claimed that their eager applause demonstrated their
acceptance of his presence as the official representative
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of all "who are struggling for their dearest rights upon
the plains of far-off Kansas."
I come to you not as a politician to urge the
claims of any candidate for office.
I
represent a party who has but one article in
their creed - the making of a Free State in
Kansas.
Reeder made use of his ethos as the ex-governor of the
territory.

He declined to solicit votes from his

audience, claiming only to be a non-political
representative of beleaguered,

free soil Kansans.

He

attempted to enhance his integrity by promising "to give
fellowship and sympathy and thanks to every man who is
laboring on sincerely to make Kansas free according to the
test of his

j u d g e m e n t ."37

In contrast to the indirect, narrative nature of
Robinson's appeals, Reeder hammered at his audience with
his first person demands.

He declined to associate

himself formally with the Republican party, choosing to
identify himself only as a free state representative. "I
speak for free Kansas and that alone," he asserted in his
introduction.

Postulating that the "truths" he revealed

during his speech might help one party or another, he
insisted that he did not wish to be held accountable for
supporting one political organization over another, even
by implication.
As the introduction drew to a close, Reeder suggested

the depth of his single-minded commitment to a free Kansas
by saying
I shall go as straight to ray object as my
intellect will allow, and shall not deviate
to the right or left for the sake of
candidates or parties.
If, however, the
truths I shall tell, and the remedies I shall
suggest, shall incidentally help any party,
it is their due and I shall have nothing to
take back.
If on the other hand, they shall
work injury to any, the responsibility is on
them and not on me, and I shall not have a
shadow of regret for my action, whatever I
may have for theirs.38
Reeder left nothing to chance in his efforts to establish
his authority as a free state spokesman.

If anything, his

emphasis upon his qualifications to represent the free
soil cause made his personal credibility the sole issue.
Reeder's insistence that the audience accept his
credentials as a man of integrity may have been
purposefully defensive.

According to Winston Brembeck and

William Howell in their work, Persuasion: A Means of
Social Influence, the validity of a speaker's assertions
as perceived by an audience is a function of the
trustworthiness he is able to project during the speech
act.^9
Reeder had been appointed governor of the Kansas
territory by President Pierce.

The Pierce administration

was perceived as strongly pro-slavery by the Republican
party.

In his speech,

"The Crime Against Kansas," Sumner

had accused Reeder of complicity with the Pierce
administration, charging that Reeder was a "tool of
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Pierce" for not challenging all of the territorial
election returns in 1854.^0

Sumner was a radical

abolitionist with high political credibility in New York,
so Reeder had to defend beyond doubt his trustworthiness
as an anti-slavery spokesman.
Reeder developed
defense.

First, he

a three-part ethical appeal in his own
established himself as a loyal

free

state man by reminding his audience of his free soil
activities and associations.

Second, he illustrated his

concern for the plight of Kansas and the constitutional
rights of those citizens he had
protect.

Third, he

been appointed to

appealed to the audience to concern

themselves with the welfare of Kansas as a means of
protecting the welfare of the entire nation by presenting
an inductive analysis of the slavery threat based upon his
experience and observations.
Rather than demonstrating his trustworthiness, Reeder
initially demanded that his audience accept his
credentials as a man of integrity by asserting that his
purpose was moral and that his intent was selfless.

His

introduction was designed to reinforce his strong partisan
credibility, establish his credentials as a trustworthy
source, and imply his support of the Republican party.

He

recited an emotional chronology of the wrongs inflicted on
the population of Kansas by the pro-slavery faction that
had pre-empted the legislative power in his territory.
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Reeder absolved himself of responsibility for carrying out
the "oppressive" measures dictated by the Pierce
administration by claiming that he suffered from equal
oppression.

Ke charged that a "scheme" existed to bring

Kansas into the Union as a slave state, just as Sumner had
claimed in his "Crime" speech.

Reeder argued that he was

obviously blameless for any part in the pro-slavery
scheme, since he had left the territory in order to bring
notice of the scheme to the nation via a series of public
lectures.

He attempted to regain his trustworthiness and

integrity by "exposing" the scheme at the public forums
provided by the election campaign.
Like Sumner, Reeder offered no evidence for asserting
the existence of any scheme.

He relied upon the audience

to associate his virtuous intention to expose the pro
slavery schemers with the commendable character he
intended them to perceive.

If the audience perceived him

to be the honest, wise, and just man he claimed to be,
then his assertions would probably be perceived as
truthful as well.
r

Reeder's strongest source of credibility was his
expertise as an eyewitness and as an administrative
insider.

His inductive analysis of the Kansas situation

was the only indication that he wanted the audience to
perform a specific service, to vote into office those
national representatives who would stop slavery from

entering the territories.

By skillfully scattering

emotional and ethical appeals throughout the body of his
speech, Reeder implied that the nation was in danger if
the situation in Kansas, as he portrayed it, were not
resolved in favor of the free state party.

His revelation

of the administration's scheme to bring Kansas into the
Union as a slave state was accompanied by a promise to
"endeavor to show you what the awful consequences of that
consummation will be to the North."
Reeder described the coming territorial election as a
travesty which would indirectly affect every member of his
audience should they fail to support the free soil
advocates in the fall election.

Reeder postulated that

the results of the October territorial elections would be
manipulated by the same armed ruffians and corrupt
election officials who had engineered the outcome of the
pro-slavery victory of 1855.

Unless his audience provided

support for national free soil candidates, history would
repeat itself.

Should the successful pro-slavery

legislature draft a slavery constitution for Kansas,
argued Reeder, then the "contest is transferred from the
plains of Kansas to the halls of Congress and it will
there be battled by y ou."4*

Reeder reasoned that a policy of unrestricted slavery
throughout the nation would result in a gross political
imbalance in Congress.

He reasoned that the election of a
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pro-slavery legislature in Kansas would result in the
extension of slavery into all other territories, upsetting
the power balance in Congress, for "Each state will send
two Senators, the South will have the preponderance of
power, and when do you suppose we will get it back?"
He indicted the Pierce administration for condoning the
constitutional abuses occurring in Kansas.

Reeder

provided an historical example to illustrate the depth of
corruption in Washington,

strengthening his credibility as

an intellectual analyst.

He compared the treasonous

activities of the Pierce administration to those committed
during the reign of Charles I of England.

He compared

Jeffries, of the Bloody Assizes, to Lecompte of Kansas,
earning a round of sympathetic "hisses" from the audience.

Reeder, himself, had been charged with treason for his
anti-slavery activities in Kansas.

He fled the territory

during the early weeks of the Republican campaign,
for his life and the safety of his family.

fearing

After his

flight, he enjoyed great popularity as an anti-slavery
s peaker.

^2

Therefore, his counter-charge against the

Democratic administration served both to reinforce his
credibility as an anti-slavery eye-witness to the
atrocities in Kansas as well as to substantiate the
Republican argument against the constitutionality of the
pro-slavery, Democratic policies in Kansas.

Reeder

143
shifted the focus of the argument from a defense of his
innocence to a charge of collective guilt for an entire
administration.

His audience responded with enthusiasm to

his counter-charge of treason against the administration
that condoned the violence in Kansas.
His final appeal served to complete the sense of
identity between the northern audience he addressed and
the free state men in Kansas.
The free laboring men [sic] of the North
should know that the people of Kansas are
fighting his battles and fighting to settle
the question whether he shall have a right to
go there and build a home for himself and his
children.^3
Reeder concluded that the only means of protecting Kansas
and the rest of the nation from the pro-slavery factions
(and, by implication, the Democrats) was to vote against
the policies of the current administration by voting
against those candidates fielded by the party currently in
power.
On September 19, in New Haven, Connecticut, Reeder
delivered his second New England address of the campaign.
He made no reference to his tenure as a representative of
Kansas.

He constructed this New Haven address with

subtle, implicit political appeals in contrast to his New
York address in which his purpose was explicitly stated.
His major concern in the second speech appears to have
been the re-establishment of civil rights in Kansas.

He

urged that legal, constitutional measures be invoked so
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that due process might return to the courts of the
territory.

His references to the violent struggles in

Kansas were refined.

He referred indirectly to the

violence, describing the bloodshed as "a struggle of a few
years."44
As in his New York speech, Reeder projected the impact
of a pro-slavery Kansas constitution upon the rest of the
nation, and specifically upon New England, detailing the
effects of new slave states on western emigration and
congressional balance-of-power.
Reeder continued with this theme of pro-Republican
morality throughout his address.

He relied upon sweeping

generalizations to illustrate the morality of the anti
slavery forces in Kansas.

He likened the free soil

population of Kansas to the serfs of Russia, for example,
in their forced servitude to the pro-slavery legislature.
To enhance identification with his implied constituency in
Kansas, Reeder relied upon the use of collective pronouns
throughout the address.

As he indicted the pro-slavery

politicians currently governing Kansas during the
campaign, he asserted,
Having thus robbed us of all our political
rights, shut us out from the ballot box,
deprived us of access to all judicial
remedies, stripped us of our leaders,
destroyed our presses, the next step was to
destroy all facilities for Northern
emigration and isolate us from our friends in
the States.45
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Reeder thus sought to establish himself as the
authoritative link between the two scenes: the Kansas
atrocities, which he had witnessed, and the prospective
northern emigrants, some of whom were perhaps occupying
seats in that very auditorium.
The New Haven address included many of the same
arguments that comprised the earlier New York speech.
Reeder barely alluded to the upcoming presidential
election, the Republican party, or any of the candidates.
He professed no partisanship except to a free Kansas.
Yet, the New York Daily Tribune subtitled his speech,
"Reasons for Electing Fremont and Dayton."

Reeder's

speech was inherently pro-Republican. Its anti-slavery
sentiments echoed an emergent Republican fantasy theme, an
argument in favor of free labor throughout the nation.
Therefore, Reeder's appearance in behalf of those free
state Kansans who had been denied due process associated
him with a worthwhile cause and was therefore probably
persuasive.

He demonstrated, through his eye-witness

testimony, that the pro-slavery forces encouraged
lawlessness.

He attempted to increase a sense of

identification between his northeastern, pro-Republican
audience and his fellow free state Kansans.

Therefore, by

linking both his cause and himself to positions which his
partisan audiences approved, he tapped a strong source of
artistic proof in support of the Republican party.
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Anti-Slavery Politicians

Salmon P. Chase, William H. Seward, and Cassius M. Clay
were well-known anti-slavery politicians.

Chase was the

recently-elected governor of Ohio and an acknowledged
leading radical Republican during the 1856 campaign.

He

was able to generate sympathy for the Republican cause by
using his own campaign and political record as evidence.
Chase was an outspoken foe of slavery.

He had served

in the U.S. Senate as a Free Soil party member from 18491855.46

He ran as the first Republican gubernatorial

candidate in Ohio in 1855, defeating his Know-Nothing and
Democratic opponents by enlarging upon the issues of
sectionalism and the problem of slavery in the
territories.

He used his own victory, and the defeat of

his opponents, as a focus for his pro-Republican oratory
during the 1856 presidential canvass.
be an example of

Chase professed to

the ideal Republican candidate,

representing the economic and political stability of the
Republican platform.47
William H. Seward had long been an active anti-slavery
representative in Congress.

His reputation as a

Conscience Whig was well known throughout the free states.
However, he was reluctant to apply his influence with the
New York voters in favor of Fremont's candidacy.

Seward,

147
himself, had hoped to represent the new party as its first
presidential candidate.

He was humiliated by the party's

decision to endorse Fremont for the position that Seward
felt he had earned during his tenure as a party founder.48
William Seward considered withdrawing from public life at
the end of the summer in 1856, since he felt that his
party had scrapped its principles by nominating an
inexperienced, but publicly and politically useful,
presidential candidate.
Seward labored in Congress throughout the summer of
1856, during which a special session of Congress had been
convened to deal with army appropriations.

Congress did

not adjourn until the end of August, and Seward was deeply
involved in arguing for the admission of Kansas as a free
state even during the special session.

When the Congress

finally adjourned, Seward announced plans to travel abroad
during the fall, but he was persuaded to remain in the
United States and lend his voice to the campaign.*9
Thurlow Weed, among other leading Republicans, urged
Seward to display better sportsmanship and to take an
active part in the

camp a i g n .

50

Seward agreed, but he

limited his engagements to New York and Detroit.5 1

His

address at Auburn, New York, which clearly demonstrated
his lack of enthusiasm for the canvass, is examined in
this chapter.
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Cassius Marcellus Clay was a southerner who had
embraced the abolitionist cause.

His support of the

Republican platform was potentially valuable because he
provided eyewitness testimony about the abuses of the
slave system in the South.

He was fiercely dedicated to

the eradication of slavery and gifted with the eloquence
to move his audience to action.
but reckless and willful.

Clay was Yale-educated

His personal life was

punctuated with duels, brawls, and at least one murder.52
Therefore, Clay's primary value to the Republican campaign
of 1856 lay in his ethical appeal as a southern
abolitionist.

Salmon P. Chase: Address of July 1, 1856

Salmon P. Chase was serving as the governor of Ohio
during the 1856 presidential contest.

Chase had served in

the U.S. Senate for six years, then won election in the
1855 gubernatorial contest when his term in the Senate
expired.

He was a popular speaker at anti-slavery

meetings,

so his prior ethos was that of an active,

politically seasoned, anti-expansionist Republican.
When speaking in behalf of the Republican party. Chase
used his own political background as his strongest
argument in favor of other Republican candidates.
limited his speaking engagements to Ohio, normally

He
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addressing partisan groups in or near Cincinnati.

On July

1, 1856, Chase spoke briefly before an outdoor rally in
downtown Cincinnati, where his political record and
achievements were well known to his

aud i e n c e .
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Chase announced that his topic would be freedom and
slavery as they affected the governing of the republic as
a whole.

Since the responsibility of his office dictated

that Chase protect the welfare of his constituents, he
meant to continue speaking against slavery for the good of
his fellow Ohioans as well as for the good of the
Republicans.

He reminded them of his long experience as

an abolitionist speaker and of his popular election as a
free soil adherent.

Then, he reminded his audience that

he was addressing

them unofficially - not as the governor

of Ohio, but as a

concerned citizen of the nation.

endeavored to

He

establish his competence on two fronts, as

a duly elected public servant and as an acknowledged
spokesman for a national party.

He included a touch of

humility, as further evidence of his selfless intent.
There are times and occasions when, before
addressing a public and political meeting, a
public servant might need to apologize for
his appearance in assemblies where the strict
line of official duties did not call him.
. . . I am here tonight to discuss the
question that most nearly affects us as
citizens.55
Having defined his identity as a servant of the public,
Chase claimed that it was his official duty as a "friend
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to our form of government" to address the "imminent
danger" facing the national government.

The body of his short address had three major parts.
I

In the first portion, Chase illustrated the alleged
shortcomings of the Democratic administration by
presenting a selective chronology of those events that led
from the repeal of the Missouri Compromise to the
Democratic campaign of 1856.

He spoke from personal

experience as he developed the chronology.

He had served

in the Senate and participated in many of the decisions
pivotal to the current campaign.
Pursuing a rhetorical strategy of enhancing his own
character by attacking the behavior of an opponent, Chase
charged the Democrats with political irresponsibility for
nominating Pierce and promoting an oligarchy which had
proven unpopular even within their own party.

"I cannot

think of any good thing done or proposed by this
President, and therefore I will be silent."56

gy

implication, Chase condemned the party which had nominated
Pierce.

However, his condemnation reflected his good

taste by being discrete, indirect, and humorous.

He

suggested that the Democrats had failed their public trust
to defend the principles of the Constitution and that
Democratic leaders had acknowledged that failure by
nominating someone other than the incumbent to run for the
, presidency.

tr
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Chase briefly developed the notion that Pierce and the
Democrats were dedicated to promoting a slave-based
political power. Rather than allude to the "plot" theory
proposed by Reeder and Robinson, Chase derived his
authority from his political experience in Washington,
D.C.

Chase charged that Pierce had served the slave-

power interests more fully than any previous President,
doing exactly as he was directed by "the sole and trusted
representatives of the slaveholding oligarchy."

Chase

avoided naming the opposition as the Democratic party.

He

alluded to the organization that fielded Pierce as its
representative, but he avoided making direct accusations
by naming the party. The partisan audience was left to
draw its own connections between Pierce, slavery, and the
party currently in power.
Chase illustrated the second half of his speech with
what he claimed were successful Republican policies as
implemented by himself as governor of Ohio.
that

Chase claimed

"Manufacturers are stimulated, the price of property

has advanced - everybody is employed - and the Union
stands]

Have I not a right to claim all this as a result

of my election?"57

Chase used his political record and

the ethos of his elected office to imply that effective
Republican leadership in Ohio could provide a model for
effective Republican leadership elsewhere in the nation.
. . . the opponents of our cause predicted

. . . that if Salmon P. Chase was elected
Governor, Cincinnati would sink; the Union
would be dissolved; there would be no trade;
commerce would make her farewell appearance
on the northern shore of the Ohio . . .5®
He then testified to the various economic and political
successes that had been achieved in Ohio since his
election, arguing that if the opposing party had been in
error about the results of Ohio's election, then they
could make a similar error in predicting the outcome of
the national election.

Having listed the positive results

of his short tenure in office, Chase linked his political
identity to the national Republican campaign effort by
preparing to "speak of the beneficent influence already
felt from this uprising of the people in behalf of the
Republican cause."
In this third portion of his speech, Chase attempted to
establish his political integrity.

He recited a lengthy

chronology of the evils inflicted upon the American
society by the party currently controlling the government.
He continued to allude to the guilty Democrats without
naming the party, demonstrating his verbal moderation in
the face of violent issues.
I care nothing about names of party; it is
the principles to be asserted and maintained;
all that we want to know is, whether men who
are presented to us for our suffrages will
use their positions in the right way.
I
don't know that it is worth while to talk
about Buchanan or any of the candidates.^9
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Chase lodged a direct attack on the Democratic party as he
concluded his speech.

Having reminded his audience of the

outrages in Kansas, he remarked that "The candidates of
the so-called Democratic party represent the wrongs we
have referred to, and in this light only have we to regard
that party."

Just as he would have his audience judge the

Republican party on the record he represented, Chase
demanded that his audience then judge the Democrats on the
evidence he presented in his address.

Chase offered his

own political record to support the Republican standards
of constitutionality and fairness.

He detailed the legal

abuses in Kansas as the Democratic record.
Chase had hoped to represent the Republicans as their
presidential candidate in 1856.

He felt that his record

as an active anti-expansionist would be adequate
endorsement for his candidacy.

When Fremont was given the

nomination, Chase continued to support his party, but he
kept his endorsement of its candidates rather general.

As

he concluded his address, Chase recommended Fremont to the
crowd, claiming that Fremont was a man " . . .
says a thing he don't
thing he don't

who never

[sic] mean, and never promises a

[sic] perform."

That was the sum of his

political endorsement.
The final passage of the address was an appeal for
anti-slavery votes in November.

The close argumentation

and personal testimony which characterized the body of the

speech gave way to generalizations and partisan
assertions.

Chase predicted that the eradication of

slavery would produce the "blessed spectacle of a happy
people, fearing God and loving the right."

Prosperity

would follow automatically once freedom was secured in all
the territories, and the welfare of the nation would be
insured, according to Chase.

All of these good things

would come to pass if his audience voted correctly.

He

could make such a promise believable for, on his own
authority, he had established happiness, prosperity and
freedom in Ohio as a Republican governor.

Cassius M. Clay:

"Slavery or Freedom?" Speech of 24

October 1856

Cassius M. Clay spoke before the Young Men's Fremont
and Dayton Central Union on Friday, October 24, in New
York City.60

His purpose was to generate new enthusiasm

for the flagging Republican campaign.

Clay's prior ethos

as a masterful orator and a popular southern abolitionist
was reinforced by his enthusiastic reception, as reported
by the New York Daily T i m e s .61

His address was

interrupted repeatedly by laughter, cheers and applause
during the course of the evening, indicating his
popularity and acceptance as a party spokesman.62

Clay employed a variety of stylistic devices to enhance
the emotional appeal of his address.

Clay relied

primarily upon satire to engage the sympathy of his
audience.

He enlarged upon the stereotypical impressions

of the South and southerners held by his northern
audience. For example, he referred to slave owners as
"those who are in the habit of fainting away whenever the
word liberty is mentioned . . . "
Clay divided his address into three major portions,
each section relying for proof on his credibility as a
southerner, a scholar, and an experienced politician^;-----First, he charged that southern slave-holding practices
created an oligarchical form of government which prevented
the universal exercise of personal liberty.

He

demonstrated that he was knowledgeable about the subject
by referring to his experiences in Kentucky politics.

He

charged that the entire southern region was an oligarchy.
The South was guilty of sectionalism, a real threat to
freedom and liberty in the rest of the nation.

" . . .

the intention of the fathers of the Constitution was that
Liberty should be national and Slavery sectional,
for " . . .

..."

the man who follows blindly the dictation of

the South and would make a slave of a black man today
would make a slave of a white man tomorrow.”

Therefore,

Clay demanded that every citizen should have the
pursue liberty for his own protection.

right to
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Further enhancing his ethos by demonstrating his
knowledge of the matter, Clay illustrated the difference
between the intent of the founding fathers who held slaves
but created the documents providing national liberty, and
the intentions of the men who desired to curtail all
personal liberties by opening the entire nation to
slavery.

He proposed that, in spite of their ownership of

slaves, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and George
Washington recognized the necessary personal liberties
that distinguished a democracy.

Again arguing from his

authority as a native southerner. Clay insisted that there
were indeed men living in the South in 1856 who
appreciated the principles of liberty as outlined by the
authors of the Constitution.
. . . although the leading patriots and minds
of the South recognize in common with those
of the North, man's equality in law . . .
yet, the great masses of the southern people
did not recognize and appreciate this great
idea.®3
He claimed that the founding fathers could not be faulted
for the oligarchy that arose in the slave states.

Clay's

detailed explanation regarding the intentions of the
founding fathers was designed to answer Democratic
arguments demonstrating the constitutionality of
unrestrained slavery.

Leading Democrats argued that the

nation was founded by slave owners who never intended the
slave to be free to enjoy the privileges of liberty.
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Measured by the neo-Aristotelian methodology developed
in Speech Criticism, Clay's arguments appear to establish
his integrity as a southerner who recognized and respected
the concepts of liberty and equality. His ethos would be
all the stronger by virtue of his role as "reluctant
witness," that is, a southerner who supported the anti
slavery cause. His image as a leading mind of the South
was reinforced by his demonstrated knowledge of those
concepts, and his good will toward his audience was
emphasized by his allusions to their good fortune in being
from the "enlightened" North.
Throughout his short address, Clay referred to the
audience as "you men of the North" and "you, the Christian
people of the nineteenth century."

He emphasized his role

as a southerner, referring to southern men collectively as
"we" and "us."

He reminded the audience of his prediction

regarding the annexation of Texas as a slave state,
further demonstrating his political foresight.
I warned you against the annexation of Texas
as a slave state.
Now after twelve years
more, I stand before you again, and I tell
you that this struggle must sometime be met,
that one or the other of these principles
must triumph in this country.64
The accuracy of his predictions reinforced his image as a
man of intelligence, further establishing his ethos.

The speaker reminded the audience that the spread of
slavery posed a national problem, which Clay had correctly
identified twelve years before the 1856 campaign.
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according to his own recorded testimony.

He demanded that

his northern audience support the cause of freedom since
he claimed that slavery was an affront to both Christian
and democratic ideals.
regional audience.

Clay's reasoning flattered his

The North was consistent in its

Christian principles and its pursuit of universal liberty,
according to Clay's definitions.

The South denied its

Christian heritage by enslaving both blacks and whites in
a society that concentrated its power in the hands of a
few greedy individuals, again according to Clay's
observations.

Therefore, if Clay could "convert" to a

Christian, northern, anti-slavery ideology, then other
intelligent, thoughtful, Christian southerners could also
"convert."

Clay's ethos was his main contribution to the

Republican cause.

William H. Seward: Address of 23 October 1856

William H. Seward entered the ranks of pro-Republican
campaign speakers with reluctance.

Stung by the party's

refusal to select him as its first presidential candidate,
Seward professed little interest in promoting the
candidacy of Fremont.

He agreed to speak in behalf of his

party only as the campaign drew to a close in the fall of
1856.
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On October 23, he addressed a Republican meeting in

Auburn, New

Y o r k . *>5

There were several thousand

townspeople in attendance, according to an estimate

appearing in the New York Daily Times.

The crowd

enthusiastically greeted Seward upon his introduction,
cheering and whistling as he rose to speak.
Although Seward was speaking to a friendly, partisan,
home-town audience, his address was devoid of specific
campaign ideology or endorsement.

The tenor of this

particular address was neither enthusiastic nor sincere.
Seward refused to discuss the candidates, claiming that
"It is not my habit to speak largely of candidates."
Rather than engaging the emotions of his audience in
support of Fremont and the Republican party, Seward
presented a solid, logical analysis of the political
dangers inherent in any three party contest.
Seward signalled his wish to renew his identification
with his audience in either a modest attempt to gain their
good will or as a means of asking their indulgence while
he ,engaged in a political ritual demanded by his party.
We are neighbors and friends. We know each
other well. I know that you are sincere and
you know, as I trust, that I am not a man of
ungrateful disposition.®®
The introduction to his message may have been aimed at his
supporters who were not willing to trust the leaders or
the policies of the new party that had ungratefully cast

Seward aside in 1856.
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Having tried to establish a link with his audience in
the introduction, Seward proceeded to analyze the general
role of organized parties in national elections.

He

warned his audience that his address would be rhetorically
unembellished by claiming that "you will not expect from
me either humorous, exaggerated, passionate, or
prejudicial speech.”

Seward insisted that his lengthy

political career, and his professional interaction with
many of the candidates, precluded him from supporting one
man over another.
First, because, being necessarily brought
into public combination or conflict with
public men, my judgement concerning them is
liable to the bias of partiality or jealousy.
Secondly, because it is not the habit of
parties in our country to select unfit,
unworthy, or unreliable men to be their
repre sentative s .® ?
His support of the Republican party was tepid.

His prior

ethos suggested that he would address the gathering with
the fervor he had displayed in his free soil arguments on
the floor of the Senate.

Yet, the even, unemotional tenor

of his address

suggests that he was unenthusiastic in his

support of the

Republican candidate and the impression

may

have affected his credibility with the audience.
The only aspect of the speech that might have increased
Seward's ethos was the character that he demonstrated as a
speaker.

He exhibited good taste and moderation

throughout the address.

His condemnation of the Know-

Nothing party was restrained, as he accused it of
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"distracting the public mind" and interposing "an unreal
or false issue" on the minds of the voters.

These traits

presented him as a man of good character.
Restraint is evident throughout the address.

He

accused the Democratic administration in Washington of
opening all states to slavery as it overruled individual
state constitutions during the period of 1850-1856, and he
concluded that " . . .

the whole of the Territories has

been already lost to freedom by the legislation of the
last seven years."

Seward provided a single, tepid endorsement of the
Republican party to fulfill the ostensible purpose of his
speech.
During the first six years of that period
1849-1856, there were only two parties - the
Democratic and the Whig parties - in Congress
and in the country.
During the last year,
there were three, the Democrats, KnowNothing, and Republican Parties.
Everyone
will at once acquit the Republican Party, and
those who now constitute it, of all agency in
the betrayal and surrender of Freedom which
have been made.®®
Seward relied upon his personal experience as a Senator to
substantiate his allegations against the Whig, Democratic,
and Know-Nothing parties.

However, his endorsement of the

Republicans was limited to his assertion that the party
could not be held responsible for any political activity
prior to its inception.
The conclusion of the address was equally ambivalent.
Seward claimed to have examined, without partiality, the
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political parties contending for the presidency in 1856.
He praised the audience as honest, well-meaning and
patriotic, a technique by which speakers are often able to
gain the good will of listeners.

He attempted to assuage

his injured dignity and reputation by observing that
"While I have tried to pursue always one steady course
which my conscience has approved, friends have often been
alienated and adversaries have become friends."

He sought

to reinforce a favorable image by claiming that his
judgment of those he alienated was charitable and he
appealed for a charitable judgement from those who opposed
him.
Seward spoke in his own defense on this occasion, not
in defense of his party.

He referred to his political

record and his presidential qualifications.

He did not

present his political loyalty with any degree of
sincerity.

The tone of the entire address was one of

wounded pride and reluctance to join in an enthusiastic
effort to elect a national candidate in spite of personal
differences.

Seward appeared to be seeking personal

support from a local, sympathetic audience rather than
using his enormous influence to sway the audience in favor
of Fremont's election and a Republican victory.

Perhaps

if he had exhibited a greater show of enthusiasm, Seward
might have alienated the New York free soil contingent.
Seward's purpose seems to have been immediate validation
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of his continued favor with the home-town crowd rather
than to be recognized among the premier Republican
speakers of the 1856 campaign.

Summary

The five speakers discussed in this chapter made
effective use of their prior ethos in promoting the
Republican platform in 1856.

The vital, pugnacious

personality of Cassius Clay infused his address with an
urgency and importance unavailable to a more timid
speaker.

As a southerner, Clay could have possessed a

particularly strong ethos, since he advocated positions a
southerner would not be expected to support.

His

credibility would have been high, analogous to a
"reluctant witness" in a courtroom. Clay's ethos probably
grew as his reputation followed him from one speaking
engagement to the next. He consistently demonstrated an
understanding of Republican values in his pro-Union, anti
slavery addresses.

Although Clay demonstrated an

occasional lack of moderation, tact, or good taste within
his speeches, his bold and direct accusations of
corruption within the ranks of the southern Democrats may
well have formed the basis of effective ethical appeals.
Robinson, Reeder and Chase demonstrated character and
intelligence in their addresses, according to the
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standards provided by the neo-Aristotelian model of
analysis.

Each man brought authority to the speech

occasion based on personal experience.

According to the

inserted observations of the newspaper reporters,
identification between speaker and audience was successful
as measured by applause and vocal feed-back from the
audience.

On the whole, their ethos probably contributed

to strengthening pre-existing positive attitudes toward
the Republican party and its presidential candidate.
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Chapter 5
Logical Appeals

According to the methodology presented in Speech
Criticism, the logical appeals of a speech act can be
examined for three elements: the validity of an idea as
presented by the speaker; the application of argumentation
theory to the development of proof in support of the
speaker's idea; and the "measure of truth" demonstrated in
the reasoning processes utilized by the speaker.1
Although cautioning that these criteria alone are not a
precise formula for speech criticism, the authors suggest
the following three-part method for judging the logical
development of a persuasive appeal: one, the "intellectual
resources" of the speaker; two, the "severity and
strictness" of the logical forms; and three, the basic
"truth" of the speaker's ideas as they relate to existing
conditions.
The "truths" from which the Republican speakers argued
l

were developed in the party ideology.

"Freedom" was the

basic theme of the party platform and free labor was the
prevailing emphasis of each Republican campaign address.
As defined by Eric Foner, free labor encompassed not only
the doctrine of freedom from bondage as a Constitutional

guarantee, but also the dignity of individual labor as the
basis of a functioning capitalistic society. 2

Individual

labor was perceived as the foundation of a vital,
expanding economy endowed with the morality of the
eighteenth century Protestant work ethic.

Free labor was

a concept that included the opportunity for the laborer to
rise from one economic level to the next as the just
reward of his industriousness.

Economic independence was

the epitome of the working man's career.3
Although the free labor concept was appealing to the
growing middle class in 1856, it was unpopular among
northern industrialists.

According to Foner's analysis,

free labor threatened the capitalistic concept that
employees should be grateful for their jobs regardless of
working conditions or salary.

However, most Republican

speakers did not focus their rhetoric on the concerns of
the big industrialists, since big business was well served
by the political status quo.

Instead, the orators were

concerned with the votes of the middle class - a middle
class, swelling with skilled immigrants and western
businessmen, that was beginning to threaten the entrenched
economic dominance of the eastern industrial
establishment.
As a result of their free labor ideology, the
Republicans perceived the stratified slave labor society
of the South as an economic threat to the North.

Nathaniel Banks, whose Wall Street speech is examined in
this chapter, addressed the negative economic
ramifications of any future southern political dominion
with a series of sectional arguments.

To enhance the

perception of the economic problems foreseen under another
Democratic administration, the Republicans developed their
own version of the southern conspiracy theory, linking
national economic ruin with continued southern political
domination in Congress.*

The speakers predicted that the

southern states would act together as a unified "slave
power" to use the national government to promote the
interests of the slave states over those of the progressminded North.5

The erosion of free labor would accompany

any consolidation of southern leadership in the federal
government, resulting in a national slave society.
Republicans claimed that any portion of a society that did
not allow its workers to savor the rewards of their own
labors could hardly be expected to promote the work ethic
and economic growth of any other region in the country.
The logical arguments employed by Republican speakers
were confined to the premise of free labor as a
Constitutional right.

In addition, many of the speakers

built arguments against the extension of slavery by
"proving" the existence of a pro-southern Democratic
conspiracy to open the entire territorial United States to
slavery.

The arguments in favor of these concepts were
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constructed by men highly skilled in public speaking who
addressed particularly receptive audiences.
This chapter examines the particular logical appeals
employed by the following speakers:

Nathaniel Banks,

speaker of the House, who provided the most dramatic
example of logical proof in favor of free labor while
addressing an outdoor assembly of New York merchants from
the steps of the New York Merchant's Exchange; George
Curtis, a newcomer to politics, who addressed a gathering
of literary men in Middletown, Connecticut, on their duty
as scholars to fight actively the "slave power" with their
pens and their votes in order to protect the First
Amendment guarantees of the Constitution; and William H.
Seward, who provided the ideological premises of the
Republican platform as a rational alternative to the
breakdown of the political and economic systems that a
Democratic administration would trigger.
Specific attention is paid to the use of economic and
sectional appeals in place of the more inflammatory
abolitionist and pro-Kansas rhetoric of the ethical and
emotional appeals. Each speech is examined for two major
premises as described in Speech Criticism: first, an
analysis of the Republican economic policy embodied in the
free labor concept in terms of credible evidence and valid
reasoning processes; second, an analysis of the political
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threat envisioned by a "united" South for further credible
evidence and valid reasoning.
According to the methodology presented in Thonssen,
Baird and Braden, the invention of sound logical arguments
lies in the speaker's ability to recognize pressing socio
political problems? to think reflectively about those
problems in order to define solutions; and to identify
probable implications of those solutions.**

The three

speakers analyzed in this chapter effectively identified
the containment of slavery and the growing threat of
southern political control in the Congress as the pressing
socio-political issues facing the campaign audience.
Their solutions lay with the election of a Republican
administration.

The logical appeals in these speeches

dealt with the implications of electing a Republican
administration and the implied problems in retaining a
Democratic administration.

Nathaniel Banks: Address of September 26, 1856

Nathaniel Banks constructed his entire appeal on the
premise that the South was to blame for all economic and
political problems that plagued the nation in 1856.

He

relied upon two lines of reasoning to support his
allegation.

First, he argued that the superiority of

northern industrialization demonstrated

the inefficiency
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of southern slave labor policies, which contributed to a
weakened economic situation in the nation as a whole.
Second, he argued that the southern political stranglehold
on national politics had occurred by northern default, not
by any particular strength of southern political acumen.
Banks'

strategy in constructing logical appeals was

clearly stated at the beginning of his address.
In that which I have to say to you I
mean to rely upon great facts above
all questions as to their truth, and
facts which, if admitted, remove all
question as to the policy by which we
should be directed in this impending
controversy
The crowd gathered to listen to Banks'

"great facts" was

estimated at well over 20,000 members by the New York
Daily Times** and as great as 25,000 by the New York Daily
Tribune.9

He spoke for over two hours to a crowd which

packed the street for an entire city block in front of the
Merchant's Exchange.

To this mass of merchants, bankers,

and speculators, Banks argued that all current national
problems were the fault of the South, rooted in economic
practices spawned by the reliance on bound labor and
protected by "slave power" representatives ensconced in
the United States Congress.
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Free Labor - Evidence

As his only evidence, Banks analyzed the economic
productivity of the nation and the portions of that
national product contributed by each region.

He claimed

that the North contributed three-quarters of the overall
industrial/agricultural wealth of the nation.

In

contrast, he claimed that the South contributed 45% of the
agricultural product, 20% of the industrial output, and
less than 20% of the trade.
figures proved that " . . .
and palpable . . .

According to him, these
the reason of this is apparent

In the South, there is one man down and

another holding him there.

There is one portion of the

people doing nothing and another portion of the same
people helping them do nothing."10

The solution could be

found, he contended, by forcing the South to emulate
northern industrial and economic practices.

Free Labor - Reasoning Processes

Banks argued that the northern industrial community
would assist the South in a total revision of its economic
structure.

This revision would allow the South to

contribute fairly to the national product. Indeed, he
suggested that slavery would automatically wither in the
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face of the more efficient, northern agricultural methods
certain to be adopted by southern planters after the
northern enlightenment arrived in the slave states.

The

speaker asserted that the southerners
will come North into the manufacturing
and mechanical establishment, the
agricultural fields and the country
houses, and learning from us, they
will accomplish great results in their
own s e c t i o n . H
Banks' argument was logically sound and strategically
wise.

He did not raise the possibility that the South

might resist change, but emphasized instead what his
audience presumed to be true: that businessmen and farmers
in the South aspired to the industrial and agricultural
achievements of the North.
Cast as a hypothetical syllogism, his argument can be
examined for logical integrity.

The major premise is: if

southerners can be relieved of the responsibility for
running the national government, then they will emulate
northern concern with economic growth and improvement.
The minor premise is: a Republican administration can
relieve the South of the responsibility for running the
national government.

The conclusion is that the South

would turn to the North as a role model for economic
improvement.

Therefore, the minor premise affirms the

antecedent and the syllogism is formally valid.

The

weakness of the argument is that Banks provided no
motivation for southern agriculturalists to come North for
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instruction.

However, since other Republican speakers

argued from similar sectional premises, then Banks must
have presumed the premises as truthful.

Southern Threat - Evidence

Banks claimed that a northern political victory would
force the South to reevaluate its economic impact on the
nation. He argued that once the South was no longer
distracted by affairs of state, its citizens would
automatically engage in commerce and industrialization.
However, he also acknowledged that it was this southern
preoccupation with national politics which had allowed
northern industrialists the leisure to develop flourishing
businesses.

The inference seems to be that the time had

come for the North to guide both the economy and the
political direction of the nation, allowing the South to
end slavery and pattern its economy on that of the North.
Banks argued that a northern political victory would
force the South to compare its achievements with those of
the North, causing its leaders to
recognize the truth of the statement
that I have made to you - that they
have no literature, no science, little
or no commerce, little or no
manufacturing and mechanical industry;
and that even their agricultural
industry is falling o f f . 12

As evidence, he cited statistics from the Bureau of
Inventions, Washington, D.C., which supported his
contention that few southerners were mechanically
inventive.

" [0] f two thousand patents issued . . . for the

last year,” he noted,

"less than one hundred and twenty-

five were issued to men living in the fifteen southern
states."13
The evidence used by Banks was loaded in favor of the
small businessman and the middle-class manufacturing
community. It was the northern industrialists and
financial merchants he was addressing in both the
immediate audience as well as the reading audience.

He

relied upon statistical evidence for all of his production
arguments, inferring that greater production was the
equivalent of greater success in both the economic and
political spheres.

Southern Threat - Reasoning Processes

Banks' reasoning can be cast into the following
syllogistic format:

men who succeed in business can

succeed in politics; northern men are successful business
men; therefore, northern men will make successful
politicians.
The next assertion in his chain of reasoning was: men
who succeed in politics should want to succeed in
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business;

southern men were successful politicians;

therefore,

southern men should want to succeed at

business.

These categorical forms support a contention

that arose repeatedly throughout his address.

Banks

formulated the hypothesis that northern control of
politics would force the South to abandon slavery and
engage in commerce patterned after northern practices.
Arguing that southern political maneuvering was the
cause of the dangerous sectionalism that was a hallmark of
the 1856 campaign, Banks used the Pierce administration to
demonstrate how Democratic policy caused sectional
division and civil unrest.14

He implied that the southern

Democrats, responsible for the election of Pierce and his
administration, were fully and solely responsible for the
repeal of the Missouri Compromise.

If it had not been

repealed, the sectional and ideological strife in Kansas
would have never occurred. Therefore, he contended, the
Democrats, specifically the southern Democrats, were
responsible for every drop of northern blood spilled in
Kansas.
As a further indictment of the pro-southern, Democratic
administration, Banks claimed that the entire nation was
at peace in 1853.

By comparison, Banks claimed that after

three years of Democratic leadership
We see today one entire section of the
confederacy arrayed in policy and
purpose, as represented by candidates,
against another portion, and the
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fairest portion of the territorial
possessions of the Government reddened
with the blood of American citizens,
stricken down by the hands of each
other in a bloody civil strife.^5
The blood-soaked imagery employed by Banks focused the
blame for the Kansas riots on the Democratic
administration in Washington, D.C.

It would have been

commonly accepted among the members of his audience that
Stephen Douglas, a Democrat, and his fellow members of the
Senate Committee on Territories were responsible for the
legislation that repealed the Missouri Compromise.
Banks and, by implication, the North were outraged
further by an executive order sending federal troops to
restore peace to the territory.

This act was perceived as

overt support of the pro-slavery territorial government —
the government elected by armed insurgents from Missouri.
Therefore, Banks placed the blame for the breakdown of law
and order in the territories with the pro-southern Pierce
administration.

Casting the argument as a hypothetical

syllogism, Banks contended that if the southern Democrats
claimed to be representatives of a peaceful
administration, then there should be no violence in the
nation. There was violence in Kansas.

Therefore, the

representatives of the Democratic party did not represent
peace.

This syllogism tests successfully as a valid

logical construction, since the minor premise denies the
consequent.
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Banks furthered his sectional argument by claiming that
the Pierce administration actually condoned and promoted
the lawlessness that characterized the Democraticallycontrolled policies.
The men of the North who have gone
into that Territory are disfranchised,
and the United States Government looks
coldly upon all these transactions
without an effort to restore peace,
unwilling even to make any declaration
of principles that shall tend to
restore peace in that distracted
Territory.^®
Banks contended that the Democrats were without an
ideological basis as a party and could not claim logically
to represent peace - or anything else - without a
declaration of ideological commitment.

His contention

reinforced the popular notion that the North was more
highly principled than the South.

Based on the pro-

Republican evidence provided by the political situation in
Kansas, Pierce's southern-influenced administration
represented only continued slavery and armed conflict.
Banks challenged the Democratic argument that the
violence in Kansas stemmed from an excessive number of
aggressive anti-slavery settlers.

Claiming to have

studied the emigration records of five western states.
Banks concluded that emigration to Kansas was not a " . .
. new thing in the history of the American states as if it
were of scandalous character, purpose and intent."1?

By

example, he demonstrated that no civil conflagration had
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accompanied any past northern migration westward.
Therefore, the blame for the volatile situation in Kansas
must be placed outside of the arrival of the northern
anti-slavery settlers.

Perceived Truth of the Ideas:

According to Thonssen, Baird and Braden, the ” . . .
i

preparation and background that the speaker brings to the
process of logical invention figures strongly in the
determination of argumentative soundness and integrity."18
Banks included statistics and examples to heighten his
credibility as an analytical speaker.

His conclusions

were logically sound when tested against both the evidence
he presented and the prevailing beliefs of his partisan
audience.

But, Banks did not merely list facts, figures,

and analyses.

His use of emotional proof, with evocative

language being of primary importance, strengthened his
logical appeals.
This use of emotional proof was a further measure of
the intellectual stock of Banks as a speaker, since a
successful orator must be able to adapt the evidence to
meet the needs of his audience.

The speakers " . . .

must

prepare the minds of the audience for the ready acceptance
of the evidence used to support the arguments."19

For

example, in order to engage the sympathy of his audience
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for his purely sectional argument, Banks demanded that
they remember the violence in the Senate.

He was

indirectly referring to Sumner's caning by the enraged
Democrat, Preston Brooks, who became an effective symbol
of southern emotionalism and violent potential, an idea
popular among the northern speakers.
Banks reminded his audience of the incident in order to
expand inductively his argument about the dangers of
increased southern political control.
[I]f the act . . . [by] which the
sovereignty of a State is despoiled of
its Representative is looked upon with
acclamation in some parts of the
country and tolerated with
indifference in other sections, every
man must feel in his heart of hearts
that there is no longer a hope for the
institutions or liberties of the
American people.20
Banks skillfully wove his emotional proofs into the
claim of logical analyses that comprised the main portion
of his address.

He used emotional proofs to illustrate

the "truth" of his logical conclusions - the test of
probable "certainty" demanded by the methodology.2 1

He

demonstrated the certainty of the economic threat posed by
future southern political strength in a manner acceptable
to his immediate audience.

His conclusion that a

Republican administration would bring "four years of peace
. . . and we will open all these avenues of wealth"22 was
one of the few unsubstantiated assertions of his entire
speech.

Banks did not address the possibility that northern
pre-occupation with politics, should the Republicans be
victorious in 1856, might weaken the northern contribution
to the national product.

Neither did he entertain the

possibility that the South might cling even more strongly
to the institution of slavery if stripped of both economic
and political options as a result of a Republican
administration.

Since Banks and his audience were

convinced that the South desired to match northern
industrial and agricultural output, he argued that the
South would willingly relinquish its institutions in order
to industrialize.

Once the South was occupied by

commercial interests, he insisted, southern political
domination would melt away.
He asserted that the South had actually amassed its
political power by default, a notion popular with his
audience.

Since the North had been absorbed by commerce

during the developing years of the nation's history, the
South "has turned its attention chiefly, so far as its
leading men are concerned, to the government of the
country," securing for themselves and their fellow
southerners the necessary "methods of obtaining places of
honor and trust in the Government."2 ^

Political power

needed to be divided between the sections of the country,
according to Banks, with the Republicans providing the
means to bring about a political balance.
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George William Curtis: Address of August 7, 1856

On August 7, 1856, George William Curtis delivered an
address entitled "The Duties of the American Scholar" to
the members of the assembled literary societies of
Wesleyan University in Middletown, Connecticut.2^

The

address was one of the most widely distributed, read, and
quoted of the Republican campaign in spite of its
suitability for a particular occasion and the narrow
audience of intellectual and economic elite of the
northeast.
In his speech, Curtis eloquently called for literary
activists in the mold of the wounded Charles Sumner, who,
"In a Republic of free men,

. . . speaks for freedom and

his blood stains the Senate floor."2 ^

Curtis artfully

built a substantial case to encourage scholars to employ
their pens actively and their voices in support of the
Republican campaign - a case so sound in its rational
development that its proofs were borrowed wholesale by
other Republicans during the remainder of the campaign.
George William Curtis spoke from experience, both as a
scholar and as a politician.

His introductory remarks

were designed to establish his intellectual resources,
since his audience was composed of academics.

The

relationship between the duties he assigned his audience
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and the political problems of the era was tenuous.

Yet,

by carefully constructing proofs that defined the
scholar's responsibility to take an active part in the
campaign and by offering himself as an inferential example
of an activist-scholar, Curtis proved that he was a
skillful strategist.
His own scholarly background was the most important
facet in establishing his intellectual stock and his
capacity for the formulation of

i d e a s .

26

Curtis chose to

demonstrate his intellectual abilities in a lengthy
introduction that contained a wealth of literary and
historical allusions.

His audience may have been aware of

his background as a protegee of Ralph Waldo Emerson and
the Transcendentalists of Brooks Farm, where Curtis stayed
for two years during his youth.

He was well-traveled,

documenting his travels in works of satire and descriptive
analysis that were published and widely circulated in the
North.

"The Duties of the American Scholar" was the first

in a series of literary orations that distinguished his
career.27
Once Curtis established his intellectual stock, he
proceeded to establish a link between his audience and the
political problems of the nation.

Since few members of

his audience were directly affected by the Kansas
situation, Curtis had to establish a connection between
the experiences shared by his immediate audience and the
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urgency of the issues facing the rest of the North.

These

students and academics, cloistered in a private,
northeastern college, needed to be reassured of their
importance in the Republican campaign.

Curtis needed to

establish a political scholarly ideal with which his
immediate audience could successfully identify.

Only then

could he effectively argue for specific action.
Curtis began his address with a series of definitions
in order to enhance the process of identification.
Scholarship was defined as an active process of
involvement in world affairs.

Curtis claimed that the

scholar of 1856 must not "abstract" himself from the
practical world any more than the Greeks would have
abstracted themselves from events at Thermopylae.
Claiming that the life of a scholar in ancient Greece did
not preclude the scholar's responsibilities as a citizen,
Curtis inferred that the precedent for action applied to
the audience he addressed in Middletown.

He demanded that

the scholars seated before him, as citizens of a republic,
fulfill their duty to protect their Constitutional
freedoms,

for without freedom, scholarship can neither

flourish nor even exist.

His premise was boldly stated,

given the occasion, because he was addressing participants
in a literary festival, not a political rally.

Curtis

acknowledged the seeming impropriety of his political
oratory on an epideictic occasion, but he defended his
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argument by asserting his intent to stray beyond the
oratorical pale of the occasion.
I know well that a conventional
prejudice consecrates this occasion to
dull abstractions and timid if not
treacherous generalities.
It would
allow me to speak of the scholar and
the American scholar, in his relation
to Greek roots and particles, but
would forbid me to mention his duties
to American topics and times.28
In this manner, he gave greater weight to the perceived
urgency of the issue under examination which is a logical
approach to a topic both unexpected and (perhaps)
unwelcome on this ceremonial occasion.

Free Labor - Evidence

Curtis included very little specific evidence in this
speech.

Instead, he relied on his ability to construct

arguments from logical premises that were accepted as
truthful by his audience.

He argued, mainly,

from

examples.
Curtis employed a brief stock argument to establish the
economic value of free labor.

His evidence against the

use of slave labor included a comparison of land values
between the potentially fertile southern areas of the
nation and the less fertile New England states.

He

asserted that the inexpensive southern farmland had been
worked to exhaustion by the unenlightened system of
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intensive slave labor.

The South's potential for a

successful agricultural society had been destroyed by the
greedy demands of the few and the labor of the oppressed
majority.

Curtis claimed that the relatively low land

values in the potentially rich southern climates
constituted the necessary evidence that slave labor was
economically uns o u n d .2 9

Free Labor - Reasoning Processes

Curtis built a case that favored scholarly involvement
in behalf of particular political activities.

First, he

defined the general role of scholars in any national
enterprise, insisting that scholars held the collective
responsibility for the soul of their nation.

Scholars

embodied the conscience of the state, carrying the
responsibility to re-awaken the populace to its
responsibilities in times of national prosperity and
prosperity's attendant immorality.

He provided examples

from ancient history, again establishing precedents for
his audience to build upon.
Greece was not greatest when rumors of
war had ceased.
Rome was not most
imperial in the voluptuous calm of
Constantinopolitan decay.
The
magnificent monotony of Bourbon
tyranny in France, and the reign of
its shopkeeping King, were not the
grand eras of French h i s t o r y . 30
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Curtis chose to emphasize the national prosperity and
complacency as the greatest impediments to a Republican
victory.

Ironically, his audience was composed of the

sons of satisfied, prosperous merchants and farmers.
Curtis condemned Greece, Rome, and France for failing
to provide for the long-term collective welfare of their
citizens.

He characterized their activities as selfish -

aimed at immediate gain. If they had only met the
aesthetic needs of their citizenry, he claimed, then they
would have prospered.

Therefore, since the goal of the

state is a prosperity which can be achieved by providing
for the common aesthetic needs of the entire nation, then
the " . . .

elevation and correction of public sentiment

is the scholar's office in the state."31
Curtis provided a confusing set of propositions in
proof of his hypothesis.

First, he defined his terms.

He

claimed that national peace was the key to prosperity.
But peace depends upon the absence of moral idealism.

He

implied that moral idealism disappears with political
compromise according to historical precedent. If peace can
be negotiated easily when moral standards are in abeyance,
then the success of private enterprise

(which depends upon

peace to succeed) becomes the measure of the moral
standard of the nation. Therefore, if keeping peace within
a nation is the most important task of the government,
then the task of the scholar is to insure that the moral

standards and aesthetic needs of the citizens are not
forgotten.

As a specific indictment of the Democratic

party, Curtis cited the political power of the wealthy,
slave-owning southerners to illustrate his hypothesis.
The Compromise of 1850, which contained the immoral
Fugitive Slave clause, was negotiated to maintain the
peace between the two sections of the nation.

Therefore,

peace was secured by compromising the moral standards of
the nation in order to preserve private enterprise.
Deductively, then, Curtis indicted the wealthy,
slaveowning southerners and their northern financial
counterparts for following a line of political expediency
that protected their financial interests.
The argument was applied to his particular audience
when Curtis asserted that the duty of the scholar is to
identify the immoral bases of such national policies and
to use all literary means to uncover and broadcast those
activities to the public.

The nobility of citizenship, he

claimed, is preserved through moral activity in this
manner.
To the right discharge of this duty
all his learning is merely subsidiary,
and if he fails to devote it to this
end he is recreant to his duty.
The
end of all scholarly attainment is to
live nobly.3 2
As an example

of an

dedicated to the

activist scholar whose life was

nobility of literary pursuits and

political application, Curtis presented a lengthy
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biography of John Milton.

Milton would have been a

familiar character to the Middletown audience as both the
author of Paradise Lost and as a foe of "Cromwellian
dictatorship."33

Curtis argued that scholars should apply

their literary skills to the same political ends which
occupied Milton - freedom of the press, enlightened
education and the revelation of truth in a public
atmosphere of dialectical freedom.
Having established the scholarly political ideal to
which he wished his audience to aspire, Curtis proceeded
to analyze the particular political role of the American
scholar.

Curtis claimed that the American scholar who

neither voiced his opinion nor voted was a traitor.
Before casting the argument as a syllogism, it is
necessary to analyze his terms.

First, Curtis argued that

a democratic republic determines policy by majority rule
and that the majority is determined by the number of votes
cast and available for tabulation.

Each non-voter weakens

his own cause numerically, allowing the minority to
achieve a political ascendancy that undermines the
democratic ideal of majority rule.

Therefore, treason is

the result of withholding one's vote.
traitors in a participatory democracy.
participatory democracy.

All non-voters are
America is a

Therefore, non-voters in America

are traitors. As a categorical syllogism, the argument is
valid.
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In a second, specific argument against the use of slave
labor, Curtis cited the "natural" decline of slavery in
the North as a sign of inefficiency as an economic, and
political, system.

Economic, political, and artistic

progress accompanied the rise of the North as an
industrial and agricultural leader at the time slavery was
abandoned.

Since the North was providing the art,

literature, educational institutions, and manufacturing
processes that were the measures of progress, as
interpreted by Curtis and the Republican sectionalists,
and the North had cast off slavery prior to the rise of
its progressive institutions, Curtis chose to acknowledge
the decline of northern slavery as a sign of rising
progressivism.
A third sign employed as an argument against
governmental support of slavery was his use of "testimony"
from the correspondence of the founding fathers, men who
were perceived as enlightened protectors of both "Liberty"
and liberty.

Curtis dealt with the ideological aspects of

"Liberty" in his definition of the governmental
responsibility to protect society from "rapacious"
individuals.

Individual liberty, a concept that occupied

the Republicans in 1856, had its roots in the
Constitutional Convention, according to evidence supplied
by Curtis.

He claimed that George Washington desired the

legal abolition of slavery in his correspondence dated
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1786; that Thomas Jefferson considered slavery a form of
despotism; and that James Madison abhorred the concept of
man as a piece of property.
Curtis inferred that this testimony, taken from a
variety of personal correspondence between the men named
above and their various political counterparts, was
evidence that the republic was conceived in a spirit of
universal individual liberty. The democratic nature of
American political institutions was constrained by an
acknowledgment of bondage.34

Therefore, democracy would

not exist - and was not designed to exist - in the
presence of slavery.
The premises of this argument would have been perceived
as valid by the partisan voters in his audience.

His

reasoning was consistent with party assertions, slanted
toward portraying the slave-owning founders as men whose
intellects rebelled at the necessity for keeping slaves.
Curtis did not choose to illustrate further the
relationship between slavery and its practice by the men
who were portrayed as the ideological founders of the
anti-slavery Republican party.

His audience had often

heard the arguments designed to exonerate Jefferson,
Madison and Washington.

Curtis simply added more evidence

with his list of correspondence.
In order to vote, however, one needed to make a
decision as to which party "respected" the majority of

national concerns and the welfare of the state.

Ideally,

one supported the party that recognized the needs of the
majority of the citizens.

At this point in his address,

Curtis began his partisan appeal.

Southern Threat - Evidence

Curtis argued that the existence of slavery denied the
basic premise of a democratic government.

Progress could

not occur, he contended, under a system which denied
liberty to any member of that system.
clear.

The evidence was

Obviously, no progress had occurred in the South,

since a lack of literature or other civilized activities
could be documented.
Manners are fantastic and fierce;
brute force supplants moral principle;
freedom of speech is suppressed
because the national speech of Man
condemns slavery . . . a slave society
has the characteristics of wandering
tribes who rob, and live, therefore,
insecure in the shadow of impending
vengeance.^5
Curtis acknowledged the existence of individuals among the
slave owners who were moral and undeserving of
condemnation.

He recognized that not all men could be

responsible for a system which governed them.

However, he

did argue that "the mass of men are never better than
their institution",36 which supported his initial
proposition that the system of slavery was at fault.
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Curtis demanded a government that would serve the
progressive needs of all members of the society.
Otherwise, the institution itself was not functional.
The events that encouraged the growth of the "slave
power" were presented as specific evidence of a southern
threat.

Curtis reminded his audience that Mississippi was

brought into the Union as a slave state over the protests
of the abolitionists who demanded a free constitution;
that the Missouri Compromise was enacted with the South as
a document of trust; that Florida had entered the Union
under Spanish rule, which had abolished slavery, then
became a slave state when becoming part of a democratic
nation; that the Pickney Resolutions violated the First
Amendment;

that the Compromise of 1850 was another

document of trust that strengthened the fugitive slave
laws; and that the Kansas-Nebraska Bill of 1854 was the
final bit of evidence that the united South was
controlling the nation's government for the benefit of a
minority of its citizens.37
The purpose of the lengthy chronology was to illustrate
the concessions wrung from the United States government by
the "Slave Power," a term Curtis employed repeatedly.

By

implying that slave holders were powerfully united in
order to transform democratic institutions to their
selfish needs, he was attempting to engage the sympathy of
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the audience while presenting documentary evidence to
support his contentions.

Curtis reminded his audience

that the threat of disunion had accompanied every demand
made by members of the "Slave Power," in spite of the
numerical and economic inferiority to the North.

Southern Threat - Reasoning Processes

Curtis argued that it was not really the threat of
disunion that so powerfully insured the policies of the
"Slave Power," but rather the moral degeneration of the
North during its search for a prosperous peace.

It was

compromise that gave the "Slave Power" its strength and
weakened the North.

Curtis described the repeal of the

Missouri Compromise to illustrate his argument.
This [repeal] was an immense victory
for the Slave Power, for it revealed
to them a state of demoralization in
the party of Freedom.
It showed the
Slave Power that it could accomplish
its ends by depending upon the moral
weakness of the enemy rather than upon
its own numerical strength.
The
historian commemorates a national
crime when he records that during all
these debates the party of Freedom had
a majority of votes in Congress.3®
At the conclusion of his speech, Curtis had argued a full
circle.

He returned to the theme of collective

responsibility, which had characterized his opening
remarks to the assembled scholars.
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In order to prove that the Republicans represented the
ideals of the democratic state whose liberties were being
exploited by the opposing, minority party, Curtis argued
that the function of a governmental institution was
limited to its ability to protect human liberty.

He

defended his assertion with the following hypothetical
reasoning: if human governments enact laws, then those
laws must be designed to protect society from those
members who would restrict individual freedoms by usurping
power.

Human governments enact laws. Therefore, the

function of government is to protect society from
individuals who would assume powers detrimental to society
as a whole.

The reasoning is valid because the minor

premise affirms the antecedent clause of the major
premise.
He clarified this circular definition by claiming that
society exists both to improve the individual's quality of
life as well as to promote the improvement of the "race".
Therefore, the government must protect society from
irresponsible people without limiting the ability of
society to improve itself and its individual members.
[C]onsequently that is the best
government which gives to men the
largest liberty and constantly
modifies itself in the interest of
Freedom.3^
By inference, Curtis indicted Douglas and his political
cohorts for preparing the legislation that repealed the

Missouri Compromise.

According to the Republicans, the

repeal was perceived as detrimental to the health of the
nation. The abrogation of civil law in the territories was
evidence of the improper use of power that resulted in the
restriction of personal liberty in the border regions.
Curtis clearly intended to influence the audience in favor
of the Republican platform, which he discussed in some
detail as a means of establishing a more responsible form
of government. He repeated the words "liberty" and
"freedom" frequently throughout the second portion of his
speech.

This repetition served to remind his audience of

the Republican slogan which included the phrases "free
labor, free soil and free men."

He obviously intended to

enhance a sense of identity which, in turn, would increase
the appeal of his logical arguments.

Perceived Truth of the Ideas

Curtis was able to supply evidence for his contentions
even at the most emotional moments of his address.

This

technique heightened his authority as a speaker and
reenforced his reputation as a scholar.40

For example,

his reference to a "national crime" reminded the audience
of his earlier examination

of the treasonous activities

of the Pierce administration.

The themes of liberty, duty

and morality appeared throughout the address, illustrated

and supported in a manner consistent with C u r t i s 1
reputation.

These themes were also consistent with the

moral temper of the region.

Curtis gathered the three

themes into a decisive call to action in the conclusion of
his address.
He asserted that freedom of thought could only exist in
an atmosphere of liberty, for without the freedom to
express thought, the intellectual life of the individual
and society would cease to exist.

He compared the

scholars seated before him in Middletown to the patriots
of Lexington and Bunker Hill.

He demanded that the

scholars temporarily forsake their homes and their purely
intellectual pursuits in order to protect their political
liberty, just as the residents of revolutionary New
England temporarily forsook their homes to secure a
government free from outside influence.

By inference, the

"Slave Power" took on overtones of British despotism taxation without representation - which was a powerful
emotional appeal in New England.
Curtis the transcendentalist was evident throughout the
<

address.

He reasoned by analogy, employing historical and

literary examples familiar to his audience, searching for
arguments relevant to the occasion and the local political
temper.

His ideas were internally consistent, as none of

his evidence refuted any portion of his theses.

Curtis

addressed the particular needs of his party, his region
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and his audience throughout the speech, placing the
particular issue - an appeal for votes - into a
sociological construct with intellectual appeal for his
audience.
Curtis engaged in a valid reflective process.

He

identified the political problem, the abrogation of
majority rule; he analyzed the problem in the proper
social setting, the lack of scholarship demonstrated by
those men wielding the greatest political power; he
suggested a solution, that those who favored majority rule
for the protection of their liberty to pursue scholarly
activities should vote against the currently prevailing
minority; and he reasoned, by example and analogy, that
the implications of both the present situation and the
implications of his solution should provide the necessary
evidence and motivation to involve his audience actively
in supporting the Republican campaign.

William H. Seward: Address of 24 October, 1856

William H. Seward enjoyed a reputation as an
impassioned defender of freedom.

During the summer months

of the 1856 campaign, he continued to argue from the
Senate floor against the extension of slavery into the
territories of the United States.

He was in the midst of

a long, distinguished career in the United States Senate
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as a representative from New York.

He had served that

state as its governor as well as its Congressional
representative, being returned to the Senate as recently
as 1855 by the vote of the state legislature.

His re-

election campaign in 1855 was the successful result of a
state-wide oratorical contest between the pro-slavery and
the free soil politicians.

Seward was returned to the

Senate for a second six year term as the representative of
the anti-slavery politicans of New York.

He did not

campaign for his Senate seat, since Senators were still
appointed in 1855, but he actively participated in the
state elections that year by stumping for Republican
candidates.4 ^
In 1855, Seward gave several speeches that were full of
enthusiasm and ringing endorsements of the newly formed
Republican Party as a result of his involvement in the New
York c a m p a i g n . 43

Seward's "free Kansas" and anti

slavery speeches were widely reprinted and referenced,
with one reference even appearing (with attribution)

in

President Pierce's annual Message to Congress in December,
1855.43
In Albany, New York, Seward condemned the Democratic
Party and the entire national administration for bowing to
the dictates of the privileged classes - the
slaveholders.44

This speech, which was delivered on

October 12, 1855 - one year prior to his campaign speech
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favoring the candidacy of John Fremont, identified clearly
the particular problems facing the emerging Republican
party and the political future of the nation. Eloquently,
Seward described "the spirit of the revolutionary age"
that must infuse the anti-slavery voters.

He argued that

slavery was "antagonistic to the fundamental principle of
the

go v ernment";45

a n <j

that the privileged classes

promoted legislation that "darkly shaded,

[allows]

personal humiliations which daily come home to
yourselves."46
I do not dwell, as others so often and
so justly do, upon the atrocious
usurpation of the government of Kansas
by the slaveholders of Missouri, nor
even on the barbarous and tyrannical
code which they have established to
stifle freedom in that territory, nor
even yet on the fraudulent and
nefarious connivance of the president
with the usurpers.47
These were not the words of a man lacking imagination or
courage, nor were they the words of a man of unpolished
rhetorical skill or unawareness of his oratorical power.
William Seward should have been a great asset to the
Republican Party in 1856, given his reputation and the
evidence of his

moral convictions in 1855.

However,

Seward gave a limited effort to the national campaign
designed by the

party he had helped to create, mold,

launch into the

political arena.

and

Only two major addresses are included in his memoirs
for the campaign period.

Seward was, of course, detained
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in Washington for the extra session of Congress that was
called in late August to deal with the budget issues of
the Indian wars.*8

The extra session of Congress demanded

a great deal of his time and energy.
expended by the end of the session.

His passion was
He had not secured

the Republican presidential nomination at the June
convention; his oratory on the floor of the Senate had not
produced any immediate results in Kansas; and he faced a
national campaign for which he had no enthusiasm, either
personally or professionally.

Seward preferred to spend

the fall in Europe, but he was dissuaded by political
friends.

They needed his voice, especially in New York,

to legitimize the activities of the new party.

Familiar

names, like that of William H. Seward, provided the sole
means of identification that the Republican Party could
depend upon for bringing new voters to its organization.
In 1856, William Seward's campaign speeches were coldly
analytical, almost devoid of passion.

Stylistically, they

contrast sharply with his speeches of 1855.

The topics of

both years were similar - campaign speeches in favor of
Republican candidates and ideals - but the lack of
metaphor, evocative language, and idealistic goals in the
1856 addresses were uncharacteristic for both the speaker
and the occasion. The ringing idealism and the sweeping
oratory were noticeably lacking in these campaign efforts.
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Even his specific references to the Republican party were
tepid and vague.
On October 2, 1856, Senator Seward made the first of
the two campaign speeches that have been included in his
memoirs. The Senator spoke in Detroit, Michigan, to a
partisan crowd of Republican supporters.

However if the

audience had come to hear grand oratory and impassioned
eloquence, they were bitterly disappointed. He proposed to
prove that the slave-holding minority of the United States
population had infiltrated every portion of the
government. As proof, Seward provided lists.

He listed

the names of every appointed and elected member of
Congress. He condemned the President, the vice-president,
his secretaries,

"printers, sergeants at arms, door

keepers and pages," each of whom "is either an active or
passive advocate of the policy of the slaveholding
class."49

He listed committee members, by name, and their

disposition to vote for slavery measures; Constitution
committees,

foreign relations committees, the committee on

agriculture, and the committee on the Army and the Navy,
services long thought to be particular southern
strongholds.
In the speech, Seward surveyed the national government,
department by department, taking his audience on a
travelogue of the Washington Mall. The courts, the Post
Office, and the Department of the Interior shared in the
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scorn heaped upon the internal operation of the Democratic
administration by Senator Seward. But, he defended his
speech to his Michigan audience, claiming that ” . . .
there is no way of escaping imminent danger, without first
calmly and steadily looking it fully in the face and
ascertaining its real nature and magnitude."J50
On Thursday, October 23, in Auburn, New York, less than
three weeks after his Michigan address, Seward spoke
before a large, partisan crowd of Republican supporters.
Rather than delivering an impassioned speech on the Kansas
situation or the spread of slavery and its attendant
political and moral evils, Seward provided a lecture on
the American political two-party system.

The Auburn

speech was an oblique endorsement of the Republican party.
It was designed to persuade by exposition, since Seward
only faintly praised his alliance with the new Republican
party while damning the Know-Nothing and Democratic
organizations.
According to the five-step formula outlined by
Thonssen, Baird, and Braden for the measurement of
successful reflective experience, the logical development
of Seward's major argument against the Know-Nothing
(American) party was sound.5 1

First, he recognized the

problem posed by the third party - a distraction of the
public mind from the "real" issue facing the canvass.
Second, he analyzed the bearing of the problem on the
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social setting of the day by arguing that Constitutional
freedoms would be denied all men if slavery were permitted
to expand into the territories.

The capacity of his

audience to engage in free trade would be limited as would
their opportunity to enjoy a free labor market and the
practice of free speech.

Seward met the third measure of

a successful reflective experience by arguing against
support of the third party by the voter. Fourth, Seward's
acuity of analysis was enhanced by his credibility as an
experienced politician and the partisan nature of his
home-town audience.
Upstate New York voters were historically disposed to
distrust third parties.

It was in their state that the

Anti-Masonic party was founded after the murder of a Mason
who published secret ritual information for public
dissemination.S2

Seward's audience was composed of active

abolitionists and angry anti-expansionists who were eager
to hear about the urgency of settling the violence in
Kansas and the role of the Know-Nothings and Democrats in
fueling the frontier violence.
Seward did not discuss the free labor concepts that
were of such importance in other Republican speeches.

His

address served two purposes, one overt and the other
covert.

His covert purpose was to remind the audience of

his long service in their behalf - governor and Senator and of his loyalty to the free-soil concepts that were the
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basis of the new party.

However, his introduction clearly

illustrated his outrage at being passed-over for the
presidential nomination.

He spoke of the "common memory"

shared by his audience and himself of the "long and
inclement political storms" which they had weathered over
the years. He was gratified to see signs of "the triumph
of the political principles which I have cherished through
so many trials" but he was clearly disappointed by his
role as a party spokesman, rather than that of premier
candidate.53
William Seward delivered a dry, rational defense of the
Republican platform by analyzing the shortcomings of the
Democratic and Know-Nothing parties. He examined the
political threat posed by the third party - the threat of
a pro-slavery victory by default at the polls.

He

referred to the record of the Pierce administration as
evidence of Democratic blundering - giving the voter
little choice but to support the Republican party as the
least of three evils.

Southern Threat - Evidence

Senator Seward provided evidence of the perfidy of the
Democratic administration by listing examples of pro
slavery legislation in his speech.

He began with the

Democratic obstruction of the admission of California
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under a "free" constitution in 1850; the Pierce
administration's policy of popular sovereignty in the
territories - the direct result of which was the frontier
violence in progress during the campaign; and the refusal
of the Democratic majority in Congress to admit Kansas as
a free state in spite of impassioned petitions and the
demands of her citizens.
Senator Seward produced a litany of events that he
offered as proof that Democratic party rule had promoted
the expansion of slavery and the negation of effective
compromise.

He resorted to lists in each speech - and the

New York Senator was not afraid to name names.

However,

for the purposes of defining thematic emergence and
political unity of thought, the Auburn speech will be
examined in this chapter.
Seward produced evidence designed to prove that
Democratic party rule was the moving force behind the
territorial expansion of slavery.

First, he reminded his

audience that slavery was legally outlawed from every part
of the nation at the time he first took national office in
1849.^4

m

1856, he claimed, Congress had allowed the

expansion of slavery into all regions, even into those
states and territories that had voted to exclude the
institution as constitutional measures.

Therefore, Seward

concluded that the campaign of 1856 was being waged on the
issue of reclaiming territory for free labor, rather than
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preventing the enactment of legislation that would allow
slavery to expand.

He shifted ground from a defensive to

an offensive argument.

Free Labor - Reasoning Processes

The solution to the expansion problem lay with the
Republican party, he assured his audience, but his proof
was curious.

He suggested that the Republicans were

blameless as the agency of either the pro-expansion forces
or the prior means of checking the growing power of the
slavery forces, since the Republican party did not exist
until after the Missouri Compromise was repealed.
Everyone will at once acquit the
Republican party and those who now
constitute it, of all agency in the
betrayal and surrender of Freedom
[sic], which have thus been made.55
His argument was rational, but tepid.
lot of ground.

It also covered a

Seward not only attempted to exonerate the

Republicans with his reasoning that the party could not
act if it did not exist, but inferred that those Whigs who
were serving in Congress while the repeal was being
enacted were exonerated, as well.
Having built a case against the Democratic party based
upon its support of pro-slavery legislation, Seward
presumed that nothing better
[I]s to be hoped from the Democratic
party in the future.
It is a party
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essentially built on the interest of
slaveholding classes.
Deprived of
that support, it would instantly cease
to exist.5<>
Seward asserted that politics regulated the daily lives of
the American people and that the security of the
individual rested upon this regulation.

However, without

wisdom and the "right conduct" in Congress, the national
good would cease to exist.
How much of individual, domestic and
social happiness depends on the
regulation and conduct of only one
single human life? How vastly more of
human happiness depends, then, on the
regulation and conduct of the whole
nation's thousand-fold longer life!5 ?
A functional, two-party system was the only hope for
carrying on the proper regulation of those collective
lives.

And, even though the Democrats had supported p r o 

slavery legislation, Seward conceded that they provided
the proper two-party balance.

Southern Threat - Reasoning

To Seward, the Know-Nothings posed a double threat to
the national safety.

In addition to their un-American,

unrepresentative "secret" stature, which was a strong
secondary threat, the Know-Nothings as a third party would
split the national vote and throw support to the
Democrats. With Know-Nothing help, a Democratic
administration might take power that would reflect a
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minority rule. Indirectly, then, the Know-Nothings became
part of the southern threat by virtue of their ability to
split tickets and provide for a pro-Democratic, pro
slavery administration.
Seward argued that the real political power was being
contested by those two parties representing the opposing
slave-power and abolitionist interests.

Relying upon his

experience as a politician and the reputation he had
earned as an anti-expansionist, the Senator claimed that
the Know-Nothing party was representative only of a
minority of voters who were clearly dangerous to the
Republican cause.

For proof, he demonstrated how the

third party would numerically weaken the support of the
Republicans.
If the American people divide, and one
portion, being a minority, declare for
Freedom [sic] while another portion,
being also a minority declare against
foreigners and Catholics, and a third,
larger than either, declare for
slavery, nothing is obtained against
foreigners and Catholics, nothing
against slavery, and Kansas becomes a
Slave State [sic].58
Seward argued that the Know-Nothing party represented an
issue which was neither urgent nor relevant to the welfare
of the nation.

He claimed that the effect of the "false

issue" raised by the American party, coupled with their
neutrality on the slavery issue, distracted the public
mind from the real issue.
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To demonstrate the American party's viability as part
of the southern threat, Seward claimed that the third
party would eventually align itself with the weaker of the
two parties in every region of the country in order to
gain political power.

Republicans could watch with dismay

as the Americans aligned themselves with Democrats in
those northern and western states that were primarily
Republican, serving their own limited, political ends.
Republican strength was so limited in the South that
Republican-American alliances throughout that region would
serve to dilute Republican principles but would not
provide a political threat to the entrenched Democratic
majority.

American-Whig alliances were a possibility in

the South, but the Whig national organization had
collapsed and neither party had a solid, national power
base.
Seward warned that the American party was facing a
short, tempestuous political life.
By virtue of a law that is
irresistible, it will sooner or later
betray each party when its own
peculiar ends require that course. The
effort will cost its life.
Crowded
and jostled between the two
combatants, it will and must
dissolve . . .59
But, the Senator warned further that any such dissolution
of the third party would occur too late to assist the
cause of the free-soil party in the current controversy.
Therefore,

since that existence of a third party disrupted
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the political system that was designed to protect the
security of the individual, Seward concluded that the
Know-Nothing party could not hope to succeed except as a
temporary impediment to freedom.
Having lectured on the third party as a disruptive
influence and the possible means of promoting minority
rule, Seward dismissed the Americans as a viable political
entity, altogether.
All masses which affect neutrality, as
well as all masses which affect to
stand independently on questions which
have already passed . . . are crowded
and crushed in the conflicts between
the two which occupy, for the time
being, the whole field of contest.
The Know-Nothings chose to ignore slavery and the
territorial expansion of the practice in 1856.

They

concentrated on nativism, an issue that occupied
(unsuccessfully)

the Masonic party of the 1820s.

Seward

contended that the slavery issue could not be ignored,
since it so fully occupied the public mind and the
administration of the government, leaving the "nativists"
to support a hollow issue.

Further, by establishing an

ideological link between the Know-Nothings and the Masons,
Seward reenforced the similarities between the failed,
discredited political activities of the latter and the
political aims of the former.
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Perceived Truth of the Ideas

Seward demonstrated the inadequacy and dangerous
ineptitude of Democratic leadership.

He blamed the

Democratic party for the breakdown of civil law and order
in Kansas and accused the Democratic administration of
ineptly protecting the Constitutional rights of the
nation's inhabitants.
Having suggested that the Know-Nothings did not address
the important issues, slavery and its impending expansion
into the territories, Seward concluded that the third
party was a clear danger to the American two-party system
of majority rule and an indirect tool of the southern
Democrats.
Seward concluded his short address by inferring that
support for any party but the Republican party would
result in the breakdown of majority rule and the
constitutional guarantees of freedom.

"If these arguments

be sound, we are shut up to the necessity of giving our
support to the Republican party as the only means of
maintaining the cause of Freedom and Humanity.

218

Summary

The final standard of measurement for determining the
integrity of the ideas found in the speeches of the
campaign of 1856 is the determination of the results of
those ideas on society. "Was the speaker right, as
determined by an appeal to historical reality?" is the
measure described in Speech Criticism.**2
The abolition of slavery was accomplished during
Lincoln's administration, ending the threat of the
extension of slavery into the territories.

However, the

free labor concepts developed by northern speakers did not
replace the slave labor system.

The transformation of the

South into a comprehensive industrial/agricultural
economy, modeled on that of the North, was forestalled by
Reconstruction.

In addition to the harsh economic

reprisals forced on the South, the social residue of class
and economic distinctions unique to the South made the
transition from a slave labor society to one of
independent industry very difficult.
Southern businessmen were expected to flock north to
learn the ways of Wall Street.

Southern agriculturalists

were supposed to journey north in large numbers to observe
scientific farming techniques, according to Republican
speakers during the 1856 campaign.

Whereas some
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industrialization and agricultural diversification
occurred after 1865, the economy of the South lagged
behind that of the rest of the nation.

Therefore, the

economic predictions of the northern speakers were
inaccurate.
Ultimately, the "southern threat" concept proved to be
sound.
War.

The South did unite and the result was the Civil
Northern Republicans did take control of the

government in 1860 and remained in control through 1884.
Since the neo-Aristotelian methodology suggests that
" . . .
final

logical proof should ideally achieve Truth as the
d e s i d e r a t u m ,

"63 then the validity of the logical

appeals used in the Republican campaign is open to a
variety of interpretations.

For example, the sectional

arguments that painted the South as a threatening abode of
ignorance and evil may have contributed to the rigors of
northern reconstruction in the South after the Civil War.
Whether or not the depth of ignorance in the South was
truthfully reported in the northern campaign is of less
importance to an analysis of the speeches than is the
measure of perceived truth of the concept in the minds of
the northern audience.
If it can be argued that the political enslavement of
the South occurred in part through the persuasive appeals
of the northern campaigners, then the ends of the
Republican speakers were fulfilled by the eradication of
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the trade and ownership of men. The ends of the campaign
were expedient, not truth-seeking.

Since the proposed

solution involved the election of a Republican
administration as the means of ending slavery, then the
ultimate goal of the campaign was achieved.
The arguments presented by the Republican speakers were
perceived as the truth by their northern audiences.

The

speakers were coherent in their definition of the urgent
nature of the political crisis and consistent in their
call for a political solution.

"Logical coherence" can

function as a means of determining the truth of a
situation, according to Thonssen, Baird and Braden, and
the speakers examined in this chapter were profoundly
articulate with regard to the political and moral crises
facing the North.64
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Chapter 6
Emotional Appeals

According to neo-Aristotelian speech theory, an
effective speaker must engage the emotions of his audience
members in order to move them to action.

Thonssen, Baird,

and Braden define this rhetorical concept of emotional
proof as that material which is "designed to put the
listener in a frame of mind to react favorably and
conformably to the speaker's purpose."1

Emotional proof

requires the speaker to adapt his remarks to the needs of
the particular audience and the issues of the moment.

He

strives to identify as an individual with his audience so
that his concerns become their concerns and the audience
is ready to act favorably on his suggestions.
The speaker, himself, is a major factor in any
emotional appeal.

He functions as the "interpreter" of

the emotions he wishes the audience to repro d u c e . 2
However, he should not be an "emotional" person.
Irrational patterns of exposition are ineffective
rhetorical tools.

The experienced speaker should present

an organized, intellectual and controlled address that
eschews "extravagant imagery " and "exaggerated
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conclusions."3

The speaker's sincerity and rationality

must be evident.
The most effective emotional tool at the speaker's
disposal is evocative language.

Speech Criticism

postulates a dual role for language in any public address.
Fi r s t , language must appeal to the rationality of the
listener so that the words have referential value.
Second,

language must fulfill the emotional needs of the

audience in order to complete the process of
identification.^

There is no clear demarcation between

the emotional and rational appeals of any persuasive
address.

The two areas overlap.

The logical development

of a particular idea is necessary for the establishment of
cause/effect relationships, but the emotive language cues
the audience on the proper reaction.
The Republican speeches were rich in imagery and
evocative language.

The speakers were essentially well

trained, rational men who had a great deal of experience
in public speaking.

There were particular speakers who

relied more heavily on emotional language and fear appeals
than their colleagues.

Primarily, these men were members

of the more radical faction of the Republican party.
The emotional appeals of the 1856 Republican
presidential canvass were encapsulated in the party
slogan.

"Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, and Fremont"

was the chant at the vast torch-light rallies where whole
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towns gathered to listen to partisan speakers.

Each of

the speakers defined his political terms within the
framework of the party slogan, since "free soil" to a
constitutionalist like Adams was a concept far different
from the free soil concept of a moralist like Henry Ward
Beecher.
Emotional appeals characterized the radical faction
within the Republican party.

The radical Republicans of

1856 were characterized by their unwillingness to
compromise on the expansion of slavery.

According to Eric

Foner, author of Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The
Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil W a r , the
party radicals united only on the expansion issue.5

They

had no cohesive economic policy and their foreign policy
was limited to the exclusion of American slavery from
Cuban soil.®
Foner identified rural New England as the most radical
section of the North.?

He cited the urban dependence on

trade agreements with southern agriculturalists as the
moderating influence on Republicans living in larger
cities.

The idealism of the radical faction within the

Republican party was shaped by the high literary and
religious standards on which the New Englanders prided
themselves.®
The Republicans of the Western Reserve were heavily
influenced by the religious abolitionism that swept the

north-east in the 1830s.
midwest had

Since the "northern tier" of the

been settled almost exclusively by New

Englanders moving due West for 20 years, radical, anti
slavery Republicanism was embraced with ease by its
inhabitants.9

Many of the Republicans of the Western

Reserve were already sympathetic to the religious
abolitionism of New England.

However, the Reserve

politicans were adamant that slavery be immediately
abolished without any further compromise or delay.

In

this demand, they surpassed even their New England
counterparts in radical tone and temper.10
Essentially, radical Republicans were idealistic freesoil activists.

They provided the moral standard for the

party and the campaign.

Although the radicals were a

strong political contingent within the free soil movement,
many of them came to the Republican party from distinct
abolitionist backgrounds.1 !

The abolitionists represented

a tradition of moral activism rather than political
activism.

Therefore, the strategies they employed in

their attempts to persuade voters to support the
Republican platform were markedly different from those
strategies employed by the political activists, since the
convictions of each particular speaker assumed priority
over purely party activities.
Ideals and morals are difficult to explain logically.
They are most effectively presented in an emotional

appeal, designed to persuade an audience to action by
arousing indignation, anger, outrage or some other
emotion.

The object of the speaker is to produce first

conviction, then action.

For this reason, the speeches of

the more radical members of the Republican party leaned
more heavily on emotional proof than did the speeches of
the conservative speakers.

The radicals strove to raise

the anti-slavery issue to primary importance, while the
conservatives attempted to placate the northern business
community with a logical, protectionist approach.
According to Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, precise
analyses of emotional appeals pose a problem for the
critic because of the individual motivation behind each
a p p e a l .

12

since antiquity, theorists have argued the

moral aspects of emotional appeals as a mode of
persuasion.

Therefore, any definition of emotional

appeals must assume some moral responsibility on the part
of the speaker and the willingness of the audience to
allow the speaker to make moral judgments.
This chapter examines two broad types of emotional
appeals used in the 1856 Republican campaign: the
religious speaking which most fully characterized the
emotional arguments against slavery and the radical
approach toward the political aspects of the moral issue
imbedded in the anti-slavery movement.

Each speech is
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examined for its primary thesis; then the particular
elements of identification and language use is isolated.

Abolitionists

The most effective abolitionist speakers in 1856 were
the pulpit orators.

Speech Criticism lists the traits

that a speaker must bring to an effective persuasive
address.13
motives.

The first trait listed is the speaker's
Listeners probably attributed to Beecher,

Cheever, and the other pulpit orators the altruistic
motive of emancipating the slaves.

These ministers were

not associated with mob violence as were the secular
abolitionists.

Most of these ministers were respected

opinion leaders with popular followings.

Many of them

spoke outside of their own churches and were widely quoted
in the press.

In particular, the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher

and the Rev. George B. Cheever were outspoken ministers
whose sermons hammered at their congregations to take an
active part in emancipating the southern slaves.

Both men

had their sermons published in the daily newspapers and
Beecher often wrote editorials.

They endorsed the

Republican platform and embellished the party appeals with
forceful moral arguments.
Their moral arguments appear to be aimed at generating
righteous indignation among the members of the audience.
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They apparently wanted to rouse their listeners to anger
over the enforced bondage of the southern slave; to
provoke the audience's guilt at shirking their collective
responsibility toward their bound brothers in Christ; and
to create a sense of shame that would move their audience
to vote against the Democratic candidate in the coming
election.

Both men were masterful orators.

Both Beecher

and Cheever were well-practiced in the techniques of
persuasion.

Those particular techniques and arguments

which they brought to bear in behalf of the Republican
party are the focus of this chapter.

Henry Ward Beecher

The Reverend Henry Ward Beecher was a popular
abolitionist speaker.

He took a leave of absence from his

New York pulpit in order to travel throughout New England
and speak on behalf of the Republican campaign.

While

none of his campaign oratory has been included in those
works dealing with his life and public service, the
essence of Beecher's emotional appeal can be extrapolated
from an account of his preaching style.
His denunciations of oppression and
oppressors do not proceed from a
soured mind, but from a profound
sympathy with the oppressed. . . . He
seems to be talking directly to each
individual hearer.
There is no
escape; he bends over the pulpit and
looks you in the face; he intends that
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you shall not go home without
appropriating a portion of the
discourse to yourself.!*
Unfortunately for the student of rhetoric, Beecher most
often spoke without notes.*5

However, his arguments

against slavery were recorded in The Independent, a
national weekly newspaper that carried Beecher's
editorials.^®

His contributions to the newspaper were

indicated with a large star, but his name seldom appeared
in print.

Identification:
Identification is a technique usually studied when
analyzing ethos.

However, Thonssen, Baird, and Braden

include identification as an important element in
emotional proof because the concept of "acting together"
or consubstantiality can be achieved only if the emotional
needs of the audience are fully met by the speaker.!7
Since the audience should perceive genuine emotion behind
the appeals of the speech, the speaker needs to embody
those emotions he wishes to arouse in his audience.
Identification between speaker and audience, then, occurs
when the speaker arouses the audience to the same
emotional level that he, himself, enjoys.
Identification was accomplished by triggering two
complex, emotional belief systems.

First, Beecher spoke

to audiences that presumed themselves to be practicing
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Christians.

Beecher was an ordained minister.

Therefore,

the identification process had already begun before
Beecher even rose to speak. As long as Beecher's message
was perceived as a message of Christian righteousness, his
audience would respond favorably.
Second, Beecher was addressing a secular audience, his
fellow American citizens.

Since the end of persuasion is

to cause the audience to engage in action, Beecher was
urging his listeners to use the polls to cause an end to a
moral evil.3-8

His aim was to engage first their righteous

anger on the broadest level - a gathering of Christians to
listen to an indictment against unchristian behavior which did not demand any particular action.

Then, having

established a common bond on that level, Beecher was able
to use that anger as the basis for a call to action in the
political arena for the purpose of bringing an end to
slavery.
Beecher based his appeals on the premises that it was
the duty and necessity of every Christian to oppose
slaveryi

Not only was it unchristian to support slavery,

but it was equally important to instruct others in their
duty to oppose slavery.

Beecher constructed emotional

appeals that appear to be aimed at making the pacifists
feel guilty.
He draws a picture of the poor hunted
fugitive; he leads you among the
cotton fields of the fair, sunny
south, where the breezes are scented

234
with orange blossoms; and there he
asks you to listen to the heart-broken
sighs of some miserable slave mother,
parted from her children. . . . But
before he is done, he smites y o u ; he
charges those before him with
indifference to this giant wrong; he
tells them that the blood of the
oppressed will be found on their
skirts, for conniving at the servitude
of three millions of their fellowmen.
Although slavery could not be abolished without the active
support of the strict abolitionists, Beecher constructed
his rhetorical strategies as if he believed that moral
commitment was not enough.

A plan of action must

accompany his campaign of persuasion.
According to Beecher, the specific problem faced by the
Republicans in 1856 was to identify a universal threat
posed by the institution of slavery.

In one address after

another, throughout the state of New York, Beecher
identified that threat.

The inherent danger posed by

slavery lay in the system's ability to function as an
economic institution only if it could unendingly expand
into new territories.21*

Once the land wore out in the old

sections farmed by intensive slave labor, the plantations
were forced to move in search of new, fertile land.
long as land was available for the large-scale,

As

single

crop agriculture that characterized the South, slavery
would continue to exist. Therefore, the Republicans were
demonstrating political

expediency by demanding that

slavery not be allowed into the territories through
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legislative channels as well as moral expediency by
opposing an institution that was immoral.
Slavery violated both the principles embodied in the
Constitution of the United States and the concept of free
labor as described by the Republicans. According to
Beecher, then, there was a consistency between the
political and the moral arguments against allowing slavery
to expand. The task facing the new party was to move men
to respond to the anti-expansionist arguments by voting
for the Republican program.

La n guage;
Like many of the radical speakers, Beecher employed a
great deal of im a gery. 21

in an article printed in the

June 29, 1856, issue of The Independent, he metaphorically
illustrated the issues of the campaign as explosives
stored in a burning building.

The prudent man, Beecher's

metaphor for the Republicans, would rush to separate the
explosives from the fire, while only a madman would stand
aside to await the outcome.

The madmen were those

potential voters who preferred to wait out the
inflammatory slavery situation, since any vote withheld
for lack of conviction was a vote for the pro-slavery
South.
Beecher also argued in his editorial that slavery
demoralized both blacks and whites.22

political ideals,
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manners and personal habits were all endangered by the
institution.
Preaching must be guarded, political
speeches must be guarded, newspapers
must be circumspect. . . . Ignorance
is right if slavery is right.
Free
speech is wrong if slavery is right. A
system of force cannot deal with moral
suasion.23
Using the imagery of slavery, Beecher suggested that the
minds as well as the bodies of all who lived in the South
were fettered under the system of human bondage portrayed
by Beecher.
He employed a variety of metaphorical constructions in
his observations.

For example, the South was described as

a ship being wildly driven ahead of an "omnipotent
storm."24

Beecher continued with the sailing metaphor,

claiming that the "current" which guided southern policy
was not of its own immediate making but that it reflected
a "tendency" that had caused its policies to "drift far"
from the intent of the ship's master.
Every Northern man should thoroughly
understand that the policy of the
South is not one of vexatious
haughtiness.
It is a policy the
necessity of which springs from the
very organization of their society,
from the irresistible nature of their
industrial system.
They cannot help
themselves.
If they would they
cannot. They are on a current which
sweeps them whether they will or
not.25
Henry Ward Beecher was a popular speaker.

Although many

of his anti-slavery arguments were familiar to audiences
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throughout the North by virtue of The Independent and its
wide circulation, it was his defense of his right to
preach against the institution of slavery that formed the
moral foundation of the radical Republicans.
The Journal of Commerce editorially attacked Beecher
for his sermons advocating abolition, according to
biographer David W. Bartlett. From his pulpit in New York
City, Beecher declaimed in his own defense:
Three million men, against natural
law, against every fundamental
principle of our state and national
government are, by law, thrown over
the pale of the race and denied to be
men.
This is not fit for the pulpit
to mention; it is allowed,
nevertheless, to preach about China
and Indial
Every year thousands of
children are snatched from their
parents' bosoms, and remorselessly
sold every whither. . . . Every year
husbands and wives are torn asunder,
Christian or no Christian; and the
Journal of Commerce browbeats that
pulpit that u t t e r s a word about such
politics . . . 2<>
These were the sentiments by which Beecher encouraged
other men of principle to join the Republican campaign,
even if they were not previously political activists.

He

took the moral issue of slavery and turned it to political
advantage for those men who would join him in 1856.

The

new moral definitions proposed by Beecher were the
emotional proofs adopted by other ministers whose speeches
survived the campaign.

238
George B. Cheever:

Reverend G. B. Cheever of New York City portrayed the
presidential canvass of 1856 as a moral crisis.

He

delivered a series of partisan sermons during the summer
and fall of 1856 to illustrate the crisis to the people of
New York.
Identification:
Since Beecher had pioneered the use of the pulpit for
political purposes, Cheever did not have to establish his
credentials as a political speaker.

He was immediately

accorded the status of a leading Republican spokesman by
virtue of his pulpit and his politically-motivated
abolitionist sentiments.
During October, the New York Daily Tribune and the New
York Daily Times printed a series of abolitionist homilies
delivered by Cheever.
sermon to the next.

His theme was consistent from one
He claimed that slavery, itself, was

a sinful activity - a well-worn abolitionist assertion.
However, even greater moral damage resulted from the
immoral practices that accompanied the institution of
slavery, according to Cheever, and these were the damages
that the Republicans could repair.
On October 20, Cheever discoursed on the moral problems
that would accompany the expansion of slavery.

The

emotional impact of the setting probably predisposed his
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audience to listen to his discourse sympathetically.
Cheever spoke from the pulpit of the Church of the
Puritans on a chilly fall Sunday evening.

Since his

sermons had been widely publicized prior to the start of
the series, the assembled audience can be presumed to have
pro-Republican or abolitionist sentiments regardless of
their active church membership.

■r

Language:
He established his intention immediately in the
introduction by quoting from Jer e m i a h . 2 7 cheever relied
heavily upon the use of metaphor and evocative language
throughout the sermon.

Slavery was the "colossal guilt",

a "shipwreck of conscience," a "national injustice," the
"impious project," a "marked and mighty sin," and a
"daring, culminating inequity".28

The men who engaged in

the holding of slaves were members of the "oligarchy of
masters" who promoted the "irresponsible despotism"
produced by a slave-holding society.
God's retributipn against the slave owners would be
like a "sun shot into chaos" and his earthly agents
[Cheever's listeners and readers] were charged to get
[T]his orb of light in the firmament
of G o d 's word in the right line . . .
and calculate our course of duty and
safety . . . We ourselves are at sea
and surrounded by breakers and God
only can rescue us . . .28
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Cheever employed the same type of navigational metaphor
favored by Beecher.

Both men reassured their partisan

audiences that they were right to seek light and safe
harbor in the face of the moral darkness that slavery
represented. The stormy political seas were the fault of
the slave owners who chose not to heed the biblical
injunctions against human bondage.
Cheever shifted ground at the end of his emotioncharged exordium, moving from a demonstration of biblical
precedents against slavery in general to a particular
argument against the practice of slavery in the United
States.

He relied upon a parallel illustration to prove

his allegations against the immorality of the institution
in a nation's history.

He compared the plight of the

ancient Jews - and God's retribution against their captors
- to the situation in the South.

He warned that God would

punish the pro-slavery southerners with the same dramatic
intensity which He had visited upon the slave owners of
Biblical times.
The punishments promised by Cheever were outlined in
the Bible, his major source of authority.

He tried to

persuade his audience to action through the use of fear
appeals, based upon situations chronicled in biblical
times. He attempted to engage the emotions of his audience
against the institution of slavery by promising dramatic
fiery retribution against the unjust among them.
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[Tjhere burns the light, the fire, the
wickedness, the warning, the
thunderbolt; you can almost hear it
hissing and detonating anew as you
open these sacred pages.
There stands
the scorched, transfixed and blasted
form of a nation once chosen and
beloved of God, but now a monument to
the universe of his inexorable
justice.30
Cheever encouraged his congregation to deplore slavery
before God's wrath was visited upon the United States just
as it was described by Jeremiah in Cheever's opening
remarks.
Since God's just and horrible punishment would extend
to those men in the North who refused to actively work for
abolition, Cheever proposed a course of action.
We are to choose for an empire between
wrong and right courses, between
injustice and justice, between
oppression and benevolence, between
slavery and freedom.3 *
This course of moral and practical action was clothed in
impressive stylistic devices.

Cheever used parallelism

and antithesis with impressive dramatic effect in this
passage as well as in others throughout the address.

The

repetition of the moral dichotomy represented in this
particular passage was powerfully designed.

Cheever

provided a clear definition of his concept of slavery as
wrong, unjust and oppressive.
According to Bembreck and Howell's text, Persuasion: A
Means of Social Influence, the audience, or receiver of
the message, must have the freedom to make choices if the
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process of persuasion is a valid process.32

cheever

presented his audience with a choice of action, a
necessary element of the persuasive process, while
demonstrating that a single course of action was desirable
among Christian men. He had predisposed his audience to
identify the correct "choices" through their common
identity as practicing Christians. Therefore, this
"loaded" dichotomy suggested that Cheever's aim was to
intensify attitudes already favorable to his cause by
appearing to offer alternatives to the "correct" actions
which would be totally unacceptable to both the speaker
and his audience.

This same dichotomy illustrates the

uncompromising attitude of the radical Republicans toward
slavery - there was no middle ground between slavery and
its abolition.

The voter supported either one or the

other if he remained a radical.
Cheever outlined a course of action for his
congregation, based upon their collective duties as
Christians and citizens.

He encouraged them to invest the

presidential canvass with the moral principles of
Christianity for
We do not preach to the people on a
question of mere expediency, or
diplomacy, or profit, or political
economy, or statesmanship, or even of
what is best, but of what is right; of
what God a H o w s . 3 3
True Christians, he asserted, cannot avoid speaking
against slavery and denouncing the "iniquity" of the

institution.

He demanded that his congregation act

against the extension of slavery with the enthusiasm of
blacksmiths employing "burning thoughts and hard blows"
rather than with kid gloves and "fastidious elegancies."34
Cheever's primary purpose was to activate his
congregation by arousing them to anger and outrage.

He

played upon their feelings of guilt within the concept of
collective responsibility, just as Beecher did with his
audiences.

Cheever praised his audience in advance of the

their actions at the polls, encouraging them to bear
testimony against the evils of slavery in a manner
analogous to the bravery exhibited by Christ when
testifying in front of Pilate.
exquisite.

Cheever's imagery was

He was able to endow the Republican campaign

with the weight of the entire Christian ethic by employing
images such as Christ's bravery in front of Pilate.

His

congregation, both immediate and secondary, was "blessed”
with a Christ-like mission to eradicate slavery.

They

would not have to engage in any activity more dangerous
than casting their votes in favor of the Republican
candidate, but Cheever ennobled the deed to heroic
proportions.
The extent of slavery's unchristian character was
illustrated with the image of Pilate.

Pilate, who sought

to place the blame for his actions elsewhere, was the
prototype of the southern slave owner.

Whereas Pilate
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placed the blame for Christ's execution on the heads of
the assembled multitude, the southern slave owner placed
the blame for the violence in Kansas on the heads of the
northern radicals who refused to compromise.
Cheever described the southern moral and political
standards transported to the plains of Kansas as wicked,
treasonous, perverted, villainous, fraudulent, diabolical
and a "monstrous prostitution of law."35

The resulting

bloodshed, he claimed, could have been avoided by devising
national policy according to the dictates of the Bible.
This [border violence] could never be,
if we, as a people, had kept the word
of God in view . . . we must take our
stand on God's Word, and square our
p o l i c y our platform, according to it
•

•

»

Having demanded that his audience take
spread of

action to stop the

slavery as their moral duty, Cheever proposed a

series of six proofs designed to defend his contention
that slavery was a sinful state, deserving of eradication
on moral grounds, alone.

With "proof," the audience would

have good reasons to take action.

These proofs occupied

the second half of the body of his sermon and they were
arranged in descending order of importance.
The arrangement of arguments within an address is a
critical element in emotional proof.37

classical

theorists argued that the most effective use of pathetic
proof was at the beginning and at the end of the speech.
Cheever adhered to this pattern of development.

According

to the Ciceronian model examined by Thonssen, Baird, and
Braden, Cheever opened his sermon with an exordium
designed to prepare his audience to sympathize with his
later premises. He first presented the grounds for
speaker-audience identification by quoting from the
scriptures to establish his source of inspiration.

The

narration was devoted to shifting audience indignation
from slavery in broad, historical terms to the proposition
facing the voters in 1856.

He built parallels between the

ancient Jews and the contemporary Africans that would
allow his audience to make inferential judgments against
the southern slaveholders who wished to extend slavery
into the territories.
His logical proofs, all based upon moral indictments
and philosophical "truths," were developed in the center
of the address. The invention of these "truths" was
consistent with the reasoning employed by other Republican
speakers who were casting about for logical reasons to
oppose slavery.

An amorphous theme was beginning to

emerge by this late point in the campaign.

This theme

would begin to replace the "fire and brimstone" thunder of
the radicals as a more rational approach to the moral
issues imbedded in the slavery controversy.

Briefly,

Cheever demonstrated the illegality of slavery within the
Christian concept of democratic government. He claimed
that laws against oppression, man-stealing, denial of
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brotherly love and the violation of the parent-child
relation were designed to protect all residents of the
United States.

His proofs were couched in metaphor and an

assumption of the common Christian experience of his
audience rather than as demonstrable lines of evidential
reasoning like the economic and political arguments of the
Congressional speakers.
Cheever1s address was consistent with the classical
model

of emotional proof as outlined in Thonssen, Baird,

and Braden,

for he closed his sermon with a call to

specific action in a highly-charged peroration.
Every man who sanctions the iniquity
of slavery, by a vote in favor of it
is himself part and parcel of the sin.
But it is not a question of mere
individual sin.
It is what you will
do with the power put into your hands
to make others sin . . .38
Cheever closed his appeal by charging his congregation to
become keepers of their southern brothers? to encourage
those northern voters not in attendance to vote against
slavery for the salvation of all souls, whether directly
or indirectly involved in the perpetuation of slavery.
One week after delivering the sermon based upon the
words of Jeremiah, Cheever delivered a second sermon in
favor of the Republicans entitled "God Against Slavery,"
based upon Ezekiel 22:29, 30,31.38

jn addition to

expanding upon the six proofs against slavery that he had
outlined the previous Sunday, Cheever developed the
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concept of "man-stealing" into a full-scale moral horror
as a means of inciting his congregation to vote against
the pro-slavery Democrats. His premise was based on the
reasoning that if another Democratic administration were
elected, then the horror would increase geometrically.
[F]or every two immortal beings forced
into this chattelism, there would be
five others forced, in like manner, by
the next.40
Cheever accused these later generations of "thieves" of a
double crime.

Their first crime was that of stealing men

to make into slaves.

Their second crime was that of

stealing the slave-born children from their natural
parents, disrupting the sacred and natural bond between
parent and child.
These emotional proofs were effective from the pulpit,
but used sparingly on the stump.

The proofs were too

reminiscent of the abolitionist rhetoric to be of much use
to the moderate Republicans and the Democratic-Republicans
in 1856.

In fact, there were some Republicans who found

the abolitionist sentiments of the pulpit orators to be
contradictory to the party's success at the polls.

It was

too easy for the Democrats to condemn Republicans as
rabble-rousing abolitionists. In fact, one of these Whigturned-Democrat speakers was Rufus Choate.

Throughout the

northeast he began to question publically the right of
activist preachers to represent a purely political
endeavor that could only result in disunion.
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The "Radical" Speakers

Invention was a very important element in the
construction of the free soil emotional proofs.

Since

even the radicals were shy about employing stock
abolitionist arguments, the invention of new arguments was
necessary.

Normally, invention would not be analyzed as a

portion of pathetic argument.

However, Republican

rhetorical tactics were founded on new varieties of
political arguments in order to avoid comparison with
abolitionist, Whig, and Democratic ideological arguments
of past campaigns.

Therefore, invention becomes an

important tool in analyzing the structure of these
Republican addresses.

In order to provide a foundation

for the recurring arguments in the later Republican
campaign speeches, a brief thematic analysis of Senator
Sumner's address from the spring of 1856,
Against Kansas," is necessary.

"The Crime

Many of Sumner's

definitions and rationalizations were quoted throughout
the campaign without attribution to the Senator.

Sumner's

address, in essence, was the keynote of the 1856
Republican campaign.
Charles Sumner compared slavery to a crime against the
government,
morality.

(treason), and a crime against social
His arguments in support of the immorality of
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slavery were passionate and highly metaphorical, much
bolder than those accusations employed during the formal
campaign.

Slavery was a "harlot" and a "wicked" practice,

a "perversion" against the Constitution.

To extend

slavery into the territories would result in the "rape of
a virgin land," an interesting contrast to the
metaphorical harlotry he called forth elsewhere in the
same speech.
His logical proofs dealing with the constitutionality
of slavery were often borrowed by Republican speakers.
Sumner charged that since slavery was clearly
unconstitutional, the extension of slavery into the
territories was an act of treason.

Freedom, he claimed,

was the natural state of men under the Constitution and
the Constitution protected men in all parts of the nation.
Slavery was practiced sectionally and was a political
concept limited to that section, claimed Sumner.
freedom was a national concept.

However,

Therefore, the pro

slavery men were the treasonous sectionalists who were in
open defiance of the constitutional guarantees of personal
freedom.

Sumner reasoned that their mere participation in

the slave society, whether they owned slaves or not, made
them traitors.
Sumner listed the particular crimes of which he accused
the South.

Congress had been "swindled" with the repeal

of the Compromise of 1850; popular sovereignty in the
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South was abridged, since slavery was the only "choice" of
those men unable to cast a vote for any elected official;
property rights substituted for human rights, according to
the fugitive slave legislation "forced" upon the North;
and the entire democratic process was prostituted by the
voting frauds perpetuated in the South and her "invaders"
in Kansas.
The pro-slavery factions in Kansas and Washington
"reeked" with conspiracy, claimed Sumner.

Government

appointees to Kansas were demonstrably pro-slavery, sent
by the pro-slavery President Pierce and his administration
to obtain control of the territories of the "Slave Power."
Sumner charged Pierce and his administration with
"murder,"

"illegal" militia raids, and the abrogation of

law and order by their Missouri "invaders."

A "tyranny"

was in effect in Kansas and Pierce, the Democrats, and all
of the pro-slavery South was to blame.
In addition to the emotive material supplied by Sumner,
some of the emotional proofs employed by the less
temperate radicals of 1856 were lifted directly from the
abolitionist campaigns of previous years.

These were the

immoderate, accusatory proofs studiously avoided by the
more moderate elements of the Republican party.

Yet, it

was the radical faction that provided the platform, the
slogan and the ideology that united the party and gave it
the strength to survive a single-issue campaign.
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Republican Appeals

The Whigs in the Republican party emphasized Union and
compromise; the Democrats plotted to undermine the power
of Calhoun and his Slave Power followers? and the
abolitionists were determined to abolish slavery
regardless of the political situation.

However, one line

of defense consistently appeared in most Republican
addresses - the northern radicals defended the rights of
free soil men to engage in free labor as guaranteed by the
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the intentions of
the founding triumvirate of George Washington, James
Madison, and Thomas Jefferson.
Salmon Chase, Andrew Reeder, Charles Robinson and Henry
Wilson were among the speakers who remained loyal to their
anti-slavery roots while campaigning for the Republican
party.

While they employed emotional proofs more limited

in scope than those all-encompassing arguments adopted by
the pulpit orators, they were adept at illustrating the
concepts of freedom and justice as promised by a
Republican administration.
For example, Senator Henry Wilson addressed a huge
crowd of laborers and workingmen at the New York City
Tabernacle on Saturday, October 4, 1856.^1

His appearance

252
on the speakers' platform was accompanied by the sounds of
a brass band and a glee club, who were entertaining the
crowd with "rousing" campaign songs.

The platform of the

Mechanics and Workingman's Central Republican Union was
read aloud to the crowd, then Wilson was introduced.
audience was wildly partisan.

His

According to the newspaper

report, he was greeted with cheers, applause, shouts and
the "waving of hats and handkerchiefs."
Since the audience and the speaker already shared
identification as Republicans, and since their goals were
similar as illustrated by the Union platform, mirrored the
Republican national platform, Wilson's job was to
intensify the commitment of the crowd to the national
party. He defended the northern principle of free labor by
characterizing

southerners

as "degraded and dishonored" as a result of the slavery
system.

This form of sectional slander became pro forma

in the Republican campaign.

It needed no further

amplification when addressed to a northern, anti-slavery
audience.
Wilson charged the Democrats with criminal activity
against the very men standing before him in New York City,
[Hjaving taken nearly 500,000 square
miles of the soil of this nation
forever consecrated to freedom and
opening it to the inroads of Human
Slavery.
It was a crime against the
mechanics, against the laboring men
and against the small farmers of the
United States . . .42
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He continued with this quasi-religious metaphor by
accusing the Democrats of obeying the demands of the Slave
Power to claim Kansas for slavery, having stolen "the
heritage of the freemen of the Republic North and South,
and desecrated it, laid it as a votive offering at the
foot of the Slave Power."43
Wilson was enlisting the support of his audience of
laboring men in favor of a political party that revered
free labor.

While the purely political issue of the

extension of slavery into the territories might not move
his audience to vote for Republican candidates, Wilson was
certain that an appeal against the restriction of free
trade and an end to free labor would command their
attention. The Republicans reasoned that territories built
with slave labor wouldn't welcome free labor.

Wilson

developed that notion of restrictive emigration while
painting the South as comparable to a rapist plundering
the territories "to dishonor and disgrace and degrade."
Wilson referred to the Democrats as "Lords of the
Lash," "traitors" and "Calhoun s e c t i o n a l i s t s . H e
demanded the emancipation of the white men of the South
from the restrictions slavery put upon free enterprise
rather than demanding that slavery be eradicated for moral
reasons.

The enslavement by the white man by the system

of slavery became a stock Republican argument.
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In contrast to Wilson's diatribe against the
enslavement of the working classes of

the South, Salmon

Chase remained an abolitionist to the

end of

P.

the campaign.

Chase demanded the emancipation of the Negro slaves
whether under the aegis of a particular party or by any
other possible means.

He, too, referred to slavery as a

crime and the slave states as "oppressors."

Democrats

were members of an "invading gang," ready to "scheme"
against the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the

Constitution.^ 5

chase employed analogy in order to

compare the 1856 canvass to a battle between the forces of
freedom and bondage.
It is here in our midst the battle of
freedom is to be fought; we are to
determine whether . . . murder and
rapine are to stalk abroad in the
broad light of day, startling even the
stoutest hearts by their atrocity.46
Chase gave voice to the radical concept that individual
liberty was more important as a goal than the preservation
of the Union.

Even the prospect of compromise with those

men who represented the slave states was perceived by the
radicals as a traitorous act.

The Union, claimed Chase,

could continue only if it were founded upon the exercise
of full freedom for all participants.47

in effect, the

Union, as represented by the Pierce administration, was
perceived as a tool of the "Slave Power."

Therefore, it

was of no use to the radicals in its present form, for the
ideals of the Constitution had been prostituted by Douglas
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and the expansionists within the administration.

Cassius

Clay expressed the radical contempt for compromise in his
New York address of October 25.
I say look back upon our past history
to see if you have not done enough in
the way of conciliation and compromise
. . . the man who blindly follows the
dictation of the South, and would make
a slave of a black man today, would
make a slave of a white man
t omorrow.* 8
Clay offered no proof for his assertion, but this radical
line of sectional reasoning was acceptable to partisan
audiences by this late date in the campaign.

The concept

of white enslavement gradually replaced the more
conservative free labor concept in the later campaign
rhetoric.

It was certainly more dramatic and it fostered

more immediate identification between speaker and
audience.

Whereas none of the audience members might have

occasion to visit the South and actually observe the
slavery system in operation, most of the audience members
could identify with the possibility of reduced emigration
to the West and a tight labor market.
The frontier radicals, exemplified by Andrew Reeder and
Charles Robinson, were more concerned with the
Constitutional violations on territorial soil than with
the larger issues of slavery.

However, they brought forth

the same arguments that Clay and Chase favored for the
purposes of identification with the audience.

Radical

speakers warned their audiences that if Constitutional
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abuses could happen in the territories, then they had
initiated a precedent that would allow abuses in any other
portion of the Union. Further, the abuses currently under
discussion were the fault of the Democratic
administration, both current and immediately past.
The territorial spokesmen relied upon graphic
description and evocative,
generate sympathy.

first-person language to

Reeder skillfully used analogy as a

stylistic device to demonstrate the specific dangers of
the spread of slavery across the nation.

Postulating that

the territories could not support both free and slave
labor, Reeder claimed that slave territories would dam the
westward expansion of the free labor advocates of the
northeast, clogging the cities and saturating the
marketplace.
These northern states may be likened
to a tub under a fountain, all the
time boiling over with a surplus
population, and streaming over the
vast West . . . [ifJ you shut off this
entire stream of northern emigration
you . . . turn back this human tide to
throw itself upon the states of the
North . . .4 ^
Reeder assumed that his audience accepted the proposition
that slave and free labor could not co-exist based on
inductive evidence provided by the violent situation in
Kansas.

By example, if the pro-slavery forces and the

free state forces could not compromise in a single,

257
uncommitted territory, then the possibility for national
compromise was even more dismal.
Reeder employed praeteritio, a sophisticated stylistic
device which allows for the inclusion of derogatory
remarks while protecting the speaker from slander, to
illustrate the horrors visited upon his fellow Kansans in
the name of justice.

For example, Reeder claimed that he

would not undertake to describe the "robberies, the house
burnings, the plunderings, the horse-stealings, the
murders" in the time allotted to his speech while, of
course, he proceeded to do so.

He felt inadequate to the

task of describing "the acts of our oppressors

[which]

were stained with blood and with every attribute which
could disgrace humanity" although those acts were planned
with "devilish ingenuity" toward "awful consequences."50
In contrast to the skillful use of devices in the
address of Reeder, Charles Robinson limited his emotional
appeals to specific eyewitness accounts designed to align
his audience against the Democrats.

He employed few

analogies or other sophisticated devices to arouse the
sympathy of his audience.

His success as an emotional

speaker lay with his ability to speak plainly of - and to
• the average citi 2 en in straightforward terms.

Robinson

was able to identify with his audience and create common
ground immediately.

He claimed that "It makes me sick

every time I think of a Northern man going for Southern
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aggression."51

He described the plight of Kansas in the

same plain, straight-forward terms that served to
underscore the nobility of the beleaguered free state men.
Captain Shores, who has spent most of
his time in defending the homes of the
people of Kansas . . . is sick, his
wife is sick, and he has no means of
support.
This is the condition of
some of our captains and you may
imagine what the rest must s u f f e r . 5 2
The success of his examples rested on the presumption that
every person in attendance at the speech had been sick at
one time; that each could identify with the care of a sick
spouse, so that identification with the sick, discouraged
Captain Shores should have been universal in the audience.
Without the use of sophisticated rhetorical devices,
Robinson created a spare, bold picture of suffering with
which his audience could easily sympathize.
Robinson illustrated his major premises with homey
anecdotes, plainly expressed without ambiguity,
maximum identification.

for the

He spoke of no threat larger than

the situation in Kansas itself, leaving it to his audience
to realize the national threat through inductive
application.53

The result was an address of great

trustworthiness from a man who humbly begged for political
support from his listeners so that a sinple problem might
be solved with their help - vote Republican and keep
Kansas free.
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Northern Dissent

Rufus Choate delivered a pro-Democratic address at
Lowell, Massachusetts, on October 30.

His speech employs

many of the same references and emotional appeals used by
the Republicans, providing an interesting rhetorical
counterpoint to the free soil rhetoric. For the sake of
comparison, a brief analysis of Choate's address is
included.

He was addressing the same geographic audience

that gathered to hear Seward, Chase, Banks and the other
leading northeastern speakers.
Throughout his introduction, Choate relied heavily upon
the same iconographic representations of national ideals
that were standard fare in the Republican speeches;
representations of national values that were familiar to
his northeastern audience and would enhance his chances to
achieve consubstantiality. He was attempting to engage the
sympathy of his audience for his message by arousing their
sense of patriotism and linking their patriotic emotions
to the imagery within his speech.

For example, he

commended his Massachusetts audience for attending his
speech like "true patriots."54

He acknowledged their

desire to elect a "successor to Washington" who would
represent a "closer Union, and a truer and intenser [sic]
American feeling and life" than that promised by the
current administration,55

260
However, Choate presented a non-sectional argument in
favor of the Democratic party that was strikingly
different from the arguments of his Republican colleagues.
Since his premises were certain to be unpopular with the
anti-slavery audience in attendance, he employed a
stylistic device that was meant to form an immediate bond
of identification between himself and his listeners.

He

introduced the body of his speech with a series of
rhetorical questions that were designed to be answered in
the affirmative.
Rufus Choate wanted compromise.

He felt that sectional

and emotional arguments were falsely divisive since they
ignored the political aspects of a presidential canvass.
No longer were the Democrats arrayed against the Whigs on
the use of tariffs and the running of the government realms in which men might exercise the use of political
power wisely.

Instead, Choate envisioned continued

conflict.
Don't tell us how provoked you are, or
how provoked Rev. Mr. This or Hon. Mr.
That has come to be against the South;
[or] how passionately one southern
member spoke or another southern
member acted; [or] how wicked it was
in Washington to hold slaves . .
Choate complained that other speakers tried to "mystify or
trick us" with statistics designed to prove the
superiority of the North or the inferiority of the South.
The result of this trickery, he claimed, was not
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beneficial to the nation as a whole, since it provided no
solutions.

Choate's observations were designed to focus

the ideals of his party on a workable solution to the
disunion that was threatened by the accusations being
tossed from pulpit to pulpit in the northeast.
Does this attempt to weave and plait
the two north wings of the old
national parties into a single
Northern one, and cut the Southern
wing off altogether, strike you to be
quite as far-sighted and safe as it is
new and bold? . . . To combine States
against States in such a system as
ours - has it been generally held a
very happy device towards forming a
more perfect union and insuring
domestic tranquillity? . . . to put in
requisition every species of rhetoric
and sophistry to impress on the
general mind that the end justifies
the means; . . . does this strike you
as altogether in the spirit of
Washington and Franklin, and the
preamble to the Constitution and the
Farewell Address?
Does it strike you
that if carried out it will prove to
be a mere Summer excursion to Moscow?
Will there be no bivouack [sic] in the
snow: no avenging Winter hanging on
retreat? No Leipaic; no Waterloo? 57
Choate was adept in the use of metaphor. He was able to
employ the same stylistic devices that Cheever and Beecher
relied upon for emotional proof in their sermons.
However, Choate demonstrated the truth of his arguments
through the imagery of the Constitution and the
presidential succession, rather than through biblical
example and individual moral exhortation.

Rufus Choate
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preferred collective action in favor of the political
good, rather than.individual action for moral good.
Choate was violently opposed to a sectional party.
But, he was also a foe of slavery.

He developed a thesis

which would allow for the containment of slavery and the
success of the new party.

Choate simply proposed that the

Missouri Compromise and the Compromise of 1850 be honored.
[T]hat which gave peace to the country
in 1820 and that which consummated the
peace of the country in 1850 ought to
be made good by the government of the
United States and with the consent of
the American people.58
Choate argued that freedom and Union were obtainable with
compromise.

He continued to embellish his address with

rhetorical questions throughout, giving to the whole
speech a defensive posture.

He did not make a conscious

attempt to engage in any further identification with his
audience after initially acknowledging those attending the
speech as his neighbors in Lowell. The speech appears to
be an ideological alignment of party and national policy.

Choate attempted to expose the sectionalism as the first
step in the destruction of the Union.

He called

sectionalism an "artificial" issue and he indicted the
abolitionists as traitors to the Union.

He called for

[T]he recognition of an equal title to
love, regard, honor, equality, in each
and every state and region; that
studious and that admirable conclusion
of all things sectional .59

Choate demanded that sectionalism give way before the
heritage shared by the entire nation.

He employed

further, local iconography in his peroration by reminding
his audience of Bunker Hill and Faneuil Hall as sites of
national - not sectional - importance.

He reminded his

audience that the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution inspired the Democratic platform.

Those

documents were not the province of the North but of the
whole nation.

His final appeal was to the memory of

George Washington, who warned against sectionalism in his
Farewell Address, an address often quoted by Republican
speakers seeking to exonerate the Founding Fathers as
slave owners.

Choate neatly deflected the Republican

arguments with complimentary emotional proofs of his own.
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Summary

The emotional appeals employed by Republican speakers
were as varied as the backgrounds of the individuals who
wrote the speeches.

Whigs emphasized Union and

compromise; Democrats plotted to undermine the power of
Calhoun and his "Slave Power" followers; and the
abolitionists were determined to abolish slavery
regardless of the political situation.
Many of the emotional appeals employed by the
Republicans appear to be at odds with one another because
of the diversity of political experience brought to the
campaign by the various speakers.

In 1856, the Republican

party had not yet crystallized its ideology and was still
dependent upon the prior reputation and particular
speaking ability of each spokesman.

Also, each speaker

represented a particular personal facet of the political
scene, so that the individual quite often spoke more
loudly than did the party he represented.
Since the main thrust of the 1856 campaign was to stop
the expansion of slavery into the territories, the rampant
emotionalism of the abolitionists was de-emphasized by
those speakers who represented the powerful inner circle
of the organization.

For Nathaniel Banks, William Seward

and George Curtis, rational exposition was a more fitting
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form of persuasion than emotional arguments better suited
to the pulpit.

They strove to form the basis for a

lasting political organization that would represent more
than the abolitionist sentiment that originally brought
them together in 1854.

The solid reasoning that

characterized the speeches of the party organizers was the
vital thrust that carried the party into the campaign of
I860, not the stale, emotional diatribes against the evils
of slavery, grown tiresome with twenty years of constant
use.
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Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusions

Summary

The Republican campaign rhetoric of 1856 was shaped in
part by the free soil concerns of northern politicians.
The repeal of the Compromise of 1850 and the extension of
slavery into the Kansas territory inflamed those
Republicans who spoke during the presidential campaign of
1856.
However, the persuasive arguments employed by
Republican speakers were constrained by the same
circumstances that spawned the organization.

The

Republican party was composed of many free soil factions
rather than a single, cohesive group.

The party had no

history and could provide no sense of identity for its
members.

In addition to the lack of a group identity,

Republican free soil sentiments ranged from those of the
abolitionists to those who favored full compromise with
the Democrats.
Therefore, the free soil conflict which confronted the
new party was double-edged.
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Free soil provided the
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campaign platform, but divided the rhetors according to
individual sentiments.
The arguments employed by Republican party spokesmen
generally advocated free soil policies for political,
moral, and economic reasons.

The arguments were open to

individual interpretation, allowing each speaker to meet
the needs of his particular audience while pursuing his
own variety of free soil advocacy.
First, the political arguments in favor of free soil
were designed to attack the results of pro-slavery.
Democratic policies in the territories and in the South.
Anti-slavery arguments and anti-Democratic arguments were
interchangeable, according to the surviving speech texts.
Republican speakers linked the Democratic party and pro
slavery activities, establishing an anti-Democratic
identity for members of the new party.
In addition to the anti-Democratic unity advocated by
Republican speakers, the free soil concept united the
North against the Slave Power Conspiracy of the South.
These sectional arguments, coupled with the antiDemocratic rhetoric of the Republican campaign, gave the
members of the new party a sense of political identity.
Second, Republican speakers established an economic
identity for their audiences.

Republicans, they

explained, were free-state residents who were convinced
that slave labor, if unstopped, would increase white
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unemployment and close the western frontier to eastern
emigrants.

It was the duty of Republicans to vote the

Democrats out of office so that slavery might be contained
in the South for the economic good of the free white men
of the North.
Third, slavery was morally reprehensible to the free
men of the North, according to party spokesmen.
Republican speakers backed their moral arguments against
slavery with evidence from the long history of
abolitionism in New England.

Slavery imprisoned both the

black man and the white man, they argued.
The Republican platform of 1856 was a compromise
measure, designed to satisfy the more militant free soil
members of the party.

Yet, Republicans argued in favor of

non-expansion and free soil rather than for abolition and
universal emancipation.

Abolition implied militancy and

lawlessness, whereas the new party demanded law and order
on the territorial frontier.

Conclusions

Although the Republicans lost the presidential election
of 1856, the party was successful in 1860.

The rhetorical

strategies used by party spokesmen in 1856 provided
rhetorical strategies for successful Republican campaigns
in 1858 and 1860.
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A primary element in the Republican success was the
politically experienced men who joined the party as its
spokesmen.

They effectively created a political identity

for the new party, avoiding any similarity to the old Whig
and abolitionist organizations.

Many campaign speakers

did not identify themselves as "Republicans."

They spoke

of issues and national concerns that were part of the
Republican platform rather than making promises in the
name of the Republican party. Many of the speakers who
chose to remain formally unaffiliated with the Republican
party were known to be opposed to the Democratic
administration.

However, once the new party placed

members into the Congress and produced great popular
support at the polls in 1856, many previously unaffiliated
opinion leaders openly joined the party and touted their
"charter" membership to generate added ethos for
themselves in the campaigns of 1858 and 1860.
In order to establish some form of identification with
their audiences, Republican speakers addressed gatherings
as fellow-citizens, fellow-merchants or fellow-scholars in
1856.

By 1858, they could address their audiences as

fellow-Republicans, based on the demographic evidence of
election returns.

The radical Republicans usually

resorted to slavery issues to cement identification with
their audiences, while the moderates chose economic themes
to dispose the audience in their favor.

By 1858, both

contingents of the Republican party could point to
Congressional and state voting records of party members as
well as the destructive line of policy being followed by
the Democrats in the face of an alternative Republican
platform.
However, Republican speakers faced constraints imposed
by the situation they strove to resolve.

The political

factions which composed the new party included many former
Democrats.

To verbally abuse a party to which they had so

recently owed political loyalty was a difficult task.
According to Lloyd Bitzer's rhetorical analysis of Abraham
Lincoln's campaign speaking in 1860, Senator Stephen
Douglas and his fellow Democrats continued to be blamed
for perpetrating a pro-slavery conspiracy.

Therefore,

much of the anti-Democratic rhetoric was aimed at
President Pierce, the Pierce Administration, and the Slave
Power Democrats. The "evil" Democrats had allowed the
repeal of the Missouri and Clay Compromises into which the
non-slave states had entered in good faith.

The negation

of the compromises, in addition to destroying good faith,
allowed the perpetuation of an institution which was
morally reprehensible to the Republicans of the northeast.
The Slave Power conspiracy theory proved popular in 1856
as a unification theme in the northeast, so it was
retained as one of the fantasy themes of the later
Republican campaigns.

Speakers painted the expansion of slavery as an
immediate threat to the security of the free state
residents by portraying the violence in Kansas as the
result of slavery expansion policies favored by the
Democrats.

The causal links used by the Republicans to

blame the Democratic administration for the constitutional
violations in Kansas were expanded (or chained) to
illustrate a threat to the entire nation.
By placing the blame for the frontier atrocities on the
Democrats, the Republicans continued to strengthen their
party identity as the united opposition to the "evil"
Democrats.

This form of party identification was vital to

the new party in 1856 and their united opposition to
Democratic territorial legislation continued into the
campaigns of 1858 and 1860.

According to Bitzer's

analysis, the Dred Scott decision increased the urgency of
the debates concerning the legality of slavery as a local
or a national institution.
Republican speakers continued to support the sectional
nature of their party.

Sectionalism was a frequent and

violent theme in the Republican speeches during the 1858
campaigns. However, the sectionalism fostered by the anti
slavery platform of the party created another rhetorical
problem.

Since the majority of large business owners in

the North had economic ties to the South, a means of
providing a sense of economic security had to be
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discovered.

This problem was not solved until after the

campaign of 1856.

Instead, the rampant sectional

arguments of 1856 were designed to insult and isolate all
southerners, as well as anyone with economic or emotional
ties to the South, whether they were slaveholders or not.
The vicious verbal attacks aimed at the educational,
social and moral structures of the slave states alarmed
those conservative northern businessmen whose economic
success depended in some measure upon a stable southern
trade.

The radical anti-southern sentiments which proved

so popular with mass audiences in the North widened the
gap between the Republicans and the business community.
As a result, the Republicans never accumulated a
comfortable treasury during the 1856 campaign.*

Large

donors were not attracted to the party, mainly because of
its uncompromising sectionalism.

Instead, the Know-

Nothing party attracted many of the wealthy, north-eastern
businessmen in 1856, a party that promised to shield their
business ventures from immigrants and papists, as well as
from radical Republicans.

However, the sectional argument remained one of the
strongest stock arguments in the Republican repertoire.
The argument condemned Democrats, slavery, the South and
Stephen Douglas in a variety of ingenious forms.

These

various forms of the sectional argument became the bases
for the fantasy themes which chained through the
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Republican culture in the four years prior to the election
of 1860.

L incoln’s enhanced conspiracy theory was simply

a more sophisticated form of the sectional argument of
1856.2

Judging the effectiveness of public speaking is a
difficult task.

Thonssen, Baird, and Braden suggest in

Speech Criticism that audience response is one method of
judging effectiveness.

However, since a variety of

speeches that were given over several months time were
examined in this study, the only available form of
response would be the popular vote recorded at the end of
the campaign.

Since voting abuses, errors in tabulation,

and the lack of a uniform registration code existed in
1856, the popular tally of recorded votes cannot be an

accurate measure of audience response.
In fact, there were recorded votes for Republican
candidates.

John C. Fremont received one-third of the

official popular presidential vote in 1856.

Other

Congressional and state offices were filled by Republican
candidates in 1856 and the years which followed.

Voters

were being affected by the Republican appeals and electing
party members to public office.

According to Thonssen,

Baird, and Braden, effective oratory can be measured by
the actions taken by the audience as a result of hearing a
speech.2

But, judging the effects of many speeches over a

six month period may not be defensible.

278
However, Speech Criticism also suggests that an
effective speech should function as a means of positive
social change.

Rather than limiting judgement of public

speaking to the immediate audience response, the critic
may study the effect of rhetoric on groups of people which
associate with one another in public life.4

Specifically,

the methodology demands that effective rhetoric
anticipates the needs of a future audience as well as the
needs of an immediate audience.

If the orator

demonstrates foresight, wisdom, vision, and perspicacity,
then his arguments may be judged sound.5
Therefore, the speeches of the Republican presidential
campaign may be judged according to their political and
social value in light of later Republican campaigns.

The

political arguments of 1856 grew from the political
exigence provided by the territorial violence and the
perceived Slave Power threat from the South.

The social

arguments reflected the larger value-laden issues
identified by Republican speakers such as Nathaniel Banks
and George Curtis.
The Republican speakers in 1856 demanded an end to the
bloodshed in the territories, adequate representation for
the anti-slavery residents of Kansas, and legislation to
stop the spread of slavery into the territories.

These

demands met immediate political needs; these demands would
cease to define the party when solutions were presented.
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However, the compelling political issues of the 1860
presidential campaign were similar to those issues of
1856.

The slavery issue was still unresolved and

territorial violence continued.

The speakers who

predicted that the violence would escalate were correct in
their predictions.

Speeches supporting territorial law

and order were delivered by Republican rhetors during the
four years between presidential elections.
Eyewitnesses like Robinson and Reeder continued to
demand an end to the pro-slavery, Democratic support of
the Lecompte faction in Kansas.

Since James Buchanan, a

Democrat, was serving as President, Republicans continued
to argue that the Democrats were to blame for the bloody
territorial violence.
The short-term demands of speakers like Clay, Robinson,
Reeder, Beecher, and Cheever were validated during the
period between presidential elections.

Violence did

escalate, as they predicted; the threat of slavery
expansion strengthened with the reinstitution of the slave
trade under a Democratic administration; and the spectre
of a united Slave Power grew stronger as southern "fireeaters" urged separation from the Union.

These Republican

speakers were accurate in their predictions of political
events in their immediate future, but would their campaign
rhetoric provide the basis for a lasting ideology?

Speakers such as Chase, Banks, Curtis, and Seward
provided the Republicans with transcendent ideas which
survived the political crises of the pre-Civil War era.
Their arguments in favor of liberty, freedom, and the
constitutionality of the legislation passing through
Congress were not dependent upon the particular political
situation.

The values reflected in their appeals were

open to compromise and wide interpretation.
The Republican argument protesting the constitutional
legality for the adoption of the Kansas-Nebraska Act
provided an ideological basis for other legislative
battles, rather than being limited to a single situation.
The economic issues inherent in the Republican free labor
concept provided the ideological framework for
endorsements of future economic policies.
The Republican idealists proposed social concepts that
sustained the party through the slavery crisis.

The

effectiveness of their appeals can be measured by the
survival of the party.

Slavery has been legislated out of

existence and the Kansas territorial dispute has been
settled.

Yet, the ideals of the early Republicans

continue to exist in the economic and legislative policies
of the contemporary party.
According to Ernest Bormann, the fantasy themes which
were most important during the late 1850s linked the free
soil movement to the rhetorical visions of a free
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frontier.6

Abraham Lincoln, especially, was concerned

about the dangers of slavery and the southern policy of
expansionism.

Bormann claims that "Lincoln's vision

portrayed the issue as one of great historical importance,
of the survival of the Union . . .

In essence, Lincoln

was caught up in a restoration drama that concerned his
entire party - the restoration of the Union to the
principles of full equality and "the great experiment in
human self-government" that occupied the founding fathers.
On June 16 1858, Abraham Lincoln delivered his "House
Divided" speech in Springfield, Illinois.®

The occasion

was his acceptance of the Republican nomination for a seat
in the United States Senate.

This speech was an example

of the restoration theme in Republican rhetoric which was
popularized in the speaking of the 1858 Illinois
senatorial campaign.
Slavery was still the pivotal issue in national
politics and the Republicans seemed no closer to
legislating an end to slavery than they were in 1856.
Lincoln was concerned about the divisiveness of the
slavery issue and could not comprehend how the nation
might survive as a single unit until its resolution.

He

did not predict the destruction of the Union in his
address, but he did warn the South to prepare to abolish
slavery according to the dictates of the free soil
advocates.
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Lincoln concluded that the Union would endure
regardless of the stress placed upon it by the divisive
slavery issue because all internal conflict could be
settled constitutionally.
Even the repeal of the Missouri Compromise was placed
in historical perspective by Lincoln, proof that even such
a grievous wrong could be rectified through the normal
course of justice.9

Without public endorsement of the

repeal, the law could not be made to work.

If the

"rightful basis" of the government were allowed to work in
favor of the people it was designed to represent and
protect, then the expansion of slavery would be a moot
issue.

However, the particular problem facing the

Republicans remained the same in 1858 as it had in 1856 how were they to ensure that the legal system of the
United States government would be allowed to operate in
all states and all territories?
With regard to the "gag rule" and the fugitive slave
laws, Lincoln remarked that the "opposition" chose to
constrain the entire concept of self-government within the
following definition:

" . . .

that if any one man choose

to enslave another, no third man shall be allowed to
object."10
In summary, Bormann's analysis of Lincoln's speaking in
1858 finds that Abraham Lincoln was more concerned with
the governmental imbalance that affected the ability to

compromise among the regions than with the issue of
slavery.

Lincoln assumed that the institution of slavery

would expire without government intervention.

He was much

more concerned with the heated sectionalism and the lack
of national unity that inspired men to reinterpret the
Constitution to meet their immediate political needs.
Lincoln was not confident that the Union could survive the
sectional divisiveness that closed off avenues of
discussion and d e bate, reducing the grounds for common
identification and self-government among the s t a t e s , H
However, the sectional argument remained one of the
strongest stock emotional arguments in the Republican
repertoire.

The argument was useful for the condemnation

of Democrats, slavery, the South and Stephen Douglas in
any variety of ingenious forms.

Sectionalism and frontier

violence provided the means of political identification in
a decade when it was necessary to skirt the issue of
outright abolition.

Without these specific emotional

appeals, the strength of the identification between the
new party and the northern idealists would have faltered
early in 1856.

The Republicans were closely linked to

their own arguments against the brutality of a social
system that enslaved both black and white citizens.

They

couldn't simply drop sectionalism and anti-expansionism
for a new vision in 1858 and 1860.

"Free labor" was a Republican concept that was the
perfect counterpoint to their "free men" philosophy.
could not exist without the other.

One

However, the concepts

were so broad that any number of intellectual and
political interpretations could be applied in the course
of future campaigns.

Suggestions for Further Study

Eric Foner suggested that the campaign of 1856 has been
too long ignored by historians and political scientists.
The lack of secondary source material currently available
about this presidential contest confirms Foner's
observation.

In order to make the best use of extant

historical and political studies of the immediate preCivil War era, the rhetorical scholar will need to examine
particular arguments for their historical development,
that is, to search for the historical exigence from which
the campaign arguments arose.
In particular, rhetoricians contemplating a study of
the campaign rhetoric of the mid-nineteenth century will
need to explore private collections for biographical and
communication data of those speakers who have not been
treated to exhaustive, published biographies.

For

example, many influential Republican speakers such as
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Robinson and Reeder are not profiled in volumes easily
accessible to scholars outside of Kansas.
The formation of the Republican party is only briefly
treated in this study.

Most standard Republican histories

state that a new party was formed on one of several
disputed dates.

Although theories of organizational

structure apply to the formation of any political party,
no study has been devoted to the formation of the
Republican party in particular.

A rhetorician with

expertise in organizational communication should examine
the dynamics of party formation in greater depth than this
study provides.
The Democratic and Know-Nothing answers to the
particular Republican free soil charges need to be
studied.

In some regions of the country, Republican

speakers advocated compromise with one or the other of the
opposing parties in an effort to split the vote.

The

rhetorical significance of the arguments in favor of
campaign compromise needs further study.
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